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There has to date been no attempt at a detailed explication of James Kelman's novels
from a consistently existential standpoint: this thesis constitutes an attempt to do so.
Whilst a number of the critical responses engendered by Kelman's work mention the
presence of existential motifs, this is usually done in passing. My central claim
however is that it is impossible to comprehend Kelman's fictions without a thorough
understanding and appreciation of the extent to which existential concerns inform
both his fictional and critical work. I argue that a consequence of viewing Kelman as
an existential writer is that the critical debate surrounding his work must be relocated
and positioned outwith the dual contexts of nation and nationalism.
Chapter one delineates the constitutive elements ofKelman's existential aesthetic,
focusing on five pivotal concerns: tradition, freedom, the everyday, locality and
narrative. The next chapter considers several classic texts in the existential tradition,
Notesfrom Underground, The Trial, The Outsider and Nausea. The techniques and
themes brought out here, along with the observations generated in chapter one,
provide a prism through which to read Kelman's novels. Chapter three analyses A
Chancer, in terms of its narrative mode and how this relates to the existential theme
of contingency which permeates the text. Next, I consider the role of the existential
issues of temporality, negation and 'the nothing' in The Busconductor Hines. Chapter
five examines A Disaffection, reading the novel in terms of Camusian absurdity and
Kierkegaard's criticisms ofHegel. Chapter six is a reading ofHow Late it Was, How
Late, which treats the novel as a fictional exposition of Sartre's theory of'the look'.
The final chapter offers some conclusions and criticisms, and considers the
implications ofKelman's existential position, particularly with what might be termed
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MS Albert Camus, TheMyth ofSisyphus, 1942, trans. Justin O'Brien
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988)
BT Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 1927, trans. John Macquarrie &
Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995)
C James Kelman, A Chancer (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1985)
BH The Busconductor Hines, 1984 (London: Dent, 1985)
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Ultimately, the individual [...] has to interpret in a quite individual way
even the words he has inherited. His interpretation of a formula at least
is personal, even if he does not create a formula: as an interpreter he is
still creative Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power}
Sometimes an expression has to be withdrawn from language and sent
for cleaning, - then it can be put back into circulation. Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value 2
A fictional technique always relates back to the novelist's metaphysics.
The critic's task is to define the latter before evaluating the former.
Jean-Paul Sartre, 'On The Sound and the Fury: Time in the Work
of Faulkner' .3
'Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 1901, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter
Kaufmann and R J Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), §767, p.403.
2Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, amended edn, ed. G H von Wright, trans.
Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p.39e.
3Jean-Paul Sartre, 'On The Sound and the Fury. Time in the Work of Faulkner', trans.
Annette Michelson, Literary Essays (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957),
pp.79-87, p.79.
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"The danger is in the neatness of identifications"4. Beckett's words although intended
for Joyce, provide us with an apposite point of departure, for Kelman too is often
neatly and unsuitably identified; whether as socialist realist, nationalist, or as a prose
counterpart to MacDiarmid. This thesis does not constitute an attempt to evade
taxonomy, rather it seeks to provide a more appropriate classification. Such
reclassification is necessary, for Kelman, whether explicitly or not, is frequently
positioned within a dialectic which sees him as both maintaining and moving out from,
a Scottish or nationalist position. This forms one side of a crudely drawn agon where
a supposed entity labelled 'English culture' is made to assume the position of
antagonist5. Such a limited grasp ofKelman's writing infects the only book length
study of his work to date, Dietmar Bohnke's Kelman Writes Back6, a work which
persistently commits Kelman to a rather muddled literary nationalism. Bohnke asserts
that "the three terms 'national identity', 'nationalism' and 'internationalism' [...] form
the starting point, backbone and guideline for the investigation of James Kelman's
work" (7) What follows here is designed to show that this is mistaken, and that this
mistake arises either from an inability to work properly through what Kelman intends
when he describes himself as an 'existential' writer, or to fail to see him as existential
novelist at all. Such confusion is at least partially understandable given that
existentialism is a cluster of loosely linked philosophical and literary practices rather
than a stable set of concepts or procedures. Sartre complained fifty years ago that
"the word is now so loosely applied to so many things that it no longer means
anything at all" (EH 27-8): outwith philosophy departments little has changed.
However, even those critical pieces which do detect an existential element in
Kelman's work, either fail to refer to existential texts to substantiate their assertions
or see Kelman's articulation of existential themes as being merely a subordinate
component in some larger literary project. Consequently there is a gap in Kelman
4Samuel Beckett, 'Dante... Bruno. Vico.. Joyce', in Samuel Beckett et al, Our
Exagimination Round his Factificationfor Incamination of Work in Progress (1929,
rpt; London: Faber and Faber, 1972), pp.3-22, p. 3.
5See for instance Alastair Renfrew, 'Them and Us? Representation of Speech in
Contemporary Scottish Fiction', in ed. Alastair Renfrew, ExploitingBakhtin,
Strathclyde Modern Language Series, no. 2 (1997), 15-28, p.26.
6Dietmar Bohnke, Kelman Writes Back: Literary Politics in the Work ofa Scottish
Writer (Berlin: Glada + Wilch, 1999).
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studies. Against all of this, and to fill this gap, it is the central contention here that
Kelman is a thoroughgoing existentialist writer, for even ifwe disregard Kelman's
self-assessment, in terms of candidate interpretations existentialism pulls together and
consistently illuminates all ofKelman's fictional and non-fictional output. However, it
is important to mention here that throughout the following, 'existential' is applied to
writers, such as Heidegger and Camus, who have explicitly rejected this term but who
nonetheless by critical consensus articulate existential positions. As stated above,
existentialism is a cluster concept, thus whilst Camus say retains the idea of a human
nature, Sartre of course does not; Heidegger is critical of the term 'subjectivity' but it
is frequently used by Kierkegaard. Existentialism is therefore used here as a family
resemblance concept; scope and space dictate that 1 practice a necessary conflation.
Consequently, what follows is therefore an existentialist reading, rather than say a
purely Heideggerian or Sartrean reading.
The following chapter and the thesis as a whole emulates the Sartrean critical
procedure outlined in the epigraph Firstly, it is necessary to delimit the constitution
and starting point of Kelman's position, the "metaphysics" to which Sartre refers.
This chapter is therefore intended to represent as far as possible an understanding and
reconstruction of what Kelman takes his broadly defined existentialism to be.
Achieving this involves an assessment of the general issues arising from Kelman's
position both in terms of his critical and prose writing, and an examination of how on
occasion these have been misapprehended and confused with what might be assumed
to be 'nationalist' positions. This assessment will involve an appraisal of the
secondary literature devoted to Kelman's writing. However, this preliminary itself
calls for a supplement. Since Kelman sees himself as operating out of a particular
tradition, and since this tradition is so little discussed in the secondary literature
devoted to his work, it is both justifiable and worthwhile to reappraise and in some
instances recapitulate the key moments of existential fiction to which Kelman's own
texts sometimes explicitly relate. Accordingly, chapter two is devoted to an inspection
and reading of four 'classic' existential texts. Taken together, these two chapters
serve then as the metaphysical definition for which Sartre calls. These chapters serve
to move the parameters within which Kelman's fictions may be assessed. From here,
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the thesis moves on to an existential analysis, an existential reading, of each of
Kelman's four novels, examining how an existential metaphysic, in the Sartrean sense,
translates into both a method ofwriting and also a particular subject of writing. These
chapters assume that it is possible for fiction to express philosophical positions: this is
not an altogether unproblematic claim, but such treatment does have sufficient
precedent to justify its use here, and there can in any enquiry be no presuppositionless
point of departure.7 The argument offered here is predominantly ostensive and works
by a process of incremental deferment. I choose to concentrate on the novels
primarily for reasons of space but many of the resulting observations are equally
applicable to the short stories and the drama.
Much critical analysis of Kelman's work begins with narrative or a consideration of
language. Here this discussion is postponed, for Kelman's narrative position is
dependent upon several antecedent considerations. It is these antecedents that are
examined first.
7We might initially note that both Sartre and Heidegger use fiction to illustrate
philosophical points, see in particular Heidegger's Poetry, Language, Thought, and
Sartre's literary examples in Being and Nothingness. Martin Heidegger, Poetry,
Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper Row, 1971). As a
valid critical methodology consider for instance Roger Scruton in his 'Beckett and the
Cartesian Soul': "I wish to explore certain themes in Samuel Beckett's prose works
[. . .] and to bring these themes into relation with the philosophical ideas which explain
them. [...] I wish to show how philosophical theories concerning the nature of the self
underlie, and to some extent account for, the ingenious nature ofBeckett's prose."
Roger Scruton, 'Beckett and the Cartesian Soul', The Aesthetic Understanding:
Essays in the Philosophy ofArt and Culture (Manchester: Carcanet, 1983),
pp.222-241, p.222. As the Sartre scholar Hazel Barnes notes, existentialism "since its
beginning has tended to bridge the gap between the philosophical and the literary".
For Barnes, fiction gave Sartre an opportunity to depict his philosophy in action.
Hazel Barnes, Sartre (London: Quartet, 1974), p.68. This view is shared by Stephen
Priest: "Literature is the art form in which Sartre expresses his own philosophy."
Although pointing out a number of inconsistencies in Sartre's position, Priest
nevertheless holds that Sartre's fictions both adumbrate and address philosophical
problems. Ed. Stephen Priest, Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings (London: Routledge,
2001), p.258, p.259. For further examples of the interplay between philosophy and
literature see also John Cruickshank, The Novelist as Philosopher: Studies in French
Fiction 1935-1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).
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For his 1997 American collection, Busted Scotch, Kelman was asked by his editor to
provide an autobiographical foreword.
You asked me to write an introduction [...] It took me three weeks'
work to discover that that is the story ofmy life. I have now given up
the project and content myself with the following comments:
It was from an admixture of two literary traditions, the European
Existential and the American Realist, allied to British rock music
(influenced directly from Blues music, with an input from Country and
Western), that I reached the age of twenty-two in the knowledge that
certain rights were mine. It was up to me what I did. I had the right to
create. I didn't have to write as if I was somebody not myself (e.g. an
imagined member of the British upper classes). Nor did I have to write
about characters striving to become other persons (e.g. imagined
members of the British upper classes). I could sit down with my pen
and paper and start making stories ofmy own, from myself, the
everyday trials and tribulations; my family, my boss, the boy and girl
next door; the old guy telling yarns at the factory; whatever. It was all
there. I was privy to the lot. There was no obligation to describe,
explain or define myself in terms of class, race or community. In spite
of dehumanising authority people existed around me as entire human
beings; they carried on with their lives as though the "forces of evil"
did not exist. My family and culture were not up for evaluation.
Neither was my work, not unless I so chose. Self-respect and the
determination of self, for better or for worse. Some of this was
intuitive, but not all.s
This short statement, incorporated into a talk delivered at the Glasgow School of
Art9, contains, though in a compressed and undeveloped form, the totality of
Kelman's literary, philosophical and political positions. These positions, which
constitute the basis ofKelman's existentialism, can be ranged under five interweaving
and mutually dependent headings: tradition, freedom, the everyday, the local and
narrative.
TRADITION
Effective exegesis of Kelman's work is on occasion disabled before it begins. In each
interview and essay where Kelman reveals his influences, there is a painstaking
account ofwhat he takes to be the parameters within which and from which his work
8'Letter to My Editor', Busted Scotch: Selected Stories (New York: Norton,1997),
p.9.
Tames Kelman, 'And the Judges said ...', Variant, 2.2 (Spring 1997), 20-23, p.20.
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is to be read and placed. However, and perhaps through a poststructuralist suspicion
of authorial declaration, these statements are often disregarded Marjorie Palmer
McCulloch10, in her haste to assure that there is no "crisis" in modern Scottish fiction,
exemplifies what might be termed the post hoc, ergo propter hoc mode of Kelman
criticism For McCulloch, it is a case of'after MacDiarmid therefore because of
MacDiarmid'. In this reading, Kelman is seen as continuing the tradition of the
Scottish literary Renaissance and ipso facto, the work ofMacDiarmid in particular.
McCulloch writes that one ofMacDiarmid's most important legacies is "the
confidence he has given Scottish writers to write out of their own experience and
tongue, whatever that might be." (18) To McCulloch, Kelman's linguistic confidence,
particularly as displayed in A Disaffection, proceeds from this source. This too seems
to be Bohnke's position, although he does move between asserting that Alasdair Gray
is the "father figure" of the new literary Renaissance to which Kelman belongs, and
the assertion that Kelman's attitude to literary language is, no matter if Kelman denies
it, authored by MacDiarmid (50-1). Whilst declining to couple Kelman and
MacDiarmid, Rosemary Goring in her review of The Good Timesu positions Kelman
in a tradition reaching back through Tom Leonard, to Lewis Grassic Gibbon and
James Hogg, though she does also note the presence of Celine, Nelson Algren and
somewhat perplexingly, William Burroughs. Mcllvanney too is noted as a literary
companion. Now this attempt to join Mcllvanney and Kelman, seeing in both a fiction
devoted to an essentially realist articulation of'Scottish' life has its problems. There is
no need here to reheat their principal points of divergence, Cairns Craig12 summarises
their most pertinent disparities, but one of their few similarities helps explain why and
in what ways all of the above readings are deficient, for the literary projects of
Kelman and Mcllvanney meet briefly around the question of tradition, or more
precisely absence of tradition.
'"Margery Palmer McCulloch, 'What Crisis in Scottish Fiction?: Creative Courage and
Cultural Continuity in Novels by Friel, Jenkins and Kelman', Cencrastus, no 84
(Summer 1984), 15-18.
"Rosemary Goring, 'Man Alive', Scotland on Sunday, Review Section, 12 July 1998,
p.21.
12Cairns Craig, 'Resisting Arrest: James Kelman' in eds. Gavin Wallace and Randall
Stevenson, The Scottish Novel Since the Seventies: New Visions, OldDreams
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993), pp.99-114, p.101.
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The introduction of both to the literary world, the formative years searching for
antecedents and informative models is dominated by a persistent sense of lack. This
lack appears not just in Scottish fiction, but extends throughout English-language
fiction where there is a perceived absence of novels and stories which effectively
articulate a specific cluster ofwhat turn out to be existential issues. Through this want
of domestic literary parentage, what Keith Dixon terms 'the orphan complex"3, both
Mcllvanney and Kelman draw heavily on 'European' literature, finding here
techniques and concepts which when imported, or translated into and applied to their
own cultural specificity, give a procedural and conceptual basis unavailable through a
reading of British fiction.
I remember the joy of discovering Albert Camus' essay Summer in
Algiers and realising that he was talking about my own people, with
great insight and compassion. Such generously shared perceptions
from other places and times were like finding out that what you
thought was a dialect was, in fact, a language and one spoken in many
parts of the world. It gave me the confidence to believe that, while I
was writing out ofmy own experience, I was also writing towards the
experience of countless others. The accent might be Scottish. But the
message, whether they wanted it or not, was for everybody.14
"Writing out ofmy own experience", it is this phrase which catches and repeats an
identical element in Kelman: "making stories ofmy own, from myself'. What leads
both to an appreciation and practice of existential fiction is this unification of fiction
and individual experience. Existential writing, whether philosophical or fictional,
validates this approach because the primary impulse of both literary and philosophical
existentialism is to reveal the ordinary experience of everyday being-in-the world. For
Mcllvanney a sense of solidarity and an accommodating tradition is triggered by a
reading ofCamus and Kelman too reaches the existential through non-native writing.
As a young writer there were no literary models 1 could look to from
my own culture. I'm not saying these models didn't exist. But if they
did then I couldn't find them. It was only later on, after I had started
l3Keith Dixon, 'Talking to the People: A Reflection on Recent Glasgow Fiction',
Studies in Scottish Literature, vol 28 (1993), 92-104, p.97.
'"William Mcllvanney, 'A Shield Against the Gorgon', Surviving the Shipwreck
(Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1991), pp. 217-37, pp.230-1
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writing, that I had the good luck to meet up with folk like Alasdair
Gray, Tom Leonard, Liz Lochhead and others through getting
involved with a writers' group led by poet and critic Philip Hobsbaum
[...] but I was already writing and my first collection of stories was
essentially completed prior to that. [...] So because of this dearth of
home-grown literary models I had to look elsewhere. As I say, there
was nothing at all in English literature, but in English language
literature - well, I came upon a few American writers. I found folk
whom I regarded as ordinary; here they were existing in stories, not as
cliches, not as stereotypes. 1 was also discovering foreign language
literature through translation; the Russians, the Germans, the French
and others. I found literary models. I found ways into writing stories
that I wanted to write; I could realize the freedom I had. I mean just
the freedom other writers seemed to take for granted, the freedom to
write from their own experience. ('The Importance ofGlasgow in my
Work', SRA 82-3)
Read alongside this quotation, Bohnke's pronouncement of Gray's paternity and
responsibility for Kelman's prose suffers from, at best, anachronism, whilst
MacDiarmid is simply nowhere to be seen. Another issue arises however in that this
search for a legitimising tradition might seem to emerge from and motion to the
familiar cluster of problems identified in the 1930s by Edwin Muir15. It needs however
to be sharply distinguished. This is necessary because Muir's problems are activated
only if one takes literature to move in and through national traditions. Muir
constructs an 'English' tradition which serves as a paradigm against which a
'Scottish' tradition is found wanting. But Kelman and Mcllvanney seek a tradition
centred around a subject or a technique, not a tradition centred around a country or a
nation. It is not possible to limit existential writing to a single geography, nor a single
language, given that as a series of practices it springs from a variety of sources
whether Danish, French, German, Italian, Russian, Spanish. Moreover, what Muir
identifies as the shortcomings of native fiction, those qualities which prevent it
achieving the alleged solidity of the German, French or English traditions - its lack of
a national basis, its 'parochiality', its heterogeneity or movement toward the demotic -
Kelman celebrates and takes as being primordial literary and cultural concerns.16 For
15Edwin Muir, Scott and Scotland: The Predicament of the Scottish Writer (London:
Routledge, 1936).
16Muir writes that the prerequisite of an "autonomous literature" is a "homogenous
language". (19). Dialect, or 'Scots' is "not capable of the more exalted forms of
reflection, expressing as it does everyday and local needs." (60) Muir contends that
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Kelman, as against Muir and as against MacDiarmid, the search for and construction
of a tradition has nothing to do with nation or nationality; nothing to do with the
formation and maintenance of a homogenous national culture. It is instead a quest to
find a mode ofwriting which not only foretells and contends with the structures and
problematics of everyday life - as it is or as it might be experienced - but sees in this
everyday life a legitimate source of material for literary creation. Within the work of
both Kelman and Mcllvanney, the perceived absence of an informing tradition does
not indicate then an engulfed or extinguished Scottish literature and it is precisely this
lack of a national basis that positions Kelman apart from what Douglas Gifford
describes as the "lonely condition'"7 of the Scottish writer. For Kelman, it is not
tradition qua Scottish tradition that is deemed a lamented absentee. Within British
fiction, Kelman identifies the lack of a thematic tradition, a tradition which interests
itself with and responds to, a complex of existential issues in an existential way. To
Kelman, mainstream English language writing, with a few exceptions, either debases
or neglects, stereotypes or marginalises, that which constitutes the existential: the
everyday, the lived, the daily problems or the problematic daily of the lives of a
majority of society.
Kelman writes that in moving outwith British fiction he "found folk whom 1 regarded
as ordinary; here they were existing in stories" which generates a fictional impulse in
which a text should show "the reality here, within this culture. Facticity or something
like that.'"8 From these quotations, it follows that Kelman intends existential in both
its philosophical and pre-philosophical senses: effectively the two senses are merged.
Thus 'existential' functions as both a basic synonym for "existing", and therefore a
literature which can represent the world as experienced by say an unemployed
"when we insist on using dialect for restricted literary purposes we are being true not
to the idea of Scotland but to provincialism, which is one of the things that have
helped to destroy Scotland" (178) and that "nobody who has not absorbed the English
literary tradition can even express the contemporary life of Scotland." (181)
l7Douglas Gifford, The Dear Green Place?: The Novel in the West ofScotland
(Glasgow: Third Eye Centre, 1985). Though Gifford sees this as a uniquely Scottish
phenomenon, his claims are, mutatis mutandis, applicable to French or Russian
writing of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
18Kirsty McNeill, 'Interview with James Kelman', Chapman, no. 57 (Summer 1989),
1-9, p.5.
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frequenter of snooker halls and dog tracks; a writing which can render a world of
gambling and unemployed boredom and yet also one which, without relegating or
leaving this world, can contend with those pivotal philosophical existentials: facticity,
contingency, freedom, and temporality. The critical component, that which must be
grasped, is that this fiction is wholly immanent. Both Kelman, and Mcllvanney, write
from within these communities and cultures, the fictive standpoint is within the
existential situation, the "facticity", not from without. For Kelman, a consistent
disclosure of these concerns is glimpsed firstly in American writing and then in a
general 'European' writing. In moving abroad for precedents, Kelman's position
gestures towards and recalls that ofCamus and that of Sartre, both of whom draw
upon American literary models, and in a reciprocal movement Sartre is himself
adopted as a model for later American writers, particularly Richard Wright and James
Baldwin. Kelman too, in his earliest interview19 nominates several American writers as
providing a needed artistic solidarity and opening up a possibility ofwriting:
Katherine Anne Porter, Flannery O'Connor, Mary Gray Hughes, Tillie Olsen,
Sherwood Anderson, Isaac Babel and Isaac Bashevis Singer. With the exception of
Isaac Babel, these writers correspond to the 'American realists' whom Kelman
mentions in the preface from Busted Scotch quoted above. Here, and against the
notion that Kelman's texts proceed from and are centred upon a 'masculine'
conception of literature, it is fiction by women to which Kelman initially responds:
"the writers at the root of the American realistic tradition have mainly been women".20
For Kelman, "women have had [...] one of the most influential roles in literature,
simply because women have had to fight against the existing value, and that value is a
paternalist male value."( ibid.) Concomitantly, in his interview with Anne Stevenson,
Kelman views his position as being analogous to "black" writers. All write as
'outsiders', for both women and 'black' writers have been excluded from the canon,
and as a consequence both have adopted certain strategies, or of equal importance,
held certain techniques and concerns off limits, in order to construct alternative
canons. When combined with Kelman's fondness for American music, something
19Anne Stevenson, 'Offthe Buses', Scotsman, Weekend Section, July 14 1973, p.2.
20Kelman in "K is for Culture': Interview with Scottish Writer James Kelman',
Scottish Trade Union Review, no. 68 (January/February 1995), 24-29, p.26.
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shared by Sammy Samuels in How Late, it becomes clear that Kelman's construction
of an existential tradition, takes up and absorbs diffuse facets. As a formative practice,
it therefore both calls back to and pursues a Nietzschean interpretation, or a form of
Heideggerian Destruktion, wherein artistic predecessors are reread, interrogated, for
what they divulge of the existential or factical.21 As Sartre takes from Husserl or Dos
Passos those elements which he finds favourable to the fictional representation of
existential themes, so Kelman simply appropriates those facets with which he is in
agreement, which correspond to his own formulation of the existential. Blues and
country and western music provided artists who "sang of their own existence, in their
own voice, from their own emotion." ('And the judges said ...', 20) whilst from
American literary precedents, Kelman found stories "about pioneering communities,
gamblers and rounders; boys who liked horses and wanted to be jockeys or
newspapermen; tramps, cowboys, gangsters; small towns and big cities. All were
rooted in a life that was recognisable, more or less, the lived-in, the everyday." (ibid.)
This pool of influence is supplemented by European fiction.
Equally significant for myselfwas a strain in European literature that
asserted the primacy of the world as perceived and experienced by
individual human beings. These individual human beings were mainly
government clerks or mixed-up members of some kind of minor
land-owning class. It was a society far removed from my own, both in
place and time. But for some reason I could read the work of these
19th century writers, mainly Russian, with a definite empathy. Gogol
and Dostoevski made me chuckle in ways that seem a contradiction in
terms in respect of mainstream English literature. Irony requires some
sort of a mutual recognition of selfhood, and I was not excluded from
it. English literature did not allow this, people like myselfwere a
sub-species and generally excluded by definition, (ibid.)
21I refer here to the passage from The Will to Power which I use as an epigraph. As
John Caputo points out, Eleidegger's notion ofDestruktion "does not destroy but
breaks through to the originary factical experiences from which the text arises". John
D Caputo, 'Heidegger' in eds. Simon Critchley and William R Schroeder, A
Companion to Continental Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp.223-223,
p.224. Michael Inwood suggests that Destruktion is best understood as an
"interpreting" or "disentangling" using the works of the past "as a basis for new
thoughts of our own". Michael Inwood, Heidegger (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997), p.51.
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Here Kelman's reading of Russian fiction generates the same response as
Mcllvanney's reading of Camus. Although separated by a language, and in the case of
classic Russian fiction, separated by time, what emerges is a fictive solidarity, a sense
that in these works the societal structures and equally the protagonists who have to
negotiate them, have a continuing and pertinent resonance. A fiction located in
nineteenth-century St Petersburg can still correspond and connect with a fiction set in
twentieth-century Glasgow. Philip Hobsbaum, recalling the writing group of which
Kelman and Tom Leonard were a part, describes the latter's Six Glasgow Poems as "a
living example of the fact that to speak from the heart of one community is to say
something cogent about them all."22 Kelman works upon and reads from an equivalent
basis. Key here is the underlying existential structure. What must be grasped then are
not what these texts say about Russian life or pied noir life or Glasgow life but what
they say of life itself; what they reveal about a life lived through and out from a
factical background, a culture. Through an analysis of a particular, they bring forth a
universal. Thus it is culture qua culture that is of value. Not Glasgow culture, not
Scottish culture, not English culture (and as we shall see, Kelman has a particularly
existential problem with these last two terms) but simply culture.
To the everyday identified in American realism, Kelman adds the primacy of the
individual, but importantly an individual of a certain social status (Gogolian clerks,
Chekhov's minor landowners). We have a fiction of the everyday, an artistic stance
premised upon the importance of an individual in an individual set of circumstances.
This individual is neither a social aspirant nor a member of the upper-class, simply an
individual.
There is a literary tradition to which I hope my own work belongs, 1
see it as part of a much wider process, or movement, towards
decolonisation and self determination: it is a tradition which assumes
two things, 1) the validity of indigenous culture, and 2) the right to
defend it in the face of attack. It is a tradition premised on a rejection
of the cultural values of imperial or colonial authority, offering a
defence against cultural assimilation [...] it's an argument based solely
on behalf of validity, that my culture and my language have the right to
22Philip Hobsbaum, 'The Glasgow Group: An Experience ofWriting' Edinburgh
Review, no. 80-81 (1988), 59-63, p.60.
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exist, and no one has the authority to dismiss that right. [...] The
second literary tradition to which my work belongs is the existential
tradition.23
Since as we have seen, Kelman's writing does not proceed from 'Scottish' sources,
this quotation, from Kelman's truncated Booker prize speech, needs to be reassessed
Misreading of this passage leads too easily to what I have elsewhere described as the
fallacy of'affirming the consequent'24. Dietmar Bohnke reads this as a declaration of
nationalist intent, and perhaps to make this reading more acceptable, when using the
quotation as an epigraph, he omits the passage which mentions the existential
tradition. The latter existential tradition is though not something which can be treated
as separate, or dispensable, for it not only colours the first tradition, it already
contains it. Within any existential conception of identity, determination begins with
the self, and this self is individual not national: determination is relative to the "my",
to what Heidegger would identify as Dasein's 'mineness'. Kelman's Booker speech
needs to be read alongside his later statement in Variant
At the Booker prize ceremony a couple of years ago I upset some
people by what I was arguing, which was not a plea for separatism,
nor for nationalism, nor for the world to recognise the supremacy of
Scottish culture [...] all of which was reported by various media. [...] It
is simply to say that the existence ofmy culture is a fact and why
should that be denied? It's an argument not for the supremacy ofmy
culture, just for its validity, and by extension, the validity of any
culture. There is no such thing as an invalid culture, just as there is no
such thing as an 'inferior' or 'superior' culture. What else is a culture
but a set of ideas, beliefs, and traditions held by any community of
people: a set of infinite extension, shifting and changing. Cultures will
function in the same way as languages, not to mention the people who
use them: unless dead they live. ('And the judges said ...',23.)
This differs from a nationalist position in that it revolves around the singular 'my'.
Culture as described here retains the fluidity and malleability characteristic of
individual existential identity. It is neither fixed nor static, it is not something which
needs to be sought in the past because it is living, acting: it is here and now. In linking
itself to the enunciation of a culture, Kelman's writing nonetheless eschews the
23Sunday Times, Scottish Section, 16 October 1994, p.21.
24Laurence Nicoll, "This is not a nationalist position: James Kelman's existential
voice', Edinburgh Review 103 (2000), 79-84, p.80.
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vectors of conventional literary realism. His mode of writing seeks to distinguish itself
from what might be loosely termed 'socialist realism' or 'naturalism'. The existential
tradition Kelman tells us
is also a point of departure for some materialist strains of left-wing
thought which, ultimately, are as authoritarian as the right-wing. These
ideologies also debase and dehumanise individual existence, forcing
people into the 'scheme of things', not allowing them the freedom to
live as whole beings. Unlike fantasy and romance 'committed' artists
here reveal their commitment in their work - their particular form of
socialism or whatever - as a function of its representation or
approximation to 'the real world', i.e. naturalism or 'social realism'
so-called. Stories, paintings, music, drama and so on are duty-bound to
concern 'the harsh reality', i.e. the effects of, and the struggle, against
the capitalist system. The central characters rarely have time to tell a
joke, fall in love, get drunk or visit the lavatory, although sometimes
they are allowed to visit museums, libraries or art galleries, or do
evening classes with a view to 'bettering' themselves. ('And the judges
said ...', 20)
Kelman does not deploy a prose which adumbrates a prefabricated Marxian
conception of class struggle. Such 'realism', Kelman's "so-called" is telling, shears
away freedom precisely because it compresses and consigns character and/or plot to a
predetermined ideological position - Marxism after all is a mode of thought acutely
reliant upon social determinism: economic base determines societal superstructure.
Upon such a realist position, artistic validity is gauged solely against an already
ordained ideologically led structure of class struggle. If the literary work does not
correspond to this structure, then it is effectively unreal However, happy workers
engaged in ploughing a field or slum-dwelling families tormented by unscrupulous
landlords is not what Kelman takes realism to be. "Realism is the term used to
describe the 'detailing of day-to-day existence'".25 One cannot depict the diurnal if
one has an eye on the Historical. Day-to-day existence includes getting drunk, falling
in love, having a joke, but also alienation, estrangement, boredom, the experience of
contingency. Gavin Wallace,26 although noting that Kelman "refines and redeems" the
25James Kelman, 'Alex La Guma (1925-1985)', in ed. Murdo Macdonald, Nothing is
Altogether Trivial: An Anthology ofWritingfrom Edinburgh Review (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1995), pp.157-162, p 160.
26Gavin Wallace, 'Introdution', The Scottish Novel Since the Seventies, pp. 1-7, p.3.
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conventions of realism, nonetheless suggests that Kelman's fictions are indebted to
the parameters ofworking-class realism established in the 1950s. Wallace does not
identify the writers he intends, but if they include Braine or Sillitoe then his assertion
becomes problematic.
John Braine you can't take seriously. Alan Sillitoe is probably a trier.
John Braine probably can't remember when he sold out, he sold out so
long ago, you know he's like Kingsley Amis or something, his work's
just junk, basically. So few writers ever seem to work things out about
narrative, the existential in literature and art, I doubt if they know what
it really is, and its importance politically. You can't get to it through
English or Scottish literature alone, you have to move through
different cultures, other traditions maybe - you've got to really
appreciate the significance of Gogol's 'Overcoat' for a start.27
Part ofKelman's difficulties with traditional realism is present in both this quotation
and that taken from 'And the judges said ...' above. It is brought forth through the
mythic 'lad o' pairts', the uncouth individual 'rescued' from his degenerate culture by
education or by what Kelman terms "the heroic pleb [. . .] in the work of social
realism." ('Artists and Value', SRA 13) For Kelman, allegedly realist novels which
propound this type of cultural escapism are complicit in an act of cultural belittlement
and they are thus 'anti-existential'28. They are anti-existential because what Kelman
identifies as a prompt to these fictions is the suggestion that some cultures, in
particular what might be termed 'working-class' culture, can neither sustain nor
accommodate intellectual activity, nor can these cultures or the individuals who form
and move among them, provide in themselves sufficient material upon which to base
fiction. To depict education, or assimilation within the middle-classes as a means of
salvation merely insists that self-improvement only becomes possible outwith one's
environment, outwith one's culture. Kelman's criticism of this supposed 'betterment'
is articulated through Robert Hines:
And education was, after all, the Scottish Way. Surely this erstwhile
nation had once been the forerunner of the concept ofEqual
Opportunity at a Spiritual Level. [...] Why, throughout the length and
27Kirsty McNeill, 'Interview with James Kelman', p.5.
2xThe term is Kelman's. See 'Let the Wind Blow High Let the Wind Blow Low',
Some Recent Attacks, p. 87.
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breadth of this grey but gold country toty wee mites were being
befriended by the Sons of the Laird and going on to become
steely-eyed village dominies or gruff but kindly members of the
medical profession, and even preachers of the gospel in far-flung
imperial establishments. (BH 95)
As David McCrone points out, the lad o' pairts was "an individual who escaped his
working- class or peasant origins."29 Kelman however wants to keep his characters
culturally situated, this is a central issue in his conception of realism, but this realism is
not however simply mimetic, for Kelman's relation to realism is ambiguous; it hovers
between conceptions, refusing to settle, and so renders definition problematic. Whilst
a number of short stories, 'Acid', 'The chief thing about this game', depict the
precarious life of the industrial labourer, others, 'O jesus, here come the dwarfs',
'Incident on a Windswept beach' have a parabolic quality: they do not cash out in a
strictly reflective text/world correspondence. This parabolic strain indicates the
presence of a particular brand of realism, one that we might identify as Kafkaesque,
which for Kelman signifies a narrative "where the world is absolutely mysterious"30.
This is what Sartre terms "fantastic realism"31. However, to appreciate this modified
realism, in addition to Kafka, we need also to consider the significance of the writer to
whom Kelman specifically refers us: Gogol. Surprisingly, given Kelman's avowal that
in order to understand his own writing you have to understand the significance of
Gogol, no critic has yet made an attempt to do so. Yet Gogol seeps into and can be
detected through Kafka's writing, and in constructing his own fictions Kelman makes
extended use ofboth. Specifically, it is Gogol's 'Petersburg Tales'- 'Diary of a
Madman', 'The Nose' and 'The Overcoat'- that deploy fictional devices and
consistently focus upon themes which are pivotal in Kelman's writing. As Richard
Peace notes, Gogol practices a prose which imports locutions not normally
encountered in literary Russian, a clear resonance with Kelman's own attacks upon
the literary 'establishment'. Relevant too is the way Gogol disrupts the constitution of
29David McCrone, Understanding Scotland: The Sociology ofa Stateless Nation
(London: Routledge, 1992), p.98.
30Ian Jack, 'Uncensored voice of a native son', Independent on Sunday, Review
Section, 28 April 1991, pp.26-7, p.26.
31Jean-Paul Sartre, '"Aminadab", Or the Fantastic Considered as a language', trans.
Annette Michelson, Literary Essays (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957),
pp.56-72.
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Russian fiction by redirecting its focus, for he writes not of types, nor of the princes
or heroes of the Russian oral tradition but of the ordinary individual. Gogol's writing
is no longer that of a rural community steeped in tradition and folklore.
It springs rather from the distorted vision of isolated individuals, driven
in upon themselves by a city environment in which they feel themselves
insecure.'2
This experience of the unreal and fantastic metropolis portends Robert Hines "grey
but gold" city and Patrick Doyle's description of Glasgow as the "antichthon". As
Peace points out, Gogol's Petersburg is a city cleansed of both history and nostalgia,
for Gogol's narrative never wavers from a resolute presentness. Gogol portends the
sudden transformation and inexplicable metamorphosis which we encounter in Kafka,
motifs which recur in Kelman when Sammy Samuels wakes up blind, and Patrick
Doyle transforms electricians' pipes into musical instruments. This motif of
inexplicable change, taken with the absence of the historical, connects with the
existential notion of a world which lacks a prior cause. The individual emerges for no
reason in an alien world which he must negotiate. Perhaps the most perspicuous and
clearly apprehensible Gogolian trace in both Kelman and Kafka is the downtrodden
clerk pressed into a world ofmonotony and stranded in a seemingly purposeless job.
'The Overcoat', depicts a structured, hierarchical society, within which a humble
copyist, Akaky Akakievich Bascmachkin, struggles.
Exactly when he entered the department, and who was responsible for
the appointment, no one can say for sure. No matter how many
directors and principals came and went, he was always to be seen in
precisely the same place, sitting in exactly the same position, doing
exactly the same work - just routine copying, pure and simple.
Subsequently everyone came to believe that he had come into this
world already equipped for his job, complete with uniform and bald
patch.33
"Richard Peace, The Enigma ofGogol: An Examination of the Writings ofN V
Gogol and their Place in the Russian Literary Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981), p.94.
"Nikolai Gogol, 'The Overcoat', Diary ofaMadman and other Stories, trans.
Ronald Wilks (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), pp.71-108, p.73.
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Akaky, the narrator informs us, has an uncertain ancestry, no one knows the origins
of his name and in the excerpt quoted above, this causal indeterminacy is bolstered by
the absence of any recollection as to his appointment. The societal structures,
directors and principals, are mentioned, but it his designated task as a copyist which is
of significance. Within rigid structures, Akaky's freedom is curtailed to such an extent
that he seems fated to a uniform and uniformed task, endlessly replicating the words
of others. A further passage following the theft of his coat portends the labyrinthine
nature of the state apparatus:
Don't you know how things are conducted here? It's high time you
knew that first of all your application must be handed in at the main
office, then taken to the chief clerk, then to the departmental director,
then to my secretary, who then submits it to me for consideration"
('Overcoat', 99)
An environment at once familiar from the texts ofKafka, the Gogolian world is
existentially appropriable for the way in which it casts the solitary individual against
an overarching regulatory system. Akaky, is the distant ancestor of Joseph K. and yet
also ofRobert Hines, Patrick Doyle and Sammy Samuels, all ofwhom in their varying
ways seek to disengage from a systematic society or a state supervised society.
One of the most perceptive articles on Gogol and his relationship to Kafka is by
Carlos Fuentes34, indeed, Fuentes goes so far as to describe Gogol as Kafka's "elder
brother" ('Gogol' 90). Fuentes argues that the central theme of Gogol's prose is
identity, or more specifically a problematised identity. "Identity is problematic because
it is always becoming, on the road, in exchange, in doubt, in inspiration." (ibid 123).
Identity is a felt absence, something mutable and impermanent. It is dimly made out
through those structures that constitute the unreality of the world. For Fuentes,
Gogol's fictions endeavour to
discover the hidden reality, the reality one can reconstitute behind the
appearance of dispersion. There is a true reality behind the screen of
social position, bureaucratic function, the false identity that others give
us, and above all, behind a falsifying use of language. ('Gogol', 102)
34Carlos Fuentes, 'Gogol', Myselfwith Others: Selected Essays (London: Picador,
1988), pp.89-124.
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The use of narrative elements to evade the falsification of language is explored below,
but here we should note that Gogol introduces the vulgar and the hitherto
insignificant into literature. Gogol's work focuses upon the seemingly insignificant
and the marginalised. Both through the construction of a fantastic world, where noses
are found in pastries and ghosts walk abroad in search of stolen coats, Gogol depicts
a place where identity has to be fought for, asserted (usually in vain) against the
pressing, omnipresent weight of external determinants. It is this mode of ambiguous
realism that Kelman adopts. Consider the early short story 'The Hon' from Short
Talesfrom the Nightshift. Now ifwe wish to persist in treating Kelman as a mimetic
realist, then it would be a curious reading indeed which could achieve such a simple
correspondence from a piece in which an old man feels a hand reach out to grab him
whilst he is sitting on the toilet. For Kelman, verisimilitude is not the desideratum; it is
a problematised and precarious freedom revealed through art that qualifies his texts as
being 'real'. In this Kelman reproduces a pivotal component in the fictions of Kafka.
A piece such as 'The Burrow' plays itself out in this Gogolian arena, for it dramatises,
as many ofKelman's own pieces do, the fundamental insecurity of life, but it does so
through a 'fantastic' situation. It is, the reader assumes, related by an animal which
exists in constant fear of the breach of its burrow. This cannot be cashed out in terms
of a simple naturalism. Fantastic realism, whether from Gogol, Kafka or Kelman is a
tradition which prompts the reader into undertaking a questioning of the 'real'
outwith the text; it encourages the reader to ponder the make up of the 'real' by
deliberately skewing, highlighting or disturbing the textual 'real'. Reality emerges
through the reader's grasp of the existential problem which the text produces. It is the
problem that is real, even if events in the story intended to elicit it are not.
Fuentes sees the Gogolian tradition at work in Kafka, and he detects his influence too
in the work of Milan Kundera. The latter supplies some of the most rewarding and
useful criticism of Kafka35, for the issues which Kundera sees as central to the
construction of the Kafkaesque, what he terms the 'Kafkan', simultaneously reveal the
parameters within which Kelman works. Kundera centres this around freedom.
35Milan Kundera, The Art of the Novel, trans. Linda Asher (London: Faber and Faber,
1988).
FREEDOM
Freedom is the most primordial of existential concerns, whether freedom of action,
freedom of value or freedom to determine the self.
whether he is an essayist, a pamphleteer, a satirist, or a novelist,
whether he speaks only of individual passions or whether he attacks
the social order, the writer, a free man addressing free men, has only
one subject - freedom. (WIL 46)
The keynote and pedal point of Sartrean existentialism, freedom both underwrites and
composes the endpoint of Sartre's philosophy and it fulfils a similarly architectonic
purpose in both the fictional and critical writing ofKelman: "Human freedom is so
inalienable a right that it can scarcely be described as a 'right' at all, it is the very
essence ofwhat it is to be a person."36 Both Sartre and Kelman grasp freedom in a
Kantian sense37. Freedom is certain, it is not argued for, nor is it negotiable, and as
can be seen in the quotation immediately above, Kelman constructs freedom along
explicitly Sartrean lines: human beings are freedom, this is their paradoxical 'essence'.
However as a basic philosophical premise it also drives an artistic conception and
Kelman renders himself an existentialist through translating Sartre's basic ontological
'picture' into an aesthetic one.
The for-itself is defined ontologically as a lack of being, and possibility
belongs to the for-itself as that which it lacks. [...] The for-itself
chooses because it is lack; freedom is really synonymous with lack.
(jBN 565)
Sartre depicts human being as first and foremost a lack, a nothing, which then
produces, detects, 'secretes', a subsequent nothing or lack in the world, these
absences are what Sartre, following Heidegger, terms "possibilities"38. Consciousness
36James Kelman, 'A Reading from Noam Chomsky and the Scottish Tradition in the
Philosophy ofCommon Sense', Edinburgh Review, no. 84 (1990), 46-76, p. 5 1.
37As Roger Scruton points out, frequently for Kant, "the certainty ofmy freedom is as
great as the certainty of anything." Scruton continues: "This argument occurs, in more
rhetorical form, in the writings of Sartre, whose existentialist doctrine of the moral life
owes much to Kant." Roger Scruton, Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982),
p.59.
38Heidegger describes the essence of Dasein as its existence, the essence of Dasein
"lies in its "to be"", "In each case Dasein is its possibility". (BT 67, 68) Sartre writes:
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directs itself towards an absence in a process of double nihilation (suggesting too a
possible motivation for the doubled 'not' in the story 'Not not while the giro'). This
then is the movement and constitution of ontological freedom, but it simultaneously
circumscribes the issues attaching to the question of tradition discussed above, for
Kelman's construction and pursuit of a literary tradition replicates precisely this
philosophical movement. We saw that Kelman's initial literary experience is coloured
by a sense of lack and that changing this, writing to fill this absence, was posited as a
possibility, a future nothingness. In Sartre and Kelman, ontological freedom therefore
impinges upon and is made manifest through artistry, through the compositional act
itself. As the existential self is made from nothing, Sartre insists that Art too comes
"out of nothingness" (WIL 113): "I cause a nothingness of being to arise which
constitutes the writing of [a] book as a possibility". (BN 41)
Art and freedom are therefore inexorably linked. Camus writes that freedom as a
theme is "inseparable from freedom of expression."39 Freedom of expression entails
both a positive and a negative liberty. Artistic freedom as Kelman conceives it, is
negative in that it is a freedomfrom imposed values, whether of form, subject or
technique. Literature, again like the existential subject, is created without any
standards being given in advance, this is what Sartre means when he describes
literature as "unconditional". (WIL 113) At this stage positive liberty, the freedom to,
enters. Any literary artist begins with a nothingness, a possibility, a tabula rasa, and
how this blank page is to be filled is entirely a matter of choice or selection on behalf
of the author.
I don't start up stories with ideas, I just actually begin a story from
nothing, like the way a sculptor operates, I just begin from writing
some words down and gradually I make a story out of it. The old
Scottish term 'makar' really, that's the way I see it. You make a story.
You begin from the words, like a craftsman in that sense, and you just
make a story. I don't begin with any idea of what the story will be, I
just begin and go on from there. ('K is for Culture', 26)
"I constitute myself as the comprehension of a possible as my possible" (BN 41).
"Albert Camus, Garnets J935-1942, trans. Philip Thody, 1962 (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1963), p.71.
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Again the comparison between ontology and aesthetics holds here. The text like the
pour-soi, comes to be through a series of choices, and these choices are always made
into the future: "just begin and go on from there." Literature is both the exercise and
product of a free act, but for Sartre, although the artist is free, to be authentic or
properly committed, his subject too must be freedom and his work must be addressed
to the freedom of the reader.
Since the creation can find its fulfilment only in reading, [. . .] to write is
to make an appeal to the reader that he lead into objective existence
the revelation which I have undertaken by means of language. [. . .]
Thus, the writer appeals to the reader's freedom to collaborate in the
production of his work. (WIL 32)
Sartre sets into play then a dialogue of freedoms. Reading becomes an "induction,
interpolation [and] extrapolation" (WIL 38) wherein the freedom of the literary act
effects a corresponding movement in the reader. Writing discloses to the reader his or
her own freedom and it is the freedom of the reader that activates the latent freedom
of the text. All literary work, Sartre presumably means all committed literary work,
revolves around this appeal40 and the appeal itself is designed to unsettle reactionary
values. The writer "gives society a guilty conscience; he is thereby in a state of
perpetual antagonism towards the conservative forces which maintains the balance he
tends to upset." (WIL 60). Kelman's polemical aesthetic operates from within this
established Sartrean position, in developing a consistently hostile stance towards the
canonical representatives of English (language) literature, he ensures that the
questions ofwho founds the canon, who deems this text or that worthy of inclusion,
who or what is excluded from this canon and upon what grounds, are exercised by the
reader's attentive engagement, the reader's freedom. He also ensures that issues
relating to artistic freedom are kept in play.
40Worth mentioning here is that Sartre famously and tendentiously insists that only
prose or drama can be 'committed' in this way. Poetry cannot 'reveal' because in
poetry language is opaque, words become objects, referring only to themselves. For
Sartre only the supposed transparency of the sign as found in non-poetic forms can
produce the necessary compositional apparatus of literary commitment. Significantly,
Kelman has produced short stories, novels and plays but never poetry. Heidegger
however places greater value upon poetry. See Michael Inwood, Heidegger, p. 111.
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Freedom though is also the primary existential subject. However, as we shall see in
the ensuing chapters, the existential tradition tends toward the description ofwhat
Sartre terms 'trapped freedoms'.
Let this freedom manifest itself in our novels, our essays, and our
plays. And if our characters do not yet enjoy it, if they live in our time,
let us at least be able to show what it costs them not to have it. (WIL
206)
the writer knows that he speaks for freedoms which are swallowed up,
masked, and unavailable. (WIL 49)
Existential literature depicts problematic freedoms, precarious freedoms. Tammas,
Robert Hines, Patrick Doyle and Sammy Samuels are all at some level curtailed,
frustrated. It is Milan Kundera who formulates the principal questions which Kafka's
fictions pose: "What possibilities remain for man in a world where the external
determinants have become so overpowering that internal impulses no longer carry any
weight?"; What are the possibilities for man in the trap the world has become?" (The
Art of the Novel, 26, 48) These too are the questions which Kelman's fictions will ask
and to answer these questions, Kundera writes that one must have a certain
understanding ofwhat the world is.
THE EVERYDAY
We have then an area of thematic investigation, freedom, and Kelman follows
philosophical existentialism in positioning this analysis within a particular
environment: the concrete world of the everyday. The 'concrete', Sartre tells us, is
"man within the world in that specific union ofman with the world which Heidegger,
for example, calls "being-in-the-world."" (BN 3).
The theme of our analytic is to be Being-in-the-world, and accordingly
the very world itself; and these are to be considered within the horizon
of average everydayness - the kind of being which is closest to Dasein.
We must make a study of everyday Being-in-the-world. (BT 94)
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The hyphenation in being-in-the-world, indicates a necessary connection, an
interdependence. For human being, the world is, to borrow a term from Charles
Taylor, the 'inescapable framework' in which being is encountered and into which
being is thrown. This basic existential conjunction is vividly expressed in the story
'Pictures' from The Burn, which opens with the narrator contemplating suicide: "the
destruction of himselfmeant the destruction of the world anyway because with him
not there his world wouldnt be either." (Burn 1) Without a world there is no being;
without a being there is no world. Now this coupling of being and world, carries with
it a challenge and a reconstitution of the subject matter of philosophy. Broadly,
existential thinking rejects the abstracting proclivity of the western philosophical
tradition, whether Husserlian bracketing, Cartesian rationalism with its retreat from
the world, Flume's bifurcation between his philosophical activity and his everyday
activity as a person, or what Kierkegaard characterises as Hegelian abstraction.
Existentialism moves philosophy from the study to the street, and in so doing
simultaneously recasts what is philosophically significant. "You see [...] if you're a
phenomenologist, you can talk about this drink and that's philosophy."41 Sartre's
introduction to phenomenology, via Raymond Aron, takes place in a cafe, and Being
andNothingness relies upon illustrations and examples drawn from literature or the
everyday world of cafes and bars. Sartre follows Heidegger in rejecting the
transcendental idealism in phenomenology whilst still retaining its method.42
Phenomenology, Sartre concludes, cannot be divorced from ontology. Ontology deals
with situated being since to exist as a subject is to exist in a world: man cannot be
divorced from the world. A consideration of ontological structures must therefore
include an analysis of the structures in situ.
"'Quoted in Ronald Hayman, Writing Against: A Biography ofSartre (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1986), p.92.
42For details see Michael Hammond, Jane Howarth and Russell Keat, Understanding
Phenomenology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). See in particular chapter four,
'Existentialism and Phenomenology', pp. 96-126.
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Heidegger's philosophy, adopted and adapted by Sartre, approximates the means of
creating fiction advanced by Albert Camus. For Camus, the writer should "stick to
what is ordinary",43 and this ordinariness is the everyday.
If I have tried to define something, it is, [...] simply the common
existence of history and ofman, everyday life with the most possible
light thrown upon it, the dogged struggle against one's own
degradation and that of others. (MS 188)
Like Camus' aesthetic, the everyday, when encountered in existential philosophy is
intended to designate the existent's most characteristic mode ofbeing-in-the-world.
For Heidegger, everyday being-in-the-world is characterised by what he terms
'concern':
Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always
dispersed itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in.
The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having
to do with something, producing something, attending to something
and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and
letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating,
considering, discussing, determining .... All these ways of Being-in
have concern as their kind ofBeing [. . .] Leaving undone, neglecting,
renouncing, taking a rest - these too are ways of concern; but these are
all deficient modes [...]. (BT 83)
Thus what Kelman sees as the uniting principle of his early work, "getting by", has
clear affinities with Heidegger's notion ofDasein as a 'coping' or 'concerned' being,
engaged in activities within the world. This commitment to the everyday, the lived as
opposed to the conceptual, can be seen both in Kelman's prose and his critical work
and explains his commendation and attraction for the situations and settings he found
in American Realism. Although Kelman's prose style develops, its subject matter, this
concernful average everydayness, never alters. Now a commitment to the everyday
may seem in conflict with the earlier claim that Kelman on occasion utilises the
methods of fantastic realism, but fantastic realism itself depicts the everyday. As
Sartre explains, "In order to achieve the fantastic, it is neither necessary nor sufficient
to portray extraordinary things."44 Everyday existence is itself fantastic for fantastic
43Albert Camus, Garnets 1935-1942, p.32.
^Jean-Paul Sartre, '"Aminadab", Or the Fantastic Considered as a Language',
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prose highlights everyday horror. Such a repositioning of concern, this literature
devoted to an articulation of the everyday, impacts upon novelistic plotting. In an
often quoted segment of his interview with Kirsty McNeill, Kelman writes
I think the most ordinary person's life is fairly dramatic; all you've got
to do is follow some people around and look at their existence for 24
hours, and it will be horror. It will just be horror. [...] All you have to
do is show this one day in maybe this person's life and it'll be horror.
[...] There's no need to be saying or thinking "When's the murder or
bank robbery going to happen?". No such abnormal event will occur -
the kind of events that seems to motivate almost all mainstream
fiction whether in book or screen form. In reality these events are
abnormal. The whole idea of the big dramatic event, ofwhat
constitutes 'plot', only assumes that economic security exists. The
way that literature generally works in our society you never have to
worry about these very routine horrors, the things that make up the
everyday reality for such an enormous proportion of the population. In
the Anglo American literary tradition there's almost no concrete
reality, no economic detail. All kinds of abnormal events and dramatic
plots are required, there's got to be folk appearing out of closets, long
lost sisters and brothers, a father who's a murderer, all that sort of
junk.(9)
Several things arise here. The notion of routine horror is clearly important but does
not constitute as Roderick Watson argues, a reference to Conrad: "There are echoes
here ofMr Kurtz's last words [. . .] and I don't think that they are accidental. Kelman's
point would be that you don't need to evoke Conrad's metaphysical fascination with
the heart of some dark "other" to see over the edge."45 You do not need to evoke
Conrad at all. Watson forgets that Kelman, following Achebe, is highly critical of
Conrad's prose. A more likely source, if one is required, is Wittgenstein: "The horrors
of hell can be experienced within a single day; that's plenty of time."46 For Kelman,
Wittgenstein is required reading for all literary artists47. Now this might seem a
Literary Essays, p. 57
45Roderick Watson, 'The Rage of Caliban: The "Unacceptable" Face and the
"Unspeakable" Voice in Contemporary Scottish Writing', in eds. Horst W Drescher
and Susanne Hagemann, Scotland to Slovenia, Scottish Studies 21 (Frankfurt am
Main, 1996), pp. 53-69, p.56.
^Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, amended edn., ed. G H von Wright, trans.
Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p.26e.
47Maya Jaggi, 'Speaking in Tongues', The Guardian, Weekend Section, July 18 1998,
pp.26-30, p.30.
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surprising claim for an existential novelist, but Kelman is referring to specific aspects
ofWittgenstein's thought, in particular, the opening of the Tractatus. "The world is
all that is the case. [...] The world is the totality of facts, not of things. [...] What is
the case - a fact - is the existence of states of affairs."48 Wittgenstein's thought
displays here an affinity with Heidegger's fundamental ontology. "Whenever Dasein
is, it is as a Fact". (BT 82) What appeals to Kelman then is not so much
Wittgenstein's logical atomism, but the concretion which penetrates and permeates his
philosophical writing. Plot and situation have then no need for extravagance or
convolution for the everyday provides enough material of philosophical and literary
importance. Cairns Craig has drawn a parallel between Kelman and Virginia Woolf,
seeing in the former an alignment with the modernist aesthetic of the latter. "Kelman
might be said to be fulfilling Virginia Woolf s assertion that the novel ought to
examine 'an ordinary mind on an ordinary day'" ('Resisting Arrest', 104)) and
Patrick Doyle seems to hint at this when he describes "The halo around the
streetlamp". (D 83) What is relevant however is that Woolf s programme, the
examination of an ordinary mind on an ordinary day, is amenable to an existentialised
conception of literary art. Existential fiction seeks the philosophical in the ordinary.
Thus far, we have described 'Being-in', one aspect of the ordinary, but the notion of
'world' requires some elaboration
THE LOCAL
Sartre writes that "Being situated is an essential and necessary characteristic of
freedom." (WIL 112) and we have seen that for an existentialist being is always being
there, being occupies a specific world and the interplay between self and world
produces being's 'situation'. Correspondingly, existential literature is, as Hazel Barnes
states a "literature- in-situation"49. Situation is both what conditions, limits, and
enables freedom, but whilst it is necessary that being be situated, the precise situation
is merely sufficient, or contingent. Being has to take place somewhere, but the where
itself is always only contingent.
48Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1922, trans. D F Pears and
B F McGuinness (London: Routledge, 1993), p.5.
49Hazel Barnes, The Literature ofPossibility: A Study in Humanistic Existentialism
(London: Tavistock, 1961), p. 374.
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I was born and bred in Glasgow
I have lived most ofmy life in Glasgow
It is the place I know best
My language is English
I write
In my writings the accent is in Glasgow
I am always from Glasgow and I speak English always
Always with this Glasgow accent
This is right enough (TGW 51)
Kelman's autobiographical foreword to the stories collected in Three Glasgow
Writers needs to be read carefully for it contains two important and interlocking
existential points. The first is a commitment to an aesthetic premised upon an
existentialised notion of locality which, and this is the second, simultaneously effects a
corresponding movement away from the national and the nationalist. As Drew Milne
notes in one of the most perspicacious analyses ofKelman's work,
Implicit in this [foreword] is a rejection of a Scottish or nationalist
mode of address, and hence a critical speech-writing relation to
English and a geographical focus on and in Glasgow. The city rather
than region or nation is the key analytic category.50
All of Kelman's novels are set in Glasgow and therefore what Milne sees as a
rejection of Scottish or nationalist modes is accurate, but a minor modification is
necessary for these categories are replaced not by 'the city', but by the local: it so
happens that on occasion, the local is the city. Kelman's novels are set in Glasgow,
but many of his short stories are situated in unidentified places, or London, or the
Channel Islands. Glasgow supplies an accent; it supplies a city, but crucially not the
city, nor the accent. As Kelman reminds us "it should be kept in mind that Glasgow
50Drew Milne, 'James Kelman: Dialectics ofUrbanity', Writing Region andNation:
Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on the Literature ofRegion and
Nation, eds. James A Davies et. al. (Swansea: University ofWales, 1994), pp.
393-407. This view ofKelman as localist is also articulated by Simon Baker See his
'Wee Stories with a Working-Class Theme' in ed. Susanne Hagemann, Studies in
Scottish Fiction: 1945 to the Present (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996), pp.
235-50, p. 238.
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can be any other town or city in Great Britain" (SRA 80). Consequentially although
Kelman writes Glasgow, he should not be taken as a Glasgow writer.
Glasgow just happens to be the city that I was born within [...] I could
have been born anywhere I suppose. And wherever that chanced to be
would have been equally unimportant or important (SRA 78)
the fact is I was born and bred in Glasgow ... to some extent where
you're born, well, that's an accident - it so happens I was born in the
city ofGlasgow so I'm a Glaswegian writer. I don't feel any particular
responsibility from being from Glasgow ... I could have been born
anywhere. Anyway ... there's all these different cultural experiences
here so the culture ofGlasgow is really rich and varied, it contains
many, many different cultures, a great many different ones, so there is
no such thing as the "Glasgow writer" in that sense. There are only
writers who live and work in Glasgow". ('K is for culture', 26.)
Contingency permeates these quotations but there also lingers an existentially inspired
mistrust of description. Kelman only extends himself the term "Glaswegian writer"
provided it is understood solely as an indicator of birthplace. To name someone a
'Glasgow writer', rather than a 'writer from Glasgow', implies that there is something
necessary or essential about their city or place of birth and as a consequence a certain
mode or theme of fiction is therefore sure to follow and critical attempts to formulate
a 'Glasgow school' linking Kelman, Galloway, Gray and Lochhead tend to miss this.
As H Gustav Klaus recognises, Kelman's writing is no more simply about Glasgow
than Joyce's is about Dublin51. The central point here then is not that Kelman offers us
Glasgow, he offers us a Glasgow, there are many different and differing Glasgows.
Kelman only offers a perspectival account, as is shown in A Chancer when Tammas
sets out to find Vi: "The south side of the city was unfamiliar to him. Aside from the
name of the main road he recognised nothing." (C 141) Glasgow is not then a
Kulturprovim, in the sense that it is the site of a single unitary culture. What Glasgow
is depends upon the position, the perspective, of the viewer Kelman only offers us a
particular account of Glasgow. Yet even this is not focused or honed enough.
If you happen to be a Scotsman in a Scottish pub and you get talking
to another Scottish man and you ask where he comes form you don't
51H Gustav Klaus, 'Kelman for Beginners', Journal of the Short Story in English, no.
22 (Summer 1994), 127-135, p. 128.
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expect him to say 'Scotland', you expect him to say 'Glasgow' or
'Edinburgh' or 'Inverness'. And if you're a Glasgow woman in a
Glasgow pub and you meet another Glasgow woman and you ask
where she's from you expect her to say 'Partick', or 'the Calton', or
'Easterhouse' or whatever. And if you're a Dennistoun man in a
Dennistoun pub and you meet another Dennistoun man and you ask
where he comes form you don't expect him to say 'Dennistoun', you
expect him to say 'round the corner' or 'Alexandra Parade' or
'Onslow Drive' etc. ('Oppression and Solidarity', SRA 72-3)
As Tom Leonard argues, literature should "set out from what is within sight and
touch"52 and it is only the immediately local which can be seen, heard or touched.
Locality is the precise 'where', the time and the place, in which an individual is
contingently situated. Thus both those who come to praise and those who come to
bury Kelman for misrepresenting Scotland rather miss the point, for no individual
self can ever contact with a country, for all that can ever be experienced is a
perspective of a fragment, a perspective upon a locality. No individual can ever
mArepresent Scotland for the simple reason that no individual can ever represent
Scotland, since Scotland, or for that matter England, Wales, Germany, Dennistoun, or
wherever, as a totality is not amenable to individual representation, for there is simply
no concrete vantage point from where this representation might be conducted. An
individual cannot, as it were, remove him or herself from a particular view of a
particular locality and insert themselves into the national.
This concern with the local, with that which is around the observer, has then clear
phenomenological precedents, but it seems to indicate too why Kelman and Tom
Leonard value the work of Charles Olson and William Carlos Williams. In his
autobiography, Williams praises Olson for his commitment to a poetry which founds
itself upon the concrete, and in a key passage Williams reveals a source for his own
poetical thinking. The poet's business is not
52Tom Leonard, 'Poetry, Schools, Place' in Reportsfrom the Present: Selected Work
1982-94 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995), pp. 21-9, p.26.
53Allan Massie for example. "What [Kelman] has offered is a slice of Scottish culture,
but it's by no means the whole thing". Quoted in Stuart Wavell, 'Scots bewail
4,000-expletive blot on the national character', Sunday Times, 16 October 1994, p.3.
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to talk in vague categories but to write particularly, as a physician
works, upon a patient, upon the thing before him, in the particular to
discover the universal. John Dewey had said (I discovered it quite by
chance), "The local is the only universal, upon that all art builds."54
Well almost all art. For Kelman and for Leonard, good art, valuable art, builds upon
the local for the local is the sole situation of the existential. Dewey's essay,
'Americanism and Localism' has distinct existential affinities, and it is important here
because it helps centre Kelman's localism within an existential dynamic.
the earth is just what it used to be. It is a loose collection of houses, of
streets, of neighbourhoods, villages, farms, towns. Each of these has
an intense consciousness ofwhat is going on within itself in the way of
fires, burglaries, murders, family jars, weddings, and banquets to
esteemed fellow citizens, and a languid drooping interest in the rest of
the spacious land. Very provincial? Not at all. Just local, just human,
just at home, just where they live.55
Dewey develops a pragmatist cleavage between the national - the American - and the
local. These concerns, fires, burglaries and so on, are those which affect people where
they are. They are rooted, real, near at hand. For Dewey, people are "chiefly
concerned with what goes on in their tenement house, their alley, their factory, their
street." (ibid., 13). This is not, as Dewey points out, parochial, it is existential, it is a
focus upon the living and the concrete actual
An individual does not live then in a nation, instead he or she lives in a particular
locality and this locality is both concrete and contingent. As Dewey states, the only
things that are national "are the high cost of living, prohibition [the essay was written
in the 1920s] and a devotion to localisms". The national or the nation, "is something
that exists in Washington and other seats of government." Thus if Kelman rejects
nationalist modes of address it is precisely because, as Dewey suggests, 'Nation' is an
ontologically unrobust category: nation is simply an abstraction useful for general
discussion, it has no ontological basis, it is one of the "vague categories" to which
Williams refers. Therefore when Kelman speaks of culture, he means local culture,
54William Carlos Williams, The Autobiography of William Carlos Williams (New
York: New Directions, 1967), p.391.
55John Dewey, 'Americanism and Localism', The Middle Works, 1899-1924, ed. Jo
Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press,
1982), pp.12-16, p. 12.
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the culture that a situated 'I' meets in and through the day-to-day. Culture is a matter
of proximity, or in the case of reading or listening to music, of experiential contact. It
is then both an epistemological and ontological impossibility to experience a nation
and thus Kelman concludes that there are no such entities as national cultures.
we have to be clear about what we don't mean when we talk in these
terms: we don't mean some kind of'pure, native-born Scottish person'
or some mystical 'national culture'. Neither of these entities has ever
existed in the past and cannot conceivably exist in the future. Even
when arguments involving these concepts are 'rational', they can only
be conducted on some higher plane. And it's always safer for human
beings - as opposed to concepts or machines - when this higher plane
is restricted to mathematics, theoretical physics or logic [. . .] The logic
of this 'higher plane' seems forced to generate a never-ending stream
of conceptual purity to do with sets and the sets of sets; and the sets of
the sets of the sets of sets; and the set of the sets of the sets of all sets.
Entities like 'Scotsman', 'German', 'Indian' or 'American'; 'Scottish
culture', 'Jamaican culture', 'African culture', or 'Asian culture' are
material absurdities. They aren't particular things in the world. There
are no material bodies that correspond to them. We only used those
terms [sic] in the way we use other terms such as 'tree', 'bird',
'vehicle' or 'red'. They define abstract concepts; 'things' that don't
exist other than for loose classification. ('Oppression and Solidarity',
SRA 72)
The pertinent term here is 'material absurdities'. Language is structured such that
individual articulators frequently used general terms, but the existence of a noun does
not entail that there exists a corresponding entity. Nation is precisely such a concept.
Here it is important to disentangle Kelman from a recent intellectual trend exemplified
and articulated by both Roderick Watson and Robert Crawford36 in which talk of
'Scotland' is replaced by talk of'Scotlands'. This though is merely a multiplication of
an initial error. Berthold Schoene-Harwood writes:
The seemingly ingenious critical manoeuvre of Scottish intellectuals
simply to replace monolithic SCOTLAND with the more pluralistic
notion of SCOTLANDS bears its own ideological quandary. While
56Roderick Watson, 'Speaking in Tongues: Reflections after Bakhtin on the Scots
Literary Tradition and Contemporary Writing' in ed. Alastair Renfrew, Exploiting
Bakhtin, Strathclyde Modern Language Studies, New Series, no 2 (1997) 1-14.
Robert Crawford, 'Dedefining Scotland' in ed. Susan Basnett, Studying British
Culture: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 83-96.
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ostensibly acknowledging and even promoting cultural diversity, it is -
like the older label - still a territorial, historically pre-encoded and
hence potentially essentialist term which serves to identify, isolate and
exclude both internal and external 'aliens' by clearly distinguishing
what is Scottish from what is un-Scottish. [,..]what the term
SCOTLANDS appears to promote resembles an only less
nationalistically inspired, territorially defined and culturally
subsumptive straitjacket of communal homogeneity. 57
Essentialist straitjackets are not of course what an existentialist would wish to don.
Kelman's fictions then, proceeding from an existentially inspired construction of
locality and situation disassociate themselves form the parameters of the national. In
so doing, Kelman also effects a separation between his own prose and previous
Glasgow texts with which one might be tempted to place his work; in particular
Archie Hind's The Dear Green Place. In Hind's novel, the narrator Mat Craig
struggles to extricate himself from his culture via the salvation of art. Moreover, in a
well known passage, Mat Craig laments the absence of local subject matter for his
proposed novel.
A whole background against which the drama and seriousness of life
could be played out was missing from their lives. All the background
against which a novelist might set his scene, the aberrant attempts of
human beings and societies to respond to circumstances, all that was
bizarre, grotesque and extravagant in human life, all that whole
background of violence, activity, intellectual and imaginative ardour,
political daring. All that was somehow missing from Scottish life. In
lieu of all this artistic and human extravagance, all the menace,
violence and horror which had been the experience of so many
European writers, in Scottish life there was only a null blot, a cessation
of life, a dull absence, a blankness and diminution and weakening of all
the fibres ofbeing, of buildings not blown up but crumbling and rotten,
of streets not running with blood or rivers of fists but with wan
puddles, a withering of existence, no agony of living58
"Berthold Schoene-Harwood, "Emerging as the others of our selves' - Scottish
multiculturalism and the challenge of the body in postcolonial representation', Scottish
Literary Journal, vol 25, no 1 (May 1998), 54-72, p.55, p.56. Movement away from
the national is also usefully discussed in Gordon MacLeod, 'In what sense a region?
Place hybridity, symbolic shape, and institutional formation in (post-) modern
Scotland', Political Geography, vol 17, no 7 (1998) 833-863.
58Archie Hind, A Dear Green Place, 1966 (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1984), p.83.
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Kelman would recognise and accept the need to source fictional models outwith
Scotland, but as I have argued above this is done in order to articulate the local. For
Mat Craig, it is not simply that technical accomplishments have to be sought abroad,
the implication is that subject matter too has to be found elsewhere. Even with
imported techniques, there is nothing of sufficient interest to which these devices can
be employed to relate. The revision of this weary hypothesis is one of Kelman's
predominant achievements. Like many writers he has to look beyond his own shores
for fictional techniques, but like Tom Leonard, this is to better articulate the near at
hand, the native culture within which he operates. Whilst Craig complains of an
absence of horror, an absence of intelligence, Kelman consistently shows that such
absence is imagined. Real terrors inhabit every locality, their disclosure merely
requires attunement to the existential.
NARRATIVE
The preceding considerations bring us now to the question of narrative, for successful
articulation of the existential themes which we have examined above requires a
particular distillation into narrative form. Given that some issues relate to specific
texts, for instance Kelman's utilisation of some of the techniques associated with the
nouveau roman in A Chancer, I postpone more specific discussion of these until the
relevant chapter. We can however begin with several general points. Firstly, treating
Kelman as an existentialist encourages a reappraisal of a critical commonplace - that
Kelman's much discussed narrative mode represents a solution to a problem posed by
Walter Scott: how to accommodate Scottish speech patterns within the language of
the English.59 Again the Scottish/English dualism is called upon to perform but again
it need not be accepted. For Kelman, the problem is not how to un-English the
language of supposed imperialist aggressors; it is not how to place demotic Scots
within standard English - remember that Kelman writes an accented English, "My
language is English [...] I speak English always/ Always with this Glasgow accent" - it
is rather how to decontaminate language, how to divest it of the anti-existential, in
59This is Cairns Craig's position. See his 'James Kelman' in Dictionary ofLiterary
Biography, vol 194, British Novelists Since 1960, ed Merritt Moseley (London: Gale,
1988), pp. 166-174, p. 170 and his The Modern Scottish Novel: Narrative and the
National Imagination (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 103.
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order that it might better represent the existential. IfKelman's prose style
coincidentally solves a problem for cultural nationalists then this is simply an
epiphenomenon, not the principal motivation. Kelman's central narrative task is how
to render prose value-free. This requires some elaboration.
Kelman's now distinct narrative style did not emerge fully-formed, but it nevertheless
evolves quickly. Although the constants of character - the marginalised and excluded
individual male - and setting - the everyday - are present at the outset, of the thirteen
stories collected in An OldPub Near the Angel, twelve feature bound direct speech.
Even within this atypical form, there is a gradual evolution from the first piece 'The
Cards' to the wholly phonetic 'Nice to be Nice' in which speech markers are entirely
absent. 'The Cards' noticeably and uncharacteristically employs an omniscient
narrator, and features literary ornament, adverbs and adjectives, which Kelman's later
prose either greatly reduces or dispenses with entirely. Taken as a whole, the
collection begins with an omniscient position and ends with first person
stream-of-consciousness. Kelman never returns to either technique. Phoneticism he
abandons because he thought Tom Leonard a better practitioner of the form;
omniscience is rejected because it positions the narrator sub specie aeternitatis,
effectively out of the world; and stream-of-consciouness, at least in the familiar
Joycean manner, is excluded because it does not permit the immanence and solidarity,
the factical rootedness, which are central components of Kelman's mature narrative
style.
These points require some elaboration for they all depend upon an underlying
commitment to freedom. The refusal of an omniscient position functions analogically
in that it corresponds to the atheistic existential position of an absent God. An
omniscient author would suggest that there is an ultimate orderer of character
possibility, whereas an existential text needs to show that possibility exists solely in
the realms of the human, within the actor himself. Character is not precast, but rather
mutable, able to change through its own volition. Even within a theistic existential
framework, the use of omniscience is still problematic for as Kierkegaard writes "God
can be the only spectator ofworld history. Human beings are supposed to be
actors,"60 Again this is why Kelman declines what have become postmodernist tropes,
in particular prolepses An existential text cannot use prolepsis because the
implication is that there is a position over and above that of the character in his or her
situation: prolepsis entails a foreteller, a foreseer. Freedom would then be illusory
because everything within the narrative would be already determined.
Since we were situated, the only novels we could dream ofwere
novels of situation, without internal narrators or all-knowing
witnesses. In short, ifwe wished to give an account of our age, we had
to make the technique of the novel shift from Newtonian mechanics to
generalised relativity; we had to people our books with minds that
were half lucid and half overcast, some ofwhich we might consider
with more sympathy than others, but none ofwhich would have a
privileged point of view either upon the event or upon itself [...] we
had to leave doubts, expectations, and the unachieved throughout our
works [...]. (WIL 166)
For Sartre, situation - concretion and rootedness of setting - demands an equivalent in
the writing itself and this is linked to the evasion of determinism discussed above.
Kelman adopts these Sartrean moves and consequently within his texts sentence
structure and lexical selection display an ideational function which is basically
phenomenological/existential In Kelman's prose, narrative describes but it does not
explain or deduce. Nor does it move from the descriptive 'is' to a didactic 'ought'.
The task of an existential narrative is to display the concrete union of being and world
but this necessarily involves the displayal of gaps and ambiguities. Being as Sartre
conceives it always preserves "a certain indetermination, a certain unpredictability"
(BN 262) since it is a process, being continually made and remade. Within an
existential novel, style tends to mimic the becoming of the existential subject. To do
so, Sartre, following Heidegger, depicts consciousness not as knowing or reflecting,
but as acting, living. As Sartre points out, the traditional novel is structured through a
combination of being and having; the existential novel through a combination of doing
and being. (WIL 174)
60Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments,
vol 1, 1846, ed. and trans. Howard V Hong and Edna V Hong (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1992), p. 158.
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Kelman suggests this through narrative temporality, for in the novels narrative time is
always now and this allows the reader to see life in the present tense, as it is being
lived. This presentness enables the existential idea of the present subject moving out
and creating, reaching into the future. Kelman's novels are active, all four open with
the detailing of a present tense activity, immediately suggesting that character is being
made as we read.
The novels of our elders related the event as having taken place in the
past. Chronological order permitted the reader to see the logical and
universal relationship, the eternal verities. The slightest change was
already understood. A past was delivered to us which had already been
thought through. [...] We were convinced that no art could really be
ours if it did not restore to the event its brutal freshness, its ambiguity,
its unforseeability. (WIL 167)
As Sartre argues, a past-tense form would give us a life already lived, it would be
converted from the existential to the essential, whereas if the narrative is happening in
'now-time', then it is being presented as an actual state of affairs, the act and the
actor exist, constitute an undeniable 'fact'. The description and depiction of
undeniable concrete facts are what make Kelman's narratives political, something
shared with the work ofTom Leonard:
It's that area of present-time consciousness that writers like Beckett
and Graham give to their personae; and the personae in turn pass it on
to the reader. It's a very political thing to do, since it seems to assume
that the only - and equal - value that can be placed on any human being
is in the fact that the human being actually exists.61
Kelman's narratives are descriptive but description as intended here needs to be
carefully qualified, for it is an existential/phenomenological method It describes
without explaining, uniting or connecting and therefore leaves those gaps and
ambiguities which Sartre discusses. In this way, Kelman's narrative method is
noteworthy not so much for what it includes as what it excludes and as well as
pointing to philosophical existentialism, this technique refers us to Kelman's reading
ofKafka.
61Tom Leonard, 'On Reclaiming the Local and The Theory of the Magic Thing',
Edinburgh Review, no. 77 (1987), 40-47, p.45.
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one thing you can notice in Franz Kafka's work, most particularly in
his use of third party narrative, he doesn't necessarily detail a thing
that exists. What he often does is refer to a space which he then fills
with a crowd of things that either don't exist, or maybe don't exist. He
fills the page with absences and possible absences, possible realities.
Who is that woman! She isn't my wife. She isn't my fiancee. And she
isn't my girlfriend. Nor my sister. She isn't my grannie nor yet my
mother. And she probably isn't my auntie and I doubt if she's my
cousin. Who is she? She isn't my neighbour. She maybe isn't someone
1 know at all. Probably she's a stranger. [...] In talking about this
technique critically you could use the terms 'negative apprehension'
and 'the subjunctive mood'. [...] when you work your way through
every absence you can think of you'll be left with a particular,
something concrete; and this is usually where you discover the finest
art, or at least the most satisfactory. ('Artists and Value', SRA 6-7)
"They were not particularly heavy, nor particularly bulky." (D 2) The description of
Patrick Doyle's pipes illustrates this negative method: if they are not heavy then what
are they? Light? Medium heavy? If not bulky then what? Of greater significance
however is Kelman's use of this method to depict character, for in Kelman's novels,
no protagonist is physically described. Using Sartre's typification, Kelman's
characters lack 'having', lack fixed essential properties, and are shown only in their
'being' and their 'doing', their existing. Character therefore emerges as a not, a lack,
and thus the fictional practice ofKafka and Kelman advances a key tenet of Sartrean
ontology.
There are other existentially significant absences in Kelman's texts and these are
explicable by reference to a number of fictional and philosophical sources. As Camus
utilises Hemingway in the production of a pared down prose, so Kelman too eschews
literary ostentation. Again there is a Wittgensteinian undercurrent for the latter values
an "unpoetic mentality, which heads straight for the concrete."62 Wittgenstein's
thought can be read as a philosophical translation of Alfred Loos' architectural
principle that all ornament is crime and Kelman evidences an anti-ornamental aesthetic
attitude in both his advice to JefFTorrington and Agnes Owens. Alasdair Gray records
in his endnotes to Three Glasgow Writers that Owens "sometimes used too many
62Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p.6e.
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adverbs, and Jim Kelman had been unremitting in his efforts to make her like Chekhov
more and Graham Greene less" {(TGW 284). Philip Hobsbaum recalls that
"Torrington told me that when he first attended one of Kelman's writing groups in
Paisley Kelman suggested that he knock all of the stained glass windows out of his
prose, referring to the adjectives and adverbs."63 Ornamentation occasions a
distortion, a muddying of the concrete. Furthermore adjectives limit, qualify and are
ultimately subsidiary to the existent itself, to the noun. However, in order to maintain
the concrete and the specific, a further purge is required.
Sort through the clumsiness and carelessness; the cliches, the
shopsoiled phrases, the timeworn description; basic technical stuff.
What it usually signifies is a straightforward lack of interest in, or
awareness of, particulars. They don't reach the concrete. They seem
content to give a general idea of something. Big handsome men and
slender beautiful women will always be seen as that no matter who
does the looking. And by quick extension of that: Everybody on the
broo is lazy. Jews are greedy. Black people are criminals. Red haired
people are bad tempered. Irish people are ignorant. Peasants are
hamfisted. Glaswegian working class males are drunken wife-beaters.
What is a cliche really but a conventional way of looking, a
conventional way of perceiving. [...] Instead of thinking or judging for
themselves they're relying on conventional wisdom, received opinion,
the everyday values of society. ('Artists and Value', SRA 9)
Cliche is expunged because it moves among the general to the neglect of the
existential particular. If as Kelman states, such conventional images dominate the
English literary canon, then the task of the writer is to resist cliche by removing from
narrative the descriptive means through which cliche is permitted to emerge.
Rejection of cliche is supplemented by a rejection of other rhetorical devices such as
simile and metaphor. This explains Kelman's interest in the Black Mountain poets, in
particular Charles Olson. In his essay 'Projective Verse'64, Olson develops an
influential statement of modern poetics which links content to form, focuses upon
voice, sees poetry as activity and urges an excision of certain rhetorical devices:
"Simile is only one bird who comes down, too easily. The descriptive functions
63Peter Kravitz, 'Introduction', The Picador Book ofContemporary Scottish Fiction
(London: Picador, 1997), pp.xi-xxxvi, p. xvii
^Charles Olson, 'Projective Verse' in ed. Donald M Allen, The New American Poetry
(New York: Grove Press, 1960), pp.386-397.
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generally have to be watched" (390). Olson advocates an objectivism wherein the
poem needs
to be as clean as wood is as it issues from the hand of nature, to be
shaped as wood can be when a man has had his hand to it. Objectivism
is the getting rid of the lyrical interference of the individual as ego.
(395)
To avoid lyrical interference Kelman cannot pair away the author to leave a
stream-of-consciousness narrative. David Lodge, chairman of the 1989 Booker judges
sees A Disaffection as formally unadventurous, written in "a mixture of interior
monologue and free indirect style, rather like the early chapters of Ulysses". He
contends that the novel "challenges the reader primarily by its content and use of
Glaswegian dialect, not by its narrative form."65 Here Lodge underestimates and
slightly misunderstands Kelman for the challenge as we have seen is in the narrative
form. A pivotal aspect of Kelman's narrative technique which Lodge misses is that it
situated within a particular circumstance and also precisely because it does not use
unadulterated interior monologue, it evinces a solidarity with that particular
circumstance. A purely first person narrative stands alone: but also it entails that the
author has access to the mind of the protagonist or is able to control and determine
what issues from it. Kelman's sophisticated commingling of third person and singular
narrative forms manages to keep experience relative to an individual perceiver: his
novels never transcend the viewpoint of the principal character; choosing to stick with
rather than preside over.
What Kelman's aesthetic amounts to is this: a twofold conception of the existential. A
resolutely non-national corpus which insists upon the validity of its form and its
content. The novels are however dialogic, they both engage with and supplement the
tradition of existential writing, but they always maintain a conversation with an
existential tradition. Thus far we have examined facets of Kelman's prose. The
purpose of this chapter has been to redefine the exegetical nomenclature with which
the critic might better approach Kelman's prose. In the next chapter, I consider four
65David Lodge, The Practice ofWriting (New York: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press,
1996), pp 10-11.
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pivotal existential works, assessing each in terms of technique and content. I do this in
order to effect a literary and philosophical prism through which to read Kelman's





The immorality of our age is perhaps not lust and pleasure and
sensuality, but rather a pantheistic, debauched contempt for individual
human beings.
Snren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript.1
The novel is not the author's confession; it is an investigation of
human life in the trap the world has become.
Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness ofBeing2
The world is not what I think, but what I live through.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology ofPerception3
'Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p.355.
2Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness ofBeing, 1984, trans. Michael Henry
Heim (London: Faber and Faber, 1990), p.221.
3Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology ofPerception, 1945, trans. Colin
Smith (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. xvi-xvii.
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Having outlined Kelman's aesthetic, this chapter concerns itself with the formation of
the existential tradition. I need this grounding because in subsequent chapters, I shall
be applying aspects of the existentialist procedures and themes brought out here to
the reading of particular Kelman texts. This preliminary chapter is a necessary sketch
since it both enables and supports the detailed readings which follow.
DOSTOEVSKY
Notes from Underground
If the genre of existentialist fiction exists then Dostoevsky's Notesfrom
Underground* is in many ways its inaugural text. Although antecedent works disclose
existential themes or existentially appropriable methods - Dostoevsky reminds us that
he emerges from under Gogol's 'Overcoat' - Notesfrom Underground effects a
unique and influential synthesis. Here, what can be read as existential issues not only
appear, but predominate.
There are several stylistic and content-related features which combine to make Notes
from Underground a seminal existential text. It is a critical commonplace that
throughout his work, Dostoevsky is concerned with individual psychology, and with
the contemporary individual, rather than with general sociology, and as with his
contemporary Baudelaire and his precursor Gogol, Dostoevsky's fiction is
metrocentric: the city becomes the factical given in which the individual is found.
Locating his texts within St. Petersburg, the city which the underground man terms
"the most abstract and intentional" (NU 17), occasions an investigation into the
alienation and anxiety engendered by life in a modern Western metropolis. The
resulting critique of the modern city is allied to a pervasive scepsis regarding the
intellectual orthodoxies (utilitarianism, determinism, Darwinism, Hegelianism, ethical
egoism, Utopian socialism) of the time. Furthermore, the artistic orthodoxies of
Romanticism and naturalism are also subject to scrutiny within an overall examination
of the art/life dualism.
These matters occur at a thematic level. Formally, the text dispenses with the
traditional telos of Aristotelian beginning-middle-end narrative, and is instead
4Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Notesfrom Underground/The Double, 1864, 1846, trans.
Jessie Coulson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972). Hereafter NU.
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constructed through divagations, underminings and hesitations, 'concluding' with an
arbitrary and sudden ending - an ending moreover which in no sense supplies narrative
closure. In common with Lermontov's A Hero ofOur Time, Hogg's Confessions ofa
Justified Sinner, and Goethe's The Sorrows of Young Werther, the novel uses an
editor, pointing forward to Sartre's Nausea, but also demonstrating precisely that
means of removing the author from the text which Kelman sees as a distinctly
existential strategy. Significantly, Notesfrom Underground is written in Russian,
which at the time of the novel's composition was still a nascent literary language.
Previously spoken only by peasants, Post-Pushkin, the use of the Russian language in
constructing fiction becomes a political act5. The use of the language of the working
classes also reflects the general proclivity of existentialist fiction to deal with the
common rather than the exceptional man: existential fiction becomes Tow'-mimetic.
"I am proud that I was the first to depict the real man of the Russian majority and the
first to expose his disfigured and tragic side".6 Throughout his work Dostoevsky
seeks to reconnect literature and the experience of the common man, the neglected
and the marginalised. These compositional and thematic features combine to produce
an enormously influential anti-novel, an avatar of much European twentieth-century
fiction: its influence detectable in all the texts examined below.
Dostoevsky's text foregrounds then certain fictional strategies which support,
exemplify or portend what we might term existentialist positions. The concern with a
particular individual immediately distances Dostoevsky from the more panoramic
5 D S Mirsky discusses the evolution of literary Russian in his A History ofRussian
Literature. In particular, he foregrounds the importance ofMikhaylo Vasilievich
Lomonosov (1711 - 1765) and Nikolay Mikhaylovich Karamazin (1766- 1826) in the
formulation of the literary language. For Mirsky, Karamazin was of singular
importance. Although his linguistic reforms were described as "anti-democratic", and
"anti-national", as Mirsky notes, "the ultimate justification ofKaramazin's language is
that it became the language of Pushkin."
D.S. Mirsky, A History ofRussian Literature, ed. Francis J Whitfield (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), p.60.
Lionel Kochan in his TheMaking ofModern Russia places a greater emphasis upon
the input ofLomonosov. The Making ofModern Russia (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1962), p. 134.
6Dostoevsky quoted in Robert Louis Jackson, Dostoevsky's UndergroundMan in
Russian Literature (The Hague: Mouton, 1958), p.28.
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socio-historical fiction of Scott, Tolstoy or Dickens and it is this affirmation of
individual experience that links Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard7. In Notesfrom
Underground, the desire to disclose the myriad sensations, the problematics, of an
individual consciousness necessitates the employment of a first person narrator. As a
philosophy of the subject, existentialism seems to demand that the novel become
reliant upon either first-person narrators, or narrative modes designed to situate the
reader within or beside a particular character's consciousness. The opening paragraph
ofDostoevsky's novel signals such a movement within.
I am a sick man ... I am an angry man. I am an unattractive man. I
think there is something wrong with my liver. But I don't understand
the least thing about my illness, and I don't know for certain what part
ofme is affected. (NU 15)
The reader encounters a first person narrative where the compressed sentences
provide a syntactic facsimile of the narrator's consciousness, entrammelled within its
"mouse hole". This segment also discloses that the narrator is a "sick man ... an angry
man", an indication to the reader that the character to be encountered herein is an
anti-hero - but moreover an anti-hero with a precarious ontology: he is "sick", but is
unaware ofwhat it is that is ailing him. The immediate concern with an individual T
(part one of the novel begins with "I" and ends with "self') also facilitates a
highlighting of the gap between the social self and the private self. Literary modernism
tends to foreground the alienation to which an individual is subject within the modern
city. A key component of existentialist philosophies, alienation and estrangement
become crucial thematics as much for the existential novelist as the existentialist
philosopher qua philosopher. In Kafka, Camus, Sartre, and Kelman, alienation - be it
from world, self, or language - is a persistent area of exploration.
At both the level of form and the level of content, Notesfrom Underground refuses a
fixed and total position. Its very title, "Notes", suggests a discontinuous, fragmented,
narrative. In terms of narration the seeming disparity between parts one and two, the
random ending, the narrative voice which continually unworks and revises its
pronouncements, are all techniques more familiar to readers of Beckett's Trilogy.
1Dostoevsky's UndergroundMan in Russian Literature, p . 13.
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Within Dostoevsky's text however such mechanisms serve to underscore the protean
nature of the work: nothing is finished, there is no ultimate textual telos for meaning is
continually made and unmade. This fluidity indicates what Bakhtin famously describes
as polyphony:
A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses,
a genuine polyphony offully valid voices is in fact the chief
characteristic ofDostoevsky's novels. What unfolds in his works is not
a multitude of characters and fates in a single objective world,
illuminated by a single authorial consciousness; rather aplurality of
consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with its own world,
combine but are not merged in the unity of the event.8
Bakhtin, though not himself an existentialist, is useful here because what he picks out
can nevertheless be translated into existential terms. The idea that individual being has
a corresponding individual world, and thus there is no objective non-situated position
is clearly existential and so too the idea that consciousness is not unified and is
characterised by a plurality and that such plurality has validity. This polyphony is a
common feature of the existentialist text where the apparent disorder of form imbues
the narrative with a 'lived' quality. In Kierkegaardian terms, the living, acting human
being is always incomplete. Life is lived constantly forwards and there is therefore
never a particular moment in which an individual can disengage from living and find a
vantage point to enable comprehension of his life. In addition, the competing voices of
the protagonist whilst immediately revelatory of the ontological precariousness of a
particular being-in-the-world, simultaneously elicit a kind of hermeneutic uncertainty
in the reader. This facet ofNotesfrom Underground is, as we shall shortly see,
developed more fully by Kafka. The Trial in particular produces interpretative doubt
because Kafka's fiction operates fundamentally at a parabolic or allegorical level and
ultimately it is left up to the reader to choose what the text is a parable of. In such a
way therefore, the text avoids becoming a receptacle for any one totalised system of
meaning. Such ambiguity is a common feature of the existentialist novel, which like
8Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), p.6.
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existential philosophy militates against the clear and distinct ideas of Cartesian
Rationalism9.
Existentialism in its stressing of choice and freedom over the systematic and the
determined can be seen as a challenge to the novelist. The chaotic configuration of
Notesfrom Underground is thus both a means of registering the flux of an individual
consciousness, but in addition a means of introducing an element of freedom at a
formal level: the polyphony of competing voices can be seen as the competing
choices, a host of possible selves, with which the narrator is faced. Furthermore, the
use of a first person narrator precludes the involvement of an authorial 'God'. Within
Dostoevsky's novel, the author/editor disappears into the background, intruding only
twice; once at the outset, once at the end. It may be objected that notions of freedom
are incommensurable with the systematicity required by syntax but an existentialist
novelist would not have a problem with this. Freedom as existentialists conceive it is
not a total freedom; language and its structure can therefore be seen as constitutive of
a certain facticity for the novelist: one is born, or thrown into a language. In his
Journals, Kierkegaard speaks of language as
being partly something originally given, partly that which develops
freely. And just as the individual, however freely he may develop, can
never reach the point at which he becomes absolutely independent,
since true freedom on the contrary consists rather in freely
appropriating that which is given [. . .] so too with language.10
This refusal to accept and utilise a coherent progressive and systematic means of
narration can be seen as contiguous with an existential refusal to accept those
ideological or philosophical systems which attempt to totalise and comprehend
individual human experience. Existentialism, beginning with Kierkegaard and as
developed by Nietzsche, interrogates the attempts of philosophy (in particular as
practised by Hegel/Hegelians) and nineteenth century science", to develop an all
9See Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, 1641, trans. John Cottingham
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.30 and passim.
"'Soren Kierkegaard, The Journals ofSoren Kierkegaard, ed. and trans. Alexander
Dru (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), §323, p.82. Hereafter/
11 For an account ofNietzsche as existentialist see Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche:
Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4th edn (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
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embracing system of objective truth. Within the Hegelian dialectic, man is
aufgehoben, taken up, cancelled or preserved, made into a part within a whole, and
for Kierkegaard he or she is thereby reduced to a concept:
What confuses the whole doctrine about 'being' [...] is that people do
not notice that they are always operating with the 'concept' existence.
But the concept existence is an ideality and the difficulty of course is
whether existence can be reduced to a concept [...] existence
corresponds to the individual thing, the individual, which even
Aristotle teaches lies outside, or at least cannot be reduced to a
concept. For an individual animal, plant, or man, existence [...] is of
quite decisive importance; an individual man has not after all a
conceptual existence. (J §1027, pp.357-8)
The system then is an abnegation, an abstraction of this individual man. For
Dostoevsky's narrator: "all these beautiful systems - these theories of explaining his
best interests to man [...] are, in my opinion, nothing but sophistry" (NU31).
Moreover Kierkegaard accuses philosophical system-builders of constructing edifices
within which the architect himself does not live:
In relation to their systems most systematisers are like a man who
builds an enormous castle and lives in a shack close by; they do not
live in their own enormous systematic buildings. Spiritually speaking a
man's thought must be the building in which he lives - otherwise
everything is topsy-turvy. (J, §583, p. 156)
This passage from Kierkegaard's Journals finds its fictional correlate in Notesfrom
Underground; "perhaps it is only from a distance that he likes the building [...]
perhaps he only likes building it, not living in it". (NU 40) The Crystal Palace to which
the narrator refers is symbolic of the system, the nexus of objective, rationalist,
scientific thought: pretty to look at but impossible to live in, for it affords the
1974), p. 85ff. This anti-scientism is as much a feature of twentieth-century
existentialist thought as it is ofNietzsche and Dostoevsky. Simone de Beauvoir notes
that Sartre "flatly refused to believe in science" going so far as to maintain that
"microbes and other animalculae invisible to the naked eye simply didn't exist at all."
Quoted in Peter Caws, Sartre (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p.6.
Heidegger, though less extreme than Sartre certainly shared his suspicion of the truth
claims of (particularly modern) science. In addition Heidegger, is interrogative of the
supposed benefits of technology. See his 'Modern Science, Metaphysics, and
Mathematics', trans. W B Barton Jr., and Vera Deutsch in Martin Heidegger, Basic
Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell, rev. edn (London: Routledge, 1993), pp.271-305.
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individual no freedom, it cannot accommodate the individual as an individual. With
possible allusion to Hamletu, the underground man compares the human subject as
constructed by the objective discourses of nineteenth century science and philosophy
to an organ stop;
science will teach men [...] that they have not, in fact, and never have
had, either will or fancy, and are no more than a sort of piano
keyboard or barrel-organ cylinder; and that the laws of nature still exist
on the earth, so that whatever man does he does not of his own
volition but, as really goes without saying, by the laws of nature.
Consequently, these laws of nature have only to be discovered, and
man will no longer be responsible for his actions". (NU 32)
Against this determinism the underground man asserts that, our most treasured
possession is "our individuality" (NU 36) and that a man "should constantly prove to
himself that he is a man and not a sprig in a barrel-organ. "(NU 38) We have here
precedents for the existential rejection of behaviourism, the notion that character, an
individual, can be predicted or caused:
since all our volition and all reasoning really may be tabulated, because
the laws of our so-called free will may indeed be discovered, it follows,
quite seriously, that some sort of table may be drawn up and that we
shall exercise our wills in conformity with that table. [. . .] After all, in
that case I can calculate my life for thirty years in advance. (NU 35)
Causality, expressed constantly through the formula 'twice two equals four' becomes
for the narrator a "wall", a barrier to freedom.
The Hegelian notion of history is further disparaged ; "In short, anything can be said
ofworld history, anything conceivable by the most disordered imagination. There is
only one thing that you can't say - that it had anything to do with reason." (NU 37)
The notion of an ultimate end, movement toward which is ineluctable, is undermined
12 From Ill.ii;
Why, look you now, how unworthy a thing you/ make ofme! You
would play upon me. You would seem/ to know my stops. You would
sound me from my lowest note to/ the top ofmy compass ... Call me
what instrument you will,/ though you can fret me, you cannot play
upon me.
William Shakespeare, Hamlet (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), p. 141.
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further by the narratal form itselfwhich via its arbitrary ending and authorial footnote
- "This is not the end" (NU 123) - implies incremental continuity rather than
progression. This movement away from teleology is enforced when the narrator
declares that the purpose is "in living, and not specifically in the goal".(7V£/40) The
collision here between on the one hand the rational, historical and teleological and on
the other the lived, effectively restates the conflict between the conceptual and the
subjective, the Kierkegaardian and the Hegelian. Hegelianism, Marxism13 and
nineteenth-century science are all reliant upon a determinism which seems to preclude
freewill and choice. Unable to live within the Crystal Palace of determinism, the
underground man withdraws inward in an attempt to construct an arena of freedom.
The 'diary' which he creates is an attempt to construct such an arena.
If one is determined by objective laws then personal identity becomes a function of the
external, objective world. In order then to exercise some degree of freedom, the
underground man retreats to a self-constructed internal world. The narrator feels that
the only way to achieve autonomy is to pose as a fictional character: "I imagined
happenings, I invented a life, so that I should at any rate live."(NU 26); "Everything
always ended happily, however, with a lazy and entrancing transition to art; that is, to
beautiful ready-made images of life, forcibly wrenched from poets and novelists and
adapted to every possible kind of service and requirement" (NU 60) but by so doing
he lapses into a mode of inauthenticity. His absorption within fictional modes of
existence results in an escape from, rather than an engagement with 'reality'. Hence
the irony of his encounter with the prostitute Liza. He tells her that "you have to learn
13 In that Marxism includes an epistemic teleology and relies upon either dialectical or
historical materialism. Further, dialectical materialism although averse to the notion
that the laws which govern matter are in any sense mechanistic, is still dependent
upon a fundamentally Hegelian (dialectical), and therefore conceptual, notion of
history: mankind in any Marxian analysis is subject to certain laws; the historical telos
being the resolution of class conflict. In a conversation with the Marxist Naville,
reproduced at the end ofExistentialism andHumanism, Sartre identifies Marxist
causality as having "no meaning except in Hegel". The causality that Marxism relies
upon is "a dream". Existentialism andHumanism, 1948, trans. Phillip Mairet
(London: Methuen, 1989), pp.68-69. Of course the later Sartre in his The Problem of
Method and Critique ofDialectical Reason, attempts a reconciliation between
existentialism and Marxism. It is the Sartre ofBeing and Nothingness with which this
chapter is concerned.
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how to live yourself, and after that you can criticise people" (A 95) but he does not
act upon his own advice. The underground man manages to convince Liza to accept
responsibility for her actions, to choose to live authentically, but this is precisely what
he himself is unable to do. Authenticity as conceived in existentialist philosophies is
bound up with freedom, choice and ultimately action, but the underground man only
talks and imagines: he does not act any more than the fictional characters with which
he identifies.
Like Raskolnikov, in Crime andPunishment, the underground man at times conceives
of himself as aNietzschean Ubermensch:
I was painfully advanced, as a man of our time should be. But they
were dullards, as like one another as a flock of sheep. (NU 48)
compared to them I was a fly, a nasty obscene fly - cleverer, better
educated, nobler than any of them, that goes without saying - but a
fly. (M/55)
All that he can manage however is a "Napoleonicpose". (NU 113 my italics) Only
capable of action within an imaginative world, instead of an overman, Dostoevsky's
narrator resembles what Nietzsche terms the 'indignant man';
For the indignant man, and whoever is continually tearing and rending
himself with his teeth (or, instead of himself, the world, or God, or
society) may indeed morally speaking stand higher than the laughing
and self-satisfied satyr, but in every other sense he is the more
commonplace, less interesting, less instructive case. And no one lies so
much as the indignant man.14
The underground man's 'lies' are his auto-fictionalisation; a facet of himself that he
recognises when he notes "Heine states that trustworthy autobiographies are almost
an impossibility, and that a man will probably never tell the truth about himself." (NU
He wants to break out from the 'herd' but cannot;
14 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good andEvil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future,
1886, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), §26, p.58.
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- Not only couldn't I make myself malevolent, I couldn't make myself
anything: neither good nor bad, neither a scoundrel nor an honest man,
neither a hero nor an insect. (NU 16)
Either a hero or dirt, there was nothing in between. That was my
undoing. (NU 59)
Unable to act, unable to turn himself into a hero in the outside world, the
underground man sinks "voluptuously into inertia" (NU 23), becoming "almost
paralysed" (NU 61). In his essay 'The Great 'Ennui", George Steiner identifies ennui
as the concomitant opposition of nineteenth century positivistic optimism: "What I
want to stress is the fact that a corrosive ennui is as much an element of nineteenth
century culture as were the dynamic optimism of the positivist and the Whig [ ..] For
every text of Benthamite confidence, of proud meliorism, we can find a counter
statement of nervous fatigue'"5 Steiner proceeds via Baudelaire to source this fatigue
in the alienation which inheres in city life. Boredom, ennui and melancholy will
become for Sartre associated with man's contingency, whilst for Heidegger they
represent the moods through which, and in which, one experiences 'the nothing'.
Within Russian fiction, ennui functions as an indicator of the superfluous man, the
displaced intellectual or the anonymous clerk. Rendered fictionally by Dostoevsky, the
dangers of inertia, ennui and paralysis are theorised by Nietzsche:
In the new generation, which has as it were inherited varying standards
and values in its blood, all is unrest, disorder, doubt, experiment; the
most vital forces have a retarding effect [. . .] centre of balance, upright
certainty are lacking in body and soul. But that which becomes most
profoundly sick and degenerates in such hybrids is the will: they no
longer have any conception of independence of decision [...] Paralysis
ofwill: where does one not find this cripple sitting today! [...] most of
that which appears in the shop windows today as 'objectivity',
'scientificality', 1'artpour 1'art, 'pure will-less knowledge' is merely
scepticism and will-paralysis dressed up.16
Nietzsche links will-paralysis to the uncertainty induced by the groundlessness and
contingency of value, the lack of a stable and coherent centre. Science, objectivity and
15 George Steiner, 'The Great 'Ennui" in In Bluebeard's Castle: Some Notes
Towards the Re-definition ofCulture (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), pp. 13-27,
p.18.
16 Beyond Good andEvil, § 208, p. 137.
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art attempt to provide a stability but the underground man would argue that they do
so at the cost of individuality; at the cost of individual freedom. With a Germanic
name, St. Petersburg was designed as Russia's window to the west, a kind of
interzone, but as such it offers its inhabitants no unalloyed foundation. Near the end of
the first part of the novel the narrator states: "Now, for example, I am particularly
oppresed by one ancient memory [. . .] like a tiresome tune that keeps on nagging at
one."(NU 46) In this passage, Dostoevsky is alluding to the opening ofHeine's 'The
Homecoming' [LDie Heimkehf ];
I don't know what it should mean, that I am so sad,
A fairy tale from old times will not leave my mind.17
The narrator ofHeine's poem cannot return to the home of a lost love: the
underground man simply has no home. For Heidegger this unhomeliness, the
'unheimlich' is Dasein's condition, but it is double edged. Lack of foundation opens
up the possibilities which reveal one's freedom, but also produces the anxiety in which
this freedom feels threatened.
For Nietzsche, whilst scepticism and nihilism are necessary for the 'revaluation of all
values', they are only preliminary stages; a kind of proto-Heideggerian 'clearing',
prerequisite before new values can be created. Nihilism is then "only a transitional
stage" Further, Nietzsche warns that "attempts to escape nihilism without revaluating
our values so far: they produce the opposite, make the problem more acute."18 The
underground man simply stops with nihilism. Notesfrom Underground functions
therefore like A Hero ofOur Time, it is a diagnostic novel, it does not propose a cure.
Dostoevsky's other works, in particular Crime andPunishment, suggest that nihilism
be eclipsed by suffering and that man be redeemed by what Kierkegaard might term a
leap to God.
17 Heinrich Heine, Selected Verse, ed. and trans. Peter Branscombe (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1968) p.40. Translation amended.
18 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 1901, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann and




Alienation, ambiguity and a persistent expression of homelessness dominate Kafka's
writing. If language is the most prominent cultural marker, that which most readily
furnishes us with a sense of identity, then self-insertion within another discursive
system automatically renders the writer an 'outsider'. Kafka writes of course in
German, the minority language ofPrague and thus he writes neither in the Czech of
his birthplace nor in the Hebrew of his ancestry. Whilst this effectuates a kind of
cultural aporia, it simultaneously dislocates the writer from one linguistic or literary
heritage and opens another, thereby enabling the construction of fresh fictional modes,
or at least enabling the formation of an alternative discourse within a major language.
This dual movement of emancipation and insertion is productive ofwhat Deleuze and
Guattari term a "minor literature".19
Language, particularly choice of language, assumes increasing importance in the
development of the existentialist novel. Kierkegaard describes how for a writer,
movement into an alien significatory system results in estrangement:
Next after stripping myself naked, possessing nothing, not the smallest
thing in the world, and then leaping into the water, I like most of all to
speak a foreign language, preferably a living one, so as to become
quite foreign to myself. (J §351, p.89)20
Entry into language then, particularly a foreign language, results in a fundamental
alienation and can be read therefore as corresponding to one's entry into existence;
what Heidegger characterises as man's thrownness [geworfenheit], The opening
sentences of bothMetamorphosis and The Trial depict this aspect ofman's being.
Kafka presents Gregor Samsa and JosefK. thrown into concrete situations:
19 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 'What is a Minor Literature' in (ed.) Ruth V.
Gross, Critical Essays on Franz Kafka (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1990), pp.35-49. Deleuze
and Guattari write that "A minor literature doesn't come from a minor language; it is
rather that which a minority construct within a major language." p.35.
20 Alastair Hannay in his edition ofKierkegaard's journals retains the Danish
"entfremdef which he translates as "estranged". Soren Kierkegaard, Papers and
Journals. A Selection, ed. and trans. Alastair Hannay (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1996), p. 138.
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As Gregor Samsa awoke one morning from uneasy dreams he found
himself transformed in his bed into a gigantic insect.21
Someone must have been spreading lies about Josef K. for without
having done anything wrong he was arrested one morning.22
These passages also encapsulate the most immediately discernible differences between
Kafka and Dostoevsky: narrative mode and narrative tone. In his study ofKafka,
Martin Greenberg asserts that his fiction is related in a "dream narrative"23. Sartre, in
a essay comparing Blanchot and Kafka, highlights the "minute and courtly style", the
"nightmare politeness"24, of the latter.
Where Dostoevsky's tone is philippic and sclerotic, Kafka's is matter-of-fact and
calmly declarative; there is notable absence of exclamation, particularly in the first
passage quoted. Kafka's heroes are never surprised by their fantastic situations.
Heidegger's description of Dasein as thrown projection illuminates too Kafka's
characterisation or more precisely Kafka's negative characterisation. K. is both
presence and absence, both a being and a lack.
What is it that defines K. as a unique being? Neither his physical
appearance (we know nothing about that), nor his biography (we don't
know it), nor his name (he has none), nor his memories, his
predilections, his complexes. His behaviour? His field of action is
lamentably limited. His thoughts? Yes, Kafka unceasingly traces K.'s
reflections, but these are bent exclusively on the current situation [...]
All ofK.'s interior life is absorbed by the situation he finds himself
trapped in, and nothing that might refer beyond that situation (K.'s
memories, his metaphysical reflections, his notions about other people)
is revealed to us.25
No family, no physical characteristics, no psychology: working through absence,
Kafka's text presents us with an existential situation, moreover a situation in the
21 Franz Kafka, Metamorphosis and Other Stories, 1916-1931, trans. Willa and Edwin
Muir (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), p.9.
22 Franz Kafka, The Trial, 1925, trans. Douglas Scott and Chris Waller (London: Pan,
1977) p. 17. Hereafter T.
23 Martin Greenberg, The Terror ofArt: Kafka andModern Literature (London:
Andre Deutsch, 1968) p. 10.
24 Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Aminadab or the Fantastic Considered as a Language' in Literary
Essays, trans. Annette Michelson (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), p.57.
25Milan Kundera, The Art of the Novel, pp.25-6.
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present, it is happening now, which has no discoverable causal antecedents. This
causal lack spills into character, for as Kundera notes the space and detail which
enable the attribution of behavioural patterns is absent. We enter a world in which any
'because' is either wholly lacking or so inaccessible that its existence makes little
effective difference to the individual.
Whilst Notesfrom Underground utilises a first person narrator, Kafka elects for a
third-person voice, only occasionally interrupted by moments of free indirect
discourse. A predominantly third-person narrative mode may seem an unusual stylistic
choice for an existentialist novelist but if, as some critics have suggested, Kafka's
primary philosophical influences are Kierkegaard and Nietzsche26, then the reason for
the predominance of a third-person style may have been suggested to Kafka by the
former. In his Journals, Kierkegaard writes that; "the majority ofmen are curtailed
'I's'; what was planned by nature as a possibility capable of being sharpened into an I
is soon dulled into a third person." (J §1376, p. 533) The use of a third person narratal
mode helps therefore to underscore what Sartre identifies as the primary thematic of
Kafka's text:
That gloomy, evanescent atmosphere of The Trial, that ignorance
which, however, is lived as ignorance, that total opacity which can
only be felt as a presentiment across an entire translucency - this is
nothing but the description of our
being-in-the-midst-of-the-world-for-others. (BN 266)
The deployment of narrative strategies other than stream-of-consciousness, is
suggestive then ofK.'s being a "curtailed I", of his individual voice being absorbed by
the third person and thus by the Other. The textual moments which employ free
indirect discourse serve to assist rather than mitigate this move. Such a narrative
mode although 'freer' than a third-person technique, still foregrounds the absence of
26 Sartre, discussing Kierkegaard's The Concept ofDread in a letter to Simone de
Beauvoir states that Kafka "feathered his nest through that book." Ed. Simone de
Beauvoir, Witness toMy Life: The Letters ofJean-Paid Sartre to Simone de
Beauvoir 1926-1939, 1983, trans. Lee Fahnestock and Norman Macafee (London:
Hamish Hamilton, 1992), p.416.
Malcolm Bradbury in his The Modern World: Ten Great Writers agrees with Sartre
on the influence ofKierkegaard but also points out Kafka's fondness for Nietzsche.
The Modern World: Ten Great Writers (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1988),
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the subjective 'I' which immediately transmits experience. K's language is always
filtered, he never speaks as himself, he never appears to the reader in his own
language. Free indirect speech occupies a lexical no-man's land midway between a
pure subjectivity and the totalised objectivity of the third-person form. Kafka's
application of narrative mechanisms reinforce then the condition of the textual
subject: K. is not a Kierkegaardian 'existing individual', not a definite subjectivity;
hence he is allowed no unmediated speech. Ffowever this may also be read as a
Dostoevskian strategy. Crime andPunishment uses a third person narrative and here
the impression is that there is always something beyond Raskolnikov, always
something confining and controlling him.
Like the underground man, K. exemplifies moments ofwhat Sartre terms 'bad faith'.
Yet if the underground man's 'bad faith' arises from a surfeit of imagination, then
JosefK.'s proceeds from a determined lack. In his essay 'K.'s Quest', Auden
describes how
the nature ofKafka's hero is radically different from all previous
conceptions of the heroic. Previously the hero is the exceptional
individual, exceptional either by his inborn gifts or his acquired virtues
[. . .] K. on the other hand, suffers and fails to achieve his goal precisely
because he is an individual [...] he cannot become what he wishes [...]
because he cannot cease to be K.27
Auden identifies K.'s ordinariness as an entirely new conception of the heroic - a
moot point - but it is his conclusion that is of significance for here Auden is in error
K.'s difficulties arise not because he is an individual but precisely because he is not.
He cannot become so because he lives for, and allows himself to be, manipulated by
others. Such an inauthentic mode of being is discussed by both Sartre and Heidegger.
In Being and Time, Heidegger describes Dasein's immersion in the world of "Others":
"It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others. Dasein's everyday
possibilities of Being are for others to dispose of as they please. These Others
27 W.H. Auden, 'K.'s Quest' in ed. Angel Flores, The Kafka Problem (New York:
New Directions, 1946), pp.46-52, p.5 1-2.
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moreover are not definite Others." (BT 164) In Heideggerian terms, K. becomes
absorbed in the world ofdasMan, the 'They'28:
The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self which we distinguish from
the authentic Self-that is, from the Selfwhich has been taken hold of in
its own way [. . .] As they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed
into the "they", and must find itself [...] IfDasein discovers the world
in its own way [...] and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own
authentic Being, then this discovery of the 'world' and this disclosure
ofDasein are always accomplished as a clearing-away of concealments
and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein
bars its own way. (BT 167)
The Other, the they, is both within and without: the shadowy state is the 'indefinite'
Other, but it is K. himselfwho effectively accedes to his dispersal. This is why
ultimately K. is disposed of "like a dog" (7254). K.'s executioners are representative
of the "anonymous others" and his dying "like a dog" acutely depicts his
non-achievment of authentic human being.
K.'s lack of definity is suggested further by the a-sequentiality of the text. Prima
facie, the novel appears to follow the Aristotelian method rejected by Dostoevsky,
but as Greenberg highlights The Trial is more an unfolding of an image than the
presentation of an action; a deepening rather than a progression.29 With the exception
of the opening and concluding sections, the order in which the chapters are presented
could be altered with little loss of sense. The text is paratactic, episodic, and one
chapter (chapter eight) is incomplete. This is presumably not how Kafka would have
wished the novel to be published, but as it stands this apparent randomness aids the
reader in recognising K. as incomplete and inauthentic.
If the existentialist concerns of authenticity and alienation are constitutive of the text's
primary thematic dynamic then perhaps the most salient moment of The Trial occurs
in chapter nine. K.'s conversation with the priest together with the latter's rehearsal of
the 'Before the Law' parable encapsulates the novel's theme of inauthenticity. When
K. states that he is going to seek additional assistance in his case, the priest replies:
28 The notion of the crowd as 'untruth' is found in most existentialist philosophies.
Heidegger's attitude is present in both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard.
29 The Terror ofArt: Kafka andModern Literature, p. 11.
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"You ask too much help from other people [...] don't you see that this is not the kind
of help you need [...] can't you see what is just in front of you nose!" (T 237) This
passage restates the advice given to K. at the outset of the novel: first by the warders;
"[do] not allow yourself to be distracted by useless ideas."(Z 23) - a very
Dostoevskian monition - and subsequently by The Inspector; "Think more about
yourself'(Z 28). The priest here represents what Sartre typifies as "The Other": "The
other looks at me and as such he holds the secret ofmy being, he knows what I am.
Thus the profound meaning ofmy being is outside ofme, imprisoned in an absence."
(BN 363) Expressing a general existentialist imprecation Sartre declares that "it is
necessary that we make ourselves what we are." (BN 59) K. however is manufactured
from without. At the beginning of the novel we are told that K. "still had his liberty."
(T 21) but he does not use it.
K.'s quest is ultimately a quest for meaning: K. identifies two crucial questions at the
outset of the novel: "who is making the accusation? What authority is conducting the
proceedings?" (T 27) but seeks answers in the external, in the court and its
employees. When K. is taken a tour of the court offices by the usher, K. asks for help
in finding the exit, fearing he will become lost if unaided. The usher replies that there
is only one way K. can go. (T 84) K. however fails to take this Nietzschean30 advice.
K. perceives that meaning and truth lie outwith the self, he fails to recognise that they
are constructs of the subject. Thus when he becomes ill during his tour of the court,
the girl who assists him states that "our judicial system is not very well known to the
public". (Z' 88) Implicit in this is that the answers K. seeks are to be found in the
private world, in subjectivity.
30 In 'Schopenhauer as Educator' Nietzsche writes;
No one can construct for you the bridge upon which precisely you
must cross the stream of life, no one but you yourself alone. There are
to be sure countless paths and bridges and demi-gods which would
bear you through this stream; but only at the cost of yourself: you
would put yourself in pawn and lose yourself. There exists in the world
a single path along which no one can go except you: whither does it
lead? Do not ask, go along it.
Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Schopenhauer as Educator' in UntimelyMeditations,
1873-1876, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983),
pp. 127-194, p.129.
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Das Gesetz, the German for 'law', is neuter. The normal capitalisation of the noun in
German, suggests a proper name and thus a universal, an abstraction, but also perhaps
a Platonic form. As a Platonic ideal, the Law lies outwith the reach of the phenomenal
in the realm of unknowable noumena.
Watchful, fearful, hopeful, the answer prowls around the question,
searches desperately in its impenetrable face, follows it along the most
senseless paths, that is along the paths leading as far as possible away
from the answer31
Meaning is never found because one seeks it in an inaccessible metaphysical realm -
"the very highest Court, which is absolutely inaccessible to you, to me and to all of
us." (7181)- whereas one should search the phenomenal, one should search oneself.
Man, as the existentialists see him, is no longer anchored in the transcendent. Meaning
is made, not discovered; it is brought about through the exercise of individual
freedom.32
The Trial opens and closes with unanswered questions. K. and the reader share the
same hermeneutical problem: what is the text about? The reader, however, like K.,
never has a completely unsullied view of the textual world. The crepuscular quality of
the narrative renders the text ambiguous. The innominate officials (a technique utilised
similarly in Conrad's Heart ofDarkness), the unspecified charge, the unnamed city
with its anonymous streets and anonymous rooms combine to produce an inexorable
opacity which the reader in common with K. cannot quite penetrate. As is suggested
31 Franz Kafka, The CollectedAphorisms (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994), no. 76,
p.18.
32 In this compare Nietzsche: "The "true world" and the "apparent world" - that
means: the mendaciously invented world and reality." Ecce Homo: How One Becomes
What One Is in On the Genealogy ofMorals and Ecce Homo, 1887 and 1908, trans.
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), p.218.
Nietzsche's resistance to Platonic ideals also surfaces in Twilight of the Idols:
"The 'apparent' world is the only one: the 'real' world has only been lyingly added
The real world - an idea no longer of any use, not even a duty any longer - an
idea grown useless, superfluous, consequently a refuted idea: let us abolish it!"
Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, 1889 and 1895, trans. R. J.
Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), p.36, p.38.
Sartre and Heidegger also reject the phenomena/noumena dualism.
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by Notesfrom Underground, whilst life is being lived, the individual cannot access
some objective viewpoint from which order and purpose will become apparent. Lack
of perspicuity therefore is Kafka's move against the possibility of absolute knowledge.
Ambiguity of setting forces the reader to maintain focus upon K. whilst it also
declines attention from the external objective world; the two must be grasped
together. Kafka's elision of the systematic is in one sense more implicit than
Dostoevsky's but in another just as explicit. In The Trial, The Court fulfils a role
similar to that assigned The Crystal Palace in Notes from Underground in that it
encompasses the objective systematicity of the determined world, where every
component (every individual) has its allotted function: the court is literally
everywhere. Sartre sees it as a metaphor for one's existence; "the characteristic in
human reality of being perpetually in court. To be free is to have one's freedom
perpetually on trial" (BN502) One has to struggle, choose and act, continuously.
If as Sartre claims, K. is not absurd in the Camusian sense'3, then he certainly seems
to be in the manner described by Kierkegaard:
The absurd. And what is the absurcfi It is ... that I, a rational being,
must act in a case where my reason, my powers of reflection tell me:
you can just as well do the one thing as the other, that is to say where
my reason and reflection say: you cannot act and yet here is where I
have to act. (J §871, p.291)
This passage explains the following segment of The Trial, "there was a mutual
attraction between the court and guilt from which it followed that the room where the
hearing would take place was bound to be up whichever stairs K. happened to
choose." (T 52) The guilt to which Kafka alludes emerges like Sartrean 'nausea' from
K.'s consciousness of a need to choose and thus a need to act. The need to act is
suggested further by the explicit theatricality of the text When the two executioners
arrive in the last chapter, K. describes them as "old ham actors" and asks "What
theatre are you playing at?" {T249) For Sartre, drama or theatre is inherently
philosophical because it reveals man in action34, however, this can be expanded to
33'Aminadab or the Fantastic Considered as a Language', Literary Essays, p.62.
34 In 'The Purposes ofWriting':
philosophy is dramatic in nature. The time for contemplating the
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include the novel. Fiction ofwhatever form is employed by existentialist novelists to
depict the 'being-there' ofman. A particular subjectivity exists in a particular world
within which he or she has to act. Setting is therefore of import and this would seem
to defeat any interpretation which assess the text using psychiatric tropes of the
Freudian or Jungian type.35 Lionel Trilling in his piece 'Freud and Literature' instances
a psychological interpretation: "Kafka, with an apparent awareness ofwhat he was
doing, has explored the Freudian conceptions of guilt and punishment, of the dream
and of the fear of the father."36 Psychological or psychoanalytic readings seem to
ignore one ofKafka's aphorisms - "Never again psychology!"37 - but further they
relegate the world K. inhabits to a form of inconsequential narrative packing.
Moreover a psychological reading needs some evidence of a psyche with which to get
going. As Kundera points out, if psychological realism depends upon character
information, whether ways of speaking, ways of behaving, or a past which motivates
the present, then K. possess none of these, he has no properties other than his
being-in-a-situation.
In What is Literature? Sartre writes "the degree of realism and truth of Kafka's
mythology, these are never given. The reader must invent them all in a continual
immobility of substances which are what they are, or for laying bare
the laws underlying a succession of phenomena is past. Philosophy is
concerned with man - who is at once agent and actor, who produces
and plays his drama while he lives the contradictions of his situation,
until either his individuality is shattered or his conflicts are resolved. A
play ... is the most appropriate vehicle today for showing man in
action, - i.e. manfull stop. It is with this man that philosophy, from its
own point of view, should be concerned. That is why the theatre is
philosophical and philosophy dramatic.
Jean-Paul Sartre, 'The Purposes ofWriting' in Between Existentialism andMarxism,
1972, trans. John Matthews (London: NLB, 1974), pp.8-32, pp.11-12.
35 The existentialist analysis favoured by the 'anti-psychiatrists' R.D. Laing and
Ludwig Binswanger rejects the use of such abstractions as 'The Oedipal Complex' or
'The Collective Unconsciousness' because they rely upon universalistic notions of
human nature. Sartre's concept of'bad faith' is an attempt to explain consciousness
existentially and thus without psychological/psychiatric universals. Fleidegger too
eschews all traditional psychological terminology in his Being and Time.
36 Lionel Trilling, 'Freud and Literature' in ed. David Lodge, 20th Century Literary
Criticism-. A Reader (London: Longman, 1972), pp.276-90, p.279.
37 Franz Kafka, The CollectedAphorisms, No. 93, p. 22.
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exceeding of the written thing. To be sure, the author guides him, but all he does is
guide him. The landmarks he sets up are separated by the void. The reader must unite
them." (WIL 31) Absence of realistic plotting necessitates that the reader focus upon
K. and K.'s situation. To achieve this consistency of focus, Kafka purges both simile
and metaphor from the narrative for both propose a 'like a', their employment would
lift the narrated events from the concrete. The Trial maintains a constant haecceity, a
precision. All that matters in the novel is here and now. Kafka's text does not utilise
the first-person strategy that we find in Notesfrom Underground but it is nevertheless
a centred text in that it concentrates entirely upon JosefK. We experience the text
from K.'s viewpoint alone. The use of an initial makes K. into a symbol, a paradigm
but also suggests a percolated subjectivity or an individual reduced to a 'case'. In his
symbolic last name is encompassed one of the paradoxes of existentialism: K. is both a
particular and a universal; both paradigm and individual.
SARTRE AND CAMUS
The Outsider and Nausea
In a review essay devoted to The Outsider, Sartre quotes the Gallimard editor Jean
Paulhan who describes Camus' novel as "like Kafka written by Hemingway".38 Sartre
disagrees:
M. Camus' views are entirely of this earth, and Kafka is the novelist of
impossible transcendence; for him, the universe is full of signs that we
cannot understand; there is a reverse side to the decor. For M. Camus,
on the contrary, the tragedy of human existence lies in the absence of
any meaning, (ibid.)
For Kafka, meaning does exist but it is inaccessible. Camus' cycle of the Absurd, of
which The Outsider forms one third, is a means of presenting an individual in a
universe where meaning is absent, for absurdity, in the Camusian sense, arises from a
fundamental collision between an individual's desire for clarity and an implacable
universe; it is both a depiction and a realisation of a basic and ineluctable incoherence.
As Sartre notes, absurdity and the absurd novel constitute both a statement of a fact
and the transcription of the lucid awareness which certain people acquire of this fact.
38Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Camus' The Outsider', Literary Essays, pp.24-41, p.34.
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(ibid.) Within Camus' novel, awareness and presentation of absurdity is registered on
the twin levels of form and content.
Like Sartre, Camus looks to American fiction39 to provide literary models. In The
Outsider these influences are registered in and through the narrative form, but, and
again like Sartre, borrowed form is used to better advance existential themes. Camus
writes deliberately against the tradition of the realistic novel of Balzac. The most
immediately apparent signifier ofCamus' departure from French literary tradition is
also one which is unfortunately lost when the novel is translated into English. As
many critics have pointed out, Camus for the most part utilises the perfect rather than
the past historic, the preterite.40 This is of course crucial at a thematic level given that
the past historic designates narrative order, chronological sequentiality and conveys a
historical teleology. It also maintains an accent of immutable determinability, and
determinsm, other than by self and of self, is, as we have discussed above, rejected
both by existentialist philosophers and existentialist novelists. This is given a
theoretical treatment by Roland Barthes, but I want to postpone discussion ofBarthes
until the next chapter, for what he terms 'zero degree' writing is of considerable
importance to an understanding ofA Chancer.
The Outsider uses a first person narrator, but not however in a traditional manner.
Consider the opening segment of the novel.
Mother died today. Or maybe yesterday, I don't know. I had a
telegram from the home: 'Mother passed away. Funeral tomorrow.
Yours sincerely.' That doesn't mean anything. It may have been
yesterday. The old people's home is at Marengo, forty miles from
Algiers. I'll catch the two o'clock bus and get there in the afternoon.
39Camus describes his not unproblematic relationship with American fiction in an
interview with Jeanine Delpech. Whilst emphasising that The Outsider uses the
technique of the American novel, Camus feels that this method leads to a "dead end":
"I would give a hundred Hemingways for one Stendhal or one Benjamin Constant."
See 'Three Interviews', Lyrical and Critical, 1950, trans. Philip Thody (London:
Hamish Hamilton, 1967), pp.259-274, p.261.
'"'See for instance Patrick McCarthy, Albert Camus: The Stranger (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.22. An earlier but still valuable discussion of
Camus' writing can be found in John Cruickshank, Albert Camus and the Literature
ofRevolt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960).
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Then I can keep the vigil and I'll come back tomorrow night. I asked
my boss for two days off and he couldn't refuse under the
circumstances. But he didn't seem pleased. I even said, 'It's not my
fault.' He didn't answer.41
In French, the demotic 'maman' imbues the narrative with a colloquiality which is
dimisished by the use of'mother' in the translation.42 However, we can see that the
Hemingway comparison holds valid for the opening is composed of concise colourless
sentences. This is a purged narrative, there is one solitary adjective, "old", and Camus
uses a noticeably reduced vocabulary. Sentences are short, clipped, but crucially what
is absent is any sense of omniscience. Traditional first-person speakers convey a
quality of priviliged understanding which is wholly absent here. "Mother died today.
Or maybe yesterday, I don't know." The epistemological doubt is registered in the
second sentence and this opens up the novel's theme of incoherence and so absurdity.
We receive experiences as Meursault lives through them, the first-person ensures a
directness and the form itself is pivotal in the production of sense, for here as
throughout, the sentences are rarely relational. Meursault is not then an understanding
narrator for understanding is a retrospective activity. Meursault describes rather than
comprehends. As Sartre points out, within The Outsider:
Each sentence is a present instant, but not an indecisive one that
spreads like a stain to the following one. The sentence is sharp, distinct
and self-contained. It is seperated by a void from the following one
[. . .] The world is destroyed and reborn from sentence to sentence.
When the word makes an appearance it is creation ex nihilo. The
sentences in The Outsider are islands.(ibid. 38)
Islands in the stream perhaps, but it is the absence of relation which is key. The
sentences are isolates, they lack conjuction, explanation or clarification. They
highlight only tense and verb, providing an existential immediacy and move through
juxtaposition rather than progression. Temporality is skewed for Meursault is
uncertain when his mother died, today or yesterday. This is Camus' way of registering
the lack of connection in the Absurdist universe: meaningful frames, whether
41Albert Camus, The Outsider, 1942, trans. Joseph Laredo (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1983). Hereafter O.
42 "Aujourd'hui, maman est morte". Albert Camus, L 'Etranger, 1942 (London:
Methuen, 1958), p.21.
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narrational, epistemic or temporal, are withdrawn. This is vividly rendered at the close
of the first section of the novel. When Meursault is interviewed by the examining
magistrate, he is asked to recount the day during which the Arab has been shot. He
describes it thus: "Raymond, the beach, the swim, the fight, the beach again, the little
spring, the sun and the five shots." (O 66) Here we are presented with stills rather
than a moving picture. Meursault can only provide the factual instants, he cannot
provide an explanation or a connection. He relates conjoined, in Hume's sense, events
rather than moments in a causal sequence. Noticeably however the only conjunction
which intrudes, "and" links the sun to the five shots. Throughout Camus' text the sun
symbolises the otherness and unintelligibility of the universe. It beats down steadily
and unremittingly; it is simply there, impassive and it underscores the contingency of
the human world.
We just stared fixedly at one another and here amid the sand, the sun
and the sea, in the dual silence of the flute and the water, everything
was at a standstill. I realized at that point that you could either shoot
or not shoot. (O 57)
The sun represents the absence ofmeaning and this absence ensures that Meursault is
left to form his judgement alone. Nothing is present which can assist, for everything
else is "still"; nothing points to a solution or a way to go. Decision is entirely up to
Meursault. Thus the sun is often felt as an oppressive presence. Meursault wants to
"escape from the sun", to rid himself and the world of incoherence and to do so, in
the first section of the novel, he indulges in a sensual life, but the novel ends with
Meursault establishing what he terms a "melancholy truce": I looked up at the mass of
signs and stars in the night sky and laid myself open for the first time to the benign
indifference of the world." (O 117) This is the lucidity of awareness, the realisation to
which Sartre refers. Absurdity is not therefore something which can be negated,
instead it is accepted and one lives with the consequences.
Whilst Camus uses form to render content, within the novel there is a more general
problematisation of language. A contrast between two languages is activated in the
first paragraph of the novel. The language of the state "Mother passed away. Funeral
tomorrow. Yours sincerely" attempts to transcribe and enclose a state of affairs, but
for Meursault it "doesn't mean anything". In a reversal, the language of the court, of
the prosecution, attempts to comprehend Meursault but it fails, there is a
communicative incapacity: they cannot understand Meursault and Meursault cannot
understand them. He records that the judge "hadn't quite grasped my system of
defence". (O 99) Asked why he killed the Arab: "Mixing up my words a bit and
realizing that I sounded ridiculous, I said quickly that it was because of the sun. Some
people laughed." (O 99) Language it seems cannot replicate or accurately depict
without distortion and so the alternative is silence. Here the novel suggests that only
in silence can the obfuscatory tendency of language be diminished. Remaining silent
precludes the falsification which inheres in language.
The novel charts then the collision between the individual, Meursault, and what he
terms the "mechanism". This term has several referents. One is the guillotine,
Meursault's method of execution, but it refers further to the language, the structures,
and the society, within which Meursault finds himself. The mechanism renders
Meursault an outsider because he cannot be accommodated within its fixed
parameters. It is the mechanism that judges, the mechanism that condemns and the
mechanism that will end his life. It is a regulated and ordered system, it is the progeny
of the Crystal Palace and The Court. "What interests me at the moment is trying to
escape from the mechanism, trying to find if there's any way out of the inevitable" {()
104) but the text reveals that "everything was set against it, and I was caught in the
mechanism again." (O 105)
Sartre's 1938 novel Nausea recalls both Notesfrom Underground, and The Notebook
ofMalte Laurids Brigge. As with the former, the novel is presented to us as an edited
text; like the latter, it assumes the form of a diary. The diary form is Sartre's method
of rendering the discontinuity of experience that we discussed above - the first page of
Roquentin's diary is an undated sheet, placed at random by the editors - but Nausea is
a more explicitly philosophical text than The Outsider. In her study of the novel,
Rhiannon Goldthorpe quotes Sartre's description ofNausea-, as being a'factum sur
la contingence"43. As Goldthorpe states, factum has two senses: the setting out of a
43Rhiannon Goldthorpe, LaNausee (London: Harper Collins, 1991), p.2.
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case, a presentation, and also a polemic. Nausea is Sartre's polemic upon
contingency. As a novel it presents in fictional form the majority of the themes later
formalised in Being andNothingness.
Like the underground man, Roquentin lives a life of bad faith, a vicarious life:
"everything I know about life I have learnt from books." (A 95) Sartre's narrator
describes of a fictional character "I was lending him my life", but unlike Dostoevsky's
anti-hero, Roquentin realises his error: "I've stopped writing my book about
Robellon; it is finished, I can't go on writing it. What am I going to do with my life?"
(A 138); "I have just learnt, all of a sudden, for no apparent reason, that I have been
lying to myself for ten years. Adventures are in books." (A 58) The something which
has happened is of course the 'nausea' to which the title of the text refers. Nausea,
what Mathieu in The Age ofReason describes as 'the taste of oneself44 occurs
through the realisation of both the factical and the contingent aspects of human
existence. Contingency reveals the gap between the subjective choosing self and the
objective, determined world.
The essential thing is contingency. I mean that, by definition, existence
is not necessity. To exist is simply to be there; what exists appears, lets
itself be encountered, but you can never deduce it. There are people, I
believe, who have understood that. Only they have tried to overcome
this contingency by inventing a necessary, causal being. But no
necessary being can explain existence: contingency is not an illusion,
an appearance which can be dissipated; it is absolute, and consequently
perfect gratuitousness. Everything is gratuitous, that park, this town,
and myself. When you realise that, it turns your stomach over and
everything starts floating about [.. .] that is the Nausea; that is what the
Bastards [. . .] try to hide from themselves with their idea of rights. But
what a poor lie [...]. (A 188)
Contingency is pervasive for it encompasses both existence and essence - what is
might not have been and what is might not have been what it is - both Roquentin and
the park in which he sits. For Roquentin, contingency is equivalent to absurdity and
44"I am my own taste, I exist. That's what existence means: draining one's own self
dry without the sense of thirst." Jean-Paul Sartre, The Age ofReason, 1945, trans.
Eric Sutton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), p.48.
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his realisation of man's meaninglessness sub specie aeternitatis is fully revealed when
he perceives a chestnut tree:
The root of the chestnut tree plunged into the ground just underneath
my bench. I no longer remembered that it was a root. Words had
disappeared, and with them the meaning of things, the methods of
using them, the feeble landmarks which men have traced on their
surface. I was sitting, slightly bent, my head bowed, alone in front of
that black knotty mass, which was utterly crude and frightened me. (N
182)
This passage depicts the crude remoteness of nature: the individual is left "alone" in
front of its "black knotty mass". Anti-Romantic in the extreme, there is here no
suggestion of communion with some transcendent Geist\ instead there is a decided
lack of connection and relation - everything is de trop. The tree does not mean
anything, does not represent anything: it just exists. But Roquentin differs form
Meursault here in that whilst the end of The Outsider finds the latter regarding nature
with indifference and thereby achieving a kind of comfort, a consolation, for
Roquentin nature induces fear. Notice too that language has become ineffectual, at
least as a means of transmitting and holding on to experience: "Words had
disappeared, and with them the meaning of things". Words and things effectively
come apart, revealing an absence of necessity, of permanent conjunction. This
permanence has been usurped, replaced by the contingent.
I am beginning to believe that nothing can ever be proved. These are
reasonable hypotheses which take the facts into account: but I am only
too well aware that they come from me, that they are simply a way of
unifying my own knowledge. (N 26)
Meaning, relation and form are products of human artifice, thus when they are
stripped away all that remains is the brute thisness of things, naked existence.
Roquentin therefore becomes aware, avant la lettre, of the distance between what
Being andNothingness terms etre-pour-soi and etre-en-soi, being-for-itself, and
being-in-itself. All that is not man is etre-en-soi. Man, because of his unique
consciousness is burdened with responsibility, 'condemned' to be free:
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" Never have I felt as strongly as today that I was devoid of secret
dimensions, limited to my body, to the airy thoughts that float up from
it like bubbles. I build my memories with my present. I am rejected,
abandoned in the present. I try in vain to rejoin the past: I cannot
escape from myself. (N 53)
The attempt to escape what one is (a free choosing self) results, as in Kafka, with
subsumption in 'the they' or as Sartre has it 'bad faith': "People who live in society
have learnt how to see themselves, in mirrors, as they appear to their friends." (N 32)
What is described as "the mirror trap" (TV 49) represents Being-for-others. For
Roquentin, the portraits of the bourgeoisie are symbolic of bad faith at both an
individual and societal level. In Bouville society men such as Olivier Blevigne
construct and inhabit a world ordered upon inveterate notions of'rights' and 'duty'.
The Bouville elite "were entitled to everything: to life, to work, to wealth, to
authority, to respect, and finally to immortality." Such a society determines the roles
of its people; women are above all "wives and mothers"45, who "raise fine children"
and teach them "their rights and duties, religion, and respect for the traditions which
have gone into the making ofFrance." (N 122-123) We are told how Blevigne's son
swore at an early age to "devote his life to the re-establishment of order." (N 134) But
Roquentin warns that "the world of explanations and reasons is not that of existence."
(N 185) Like Meursault, Roquentin has seen under and through these everyday
purposive structures. Significantly then, the portraits of the town dignitaries are dark
brown46; the narrative thus establishes a connection between the Bouville notaries and
the brute existence of the chestnut tree. The tree just exists, the bourgeoisie surrender
their freedom to a culturally transmitted determinism and therefore become as
artificial as their portraits.
45 This passage, which designates women as the "help-mates" of the (male) town
notaries, hints at the feminist existentialism of Simone de Beauvoir and the self/other
dualism discussed in her The Second Sex. The allocation of roles predicts de
Beauvoir's pronouncement that "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman. No
biological, psychological, or economic fate determines the figure that the human
female presents in society; it is civilisation as a whole that produces this creature".
The Second Sex, 1949, trans. H.M. Parshley (London: Pan, 1988), p.295.
46 "The general hue of the portraits bordered on dark brown. Bright colours had been
banished, out of a sense of decency." p. 123.
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The "mirror trap" is however also a method of narration. Sartre begins his essay on
Dos Passos by stating that "A novel is a mirror"47, a relatively traditional assertion,
but Sartre intends a specific kind of mirroring. Here Sartre effects an overlap between
phenomenology and fictional technique and the resulting synthesis is Sartre's
challenge to both French literature and French philosophy. As R D Cumming points
out, Sartre sees in Dos Passos a particular kind ofmirroring, a particular kind of
reflecting.
Dos Passos art of storytelling is superficial in the sense that a looking
glass is merely "reflective"; all that is disclosed by his descriptions is a
succession of appearances [. . .] But reflection in the traditional French
novel was a different and more profound undertaking, which Sartre is
employing the mirror analogy to discredit [...] In this tradition
reflection is explanatory, individuals in the novel pause to reflect and
explain what they are doing, by reference to their characters. And
insofar as their explanations are incomplete, they allow themselves to
be further explained by the reflections of the novelist. They, or the
novelist, intervene in the succession of appearances, go behind what
they appear to be doing, and discover what they are really doing [. . .]
The succession of appearances is no longer inexplicable but
predetermined.48
Like Camus, Sartre seeks to eject determinism, the predetermined, from the narrative
but for Sartre, this is to retain the phenomenological Abschattungen, the succession of
appearances by which consciousness is constituted. "I was the root of the chestnut
tree. Or rather I was all consciousness of its existence. Still detached from it - since I
was conscious of it - and yet lost in it, nothing but it." (N 188) This passage from
Nausea is clearly phenomenological: consciousness is nothing other than the object(s)
it intends; consciousness is consciousness ofand consciousness is by virtue of its not
being what it is conscious of. Through praising the technical devices ofDos Passos,
Sartre is simultaneously rejecting the Proustian novel Sartre wants to replace it with a
narrative concerned with the detailing ofAbschattungen, "inexplicable tumults of
colour, sound and passion" (90) and this means description without explanation.
"Proust analysed them, related them to former states and thereby made them
47Jean-Paul Sartre, 'John Dos Passos and 1919\ Literary Essays, pp.88-96, p.88.
48Robert Denoon Cumming 'Introduction', The Philosophy ofJean-Paul Sartre (New
York: Random House, 1965), pp.3-47, p7.
71
inevitable. Dos Passos wants to retain only their factual nature." (91) As does Sartre
for whom writing should be phenomenological in that it should detail without
explaining. So if Sartre rejects the Husserlian epoche because it brackets the world - it
leaves consciousness wrcsituated - he does however practice a kind of novelistic
epoche in that he brackets out either an explaining, reflective character or an
explaining, reflective author.
This sketch has brought out a cluster of themes and techniques. Dostoevsky discloses
existential themes through a narrative written in a language only recently utilised for
literary purposes. Notesfrom Underground is centred on a disaffected individual
attempting to achieve and exhibit freedom against prevailing social and philosophical
schemes. As we have seen this narrative is unsystematic, with both form and narrator
attempting to resist the determined and the determining. The underground man lapses
into bad faith, something he shares with Kafka's Joseph K.. Kafka provides us with
the motif of inaccessible meaning and the narrative technique of negative
characterisation. Kafka's individual, like Dostoevsky's, is positioned against a system,
but here this system is expanded and intensified until becoming omnipresent. The
Trial exemplifies fantastic realism; K's. trial, his situation, has the logic and
consistency of a dream. Camus too illustrates an individual conflict, here against 'the
mechanism' and this conflict is delivered through a purged narrative which attempts
to register the incomprehensibility of the world. For Sartre, the task of the writer is to
reveal the contingent and thereby the freedom ofwhich the self is made. Roquentin,
the most intellectual of these existential protagonists, has an internal conflict between
acceptance of his freedom and the need for permanence. Contingency and freedom
necessitate a counterbalancing fictional technique which Sartre, like Camus, gleans
from American novelists. This then in brief is the existential tradition. This is the
background against which Kelman's novels are to be read. I shall from time to time
assess other texts, but these it seems to me are the crucial narratives in any




Ambiguity, Contingency and Possibility.
Men ofchance.- The essential part of every invention is the work of
chance, but most men never encounter this chance. Friedrich
Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices ofMorality 1
[T]he philosophy of existence decisively breaks the frame of necessity
within which every type of dogmatic philosophy moves. The
perspective that it recognises, and within which it moves, is that of
possibilities. Nicholas Abbagnano, 'Existentialism is a Positive
Philosophy'.2
What is action? - the eternal question of the novel, its constitutive
question so to speak. How is a decision born? How is it transformed
into an act, and how do acts connect to make an adventure? Milan
Kundera, The Art of the Novel3
Loose ends, things unrelated, shifts, nightmare journeys, cities arrived
at and left, meetings, desertions, betrayals, all manner of unions,
adulteries, triumphs, defeats ... these are the facts. Alexander
Trocchi, Cain's Book.4
'Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices ofMorality, 1881, trans.
R J Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.364.
2Nicholas Abbagnano, 'Existentialism is a Positive Philosophy', trans. Nino Langiulli,
in ed. Nino Langiulli, European Existentialism (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1997),
p.285.
"Milan Kundera, The Art of the Novel, trans. Linda Asher (London: Faber and Faber,
1988), p.48.
4Alexander Trocchi, Cain's Book, 1963 (London: John Calder, 1992), pp.12-13.
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Published one year after The Busconductor Mines, A Chancer appears technically
regressive. Whilst retaining the characteristic absences - speech markers, conventions
of punctuation - which pervade both Hines and Kelman's subsequent novels, read
beside those texts which follow, A Chancer is anomalous in that it is a uniquely
extrinsic novel. Gone is the exigent, personal tone and the internal dialogical quality
which the reader encounters in the other works. Instead, these Kelman tropes are
replaced by an indifferent third-person voice which only occasionally suggests or
relates internal processes. What appears a stylistic volte face is however clarified by
Kelman himself. Although published after Hines, A Chancer is actually a much earlier
novel, one which Kelman began when he was aged 285. When he came to revise and
complete it for publication, Kelman declined to impose his more familiar technical
devices since these had evolved since the novel was begun (this itself is an interesting
existential point: the novel belongs to Kelman's past, the realm ofbeing-in-itself, and
therefore it cannot be altered). So, A Chancer needs to be seen and read as a stage in
Kelman's work (indeed as his first full length fiction it reworks material from previous
short stories)6. This does not mean that we need either relegate or disregard the text,
since ifHines constitutes an 'intellectual' novel, what Kelman terms a novel of
"intellectual exploration"7 then A Chancer, despite being technically atypical, may be
read as a physical counterpoint. Where Hines ruminates, Tammas acts; Hines attempts
continually to suspend the world, Tammas continually engages with it. Like some
Beckettian synthesis ofCartesian categories the two narrative strategies can be seen
as complementary facets of the same aesthetic. However, although the novel does not
take place within Tammas, it does gives us a vision of his internal life through the
relation of external events. In this way, Kelman offers his own version of what
Gertrude Stein terms "the inside as seen from the outside"8, which is itself a
5Duncan McLean, 'James Kelman Interviewed' in ed. Murdo Macdonald, Nothing is
Altogether Trivial: An Anthology of Writingfrom Edinburgh Review (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1995), p. 114 .
6At least two episodes within the novel are rewrites of stories previously published in
Not Not While the Giro. The opening segment ofA Chancer, the card game in the
factory, is a revision of the story 'Double or clear plus a tenner'; whilst the episode
dealing with Tammas' brief employment in the copper factory (C 244ff) is a
reworking of'The Chief Thing About This Game'.
7Duncan McLean, 'James Kelman Interviewed', p. 116.
sGertrude Stein, The Autobiography ofAlice B Toklas, 1933 (Harmondsworth:
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restatement of a fictional principle found in Gogol and Lermontov, the idea of
inferential characterisation.9
The adoption of this prose method is significant for through this almost exclusive
meditation upon action, A Chancer contends with the problematic of existential
identity, which in its Sartrean formulation consists solely in projected activity. This
brings forth an adjoining problem, for as Heidegger and Abbagnano10 point out, the
formation of identity through projection depends upon possibility and it is thus this
notion which Abbagnano promotes as the defining feature of the philosophy of
existence, and which Heidegger sees as constitutive of Dasein. A Chancer discloses
these existential issues through both its style and subject matter. The fragmented and
seemingly contingent structure of the novel replicates the ontological status of the
central character Tammas, whilst gambling, Tammas' principle activity, embraces a
cluster of existential motifs of which the most noticeable is the relation and interplay
of chance and fate, free will and determinism. Gambling acts then as a route of access
between technique and content since it is through contingency and related issues that
the existential theme and its method of articulation are conjoined. However, given
that the novel features little in the way of plot and little in the way of dialogue, in this
chapter I concentrate primarily on narrative method, and how this method
substantiates and articulates an existential viewpoint. The last sections of this chapter
deal with gambling.
For Kelman, "the problems [in] writing the Chancer [sic] were how to be absolutely
concrete, [...] to do nothing that was abstract, nothing that was internal, there are
some internal sections in Chancer but they are technically irrelevant, or redundant:
Penguin, 1966), p. 170. Kelman indicates the influence of Stein in 'K is for Culture',
p.26.
Robert Reid identifies what he terms "inferential characterisation" as central to
nineteenth century Russian realism. "The assumption was that from external
indicators, facial expressions, complexion changes [...] it was possible to infer both
transitory inner states and more permanent mental and psychic personality." Robert
Reid, Lermontov's A Hero ofOur Time (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1997), p.38.
Kelman substitutes acts for physical description.
10Nicholas Abbagnano, 'Existentialism is a Positive Philosophy', European
Existentialism, pp. 276-301.
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they don't have to be there."" Concretion and eschewal of abstraction are crucial
moves in Kelman's writing and it is something to which I shall attend throughout, but
this concern with immediacy and concretion, particularly when taken at a narrative
level, together with the lack of an internal viewpoint, point immediately toward an
engagement with a set of aesthetic problems posed firstly by Camus and Sartre and
then developed and re-theorised by Robbe-Grillet and Barthes. As various critics -
Roderick Watson, Cairns Craig and Drew Milne12 - have noticed, A Chancer
exemplifies what Barthes terms 'Zero Degree' writing. I want to agree with this claim
but also to modify and develop its exegetical possibilities. This development is
necessary because Craig and Watson, since they pursue other critical agendas,
mention Barthes only in passing, whilst Milne's piece is more concerned to disclose
convergences between Kelman, Adorno and Marcuse. However, in order to expose
the significance of the novel's narrative style it is imperative that the poetics of the
nouveau roman, of zero degree writing, are placed within, and assessed through, a
broadly existentialist discourse. This is for two reasons. Firstly this is Kelman's
procedural basis, the writers and thinkers with whom he engages are read in terms of
a primary constitutive existentiality, and secondly, the new novel is itself greatly
influenced by existentialism and by Sartre in particular.13 So, although it may seem
initially puzzling that an existential writer such as Kelman aligns himself with the
programme of the new novel, this puzzlement dissolves when we grasp that Kelman
adopts those components of the nouveau roman which correspond to, or spring from,
this prior existential discourse.
Barthes has Camus in mind when he describes the contest between what he terms
'Classical' writing and 'zero degree' writing. Famously for Barthes, Camus indicates
his movement to the latter by jettisoning the preterite, the past historic, a form
"ibid, p. 115.
"Roderick Watson, 'The Rage of Caliban: The "Unacceptable" Face and the
"Unspeakable" Voice in Contemporary Scottish Writing', p.56. Cairns Craig, 'James
Kelman', Dictionary ofLiterary Biography, p. 170. Drew Milne, 'James Kelman:
Dialectics ofUrbanity', p.394.
13See for instance Anna Boschetti, 'Sartre and the Age of the American Novel', trans.
Maria-Teresa Vanderboegh and David Vanderboegh, in eds. Jean-Francois Fournay
and Charles D Minahen, Situating Sartre in Twentieth-Century Thought and Culture
(London: MacMillan, 1997), pp. 71-92, p. 84-5.
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obsolete in spoken French. To Barthes this is also an indicator that Camus is rejecting
a narrative which inserts itself into or identifies itself as belonging to "Art":
the preterite, which is the cornerstone ofNarration, always signifies
the presence ofArt; it is part of a ritual of Letters. Its function is no
longer that of a tense. The part it plays is to reduce reality to a point of
time, and to abstract, from the depth of a multiplicity of experiences, a
pure verbal act, freed from the existential roots of knowledge, and
directed towards a logical link with other acts, other processes, a
general movement of the world: it aims at maintaining a hierarchy in
the realm of facts. Through the preterite, the verb implicitly belongs
with a causal chain.14
Disrupting the "ritual of Letters" is a Kelman given, but the key terms here for an
existential reading are "multiplicity of events", "logical link" and "causal chain". As
Barthes explains it, the preterite conceals a "demiurge a God or a reciter" (27)
through which there is a unification of cause and end and thus a narrative telos. All of
which has an anti-existential thrust: "the teleology common to the Novel [Barthes
means the 'Classical', bourgeois novel] and to narrated history is the alienation of the
facts" (29). In alienating facts, in both unfolding and upholding a causal teleology, the
preterite and the novels with which it is associated banish ambiguity and mystery -
two characteristics of the existential Lebenswelt - but also perforce contingency. Here
a Sartrean allusion emerges, for Sartre had earlier charged the bourgeois novel with
neglecting "the strangeness and opacity of the world". (WIL 87) The preterite, the key
tense of the bourgeois or classical text, imputes then an inevitability to related events
and in so doing generates a determinism, a linkage and ordering, whereby the
narrative is made inexorably sequential: it is remember apast tense, the events it
records are over. An existential narrative however seeks to depict the world as
lacking precisely these logical links, these relations and forms, which the preterite
imposes. In order to recover and display these lost existentials, the preterite needs to
be supplanted:
[when] the preterite is replaced by less ornamental forms, fresher,
more full-blooded and nearer to speech (the present tense or the
present perfect), Literature becomes the receptacle of existence in all
14Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero & Elements ofSemiology, trans. Annette
Lavers and Colin Smith 1953, 1964 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), pp. 26-7.
References hereafter in the text.
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- its density [...] the acts it recounts are still separated from History, but
no longer from people. (28).
The "colourless" or "neutral" writing of Camus and Kelman is therefore a writing
which seeks to maintain concretion - events are reunited with people, language moves
nearer to speech - but importantly writing which maintains the ambiguity and
contingency which conjure the "density" of existence.
Aside from the low droning noise it was quiet in this section of the
factory. In the smoke-area around a dozen men were sitting at a big
wooden table, involved in a game of solo. (C 1)
The opening sentence ofA Chancer has little literary ornament, but it is through the
almost inconspicuous use of "this" that both haecceity and a sense of presentness are
brought forth: "this" supplies the necessary concretion. However, A Chancer also
divulges the inconclusive and the ambiguous, for numerous epistemological gaps 'fill'
the novel. In the passage above, the preposition "around" indicates an uncertainty in
the narrative; there is no claim to know. When Margaret and Robert, Tammas' sister
and brother-in-law, first appear in the novel, (C 31), their relationship to Tammas is
not stated, instead it is gradually revealed. When Tammas goes to play football, the
narrative records that the men are "laughing at something" (C 86) but the narrator
does not intercede to reveal at what. Consider too the following passage.
Aye. Fuck sake. McCann was frowning at him.
Naw I mean if it was just cause of the dough and that ...
Naw.
Tammas continued on by himself.
I bumped into that girl earlier on.
What was that?
Margaret shook her head. You never told me you'd stopped seeing
her.
Are you talking about Betty?
Well I didnt know you were seeing anybody else!
Mm ... Tammas looked away. (C 82)
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These two episodes from A Chancer 'follow' each other in the narrative, but their
relationship, if any, is one of contiguity rather than causality. Within each section lurk
unanswered questions. In the first, if not because of the "dough" then because of
what? In the second, why does Margaret shake her head? These explanatory gaps are
supplemented by a momentary aporia as the reader attempts to negotiate the deictic
shift between the first episode and the second. Noticeably, there are no apparent
temporal indicators; the second section might be hours later, a day later, and so on.
Further, within this latter section, it is not immediately clear either who is speaking
nor indeed to whom. Speakers are not initially identified and the reader is only certain
of the owner of the spoken words as the narrative unfolds. Recalling Barthes, the
"Aye" and "Fuck sake" in the exchange between Tammas and McCann indicates a
repositioning of language nearer to speech, whilst in the exchange between Tammas
and Margaret, words and their speaker(s) are not only "reunited", but by the absence
of quotation marks they are effectively merged. It is only when Tammas looks away
that this convergence lapses with the introduction of the third person. However, in
both segments the third person noticeably articulates only such information as cannot
be conveyed through speech and here, as throughout the novel, the third person is
restricted to the conveying of external activities. In the example above, McCann
frowns, Tammas continues, Margaret shakes her head, Tammas looks away. This
restriction actuates the cleansed, non-judgemental narrative which we outlined in
chapter one, where the narrator does not intercede to make up for any perceived
informational deficiencies, but in so doing, it leaves those gaps and uncertainties
which permeate the existential world thus allowing the bringing forth and maintenance
of both density and ambiguity. To sustain this climate there are no adjectives, only
processional verbs. Adjectives and superfluous nouns, anything which describes,
anything which might enclose events and persons, cordoning off the possible by
imprisoning the grammatical subject in an eternal description, are omitted. Verbs
however, particularly as they are deployed here, give an impression of activity and
fluidity, recalling the familiar Sartrean tenet: to be is to do. Within .4 Chancer, 'doing'
always takes precedence over having. Additionally, verbs maintain the narrative within
a factual domain: either someone is moving, speaking, frowning, or they are not.
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Adjectives however, such as 'fat', 'thin', 'stupid' possess and transmit ajudgement
but importantly an extrinsic judgement, they rely upon an observer/narrator. In a
traditional third-person narrative these adjectives are provided by the narrator. For an
existential novelist adjectives are to be avoided because they introduce a sense of
aloofness and separation, where the narrator effectuates a breach, positioning himself
apart from his or her characters - here we should recall that it is exactly this idea of a
narrative viewpoint sub specie aeternitatis that causes Sartre to criticise Mauriac.15 In
relating only facts, detailing only activities, and in rejecting adjectival description, we
are effectively left alone with Tammas, who is not so much a character as a centre of
activity, a movement.
what affects us, what persists in our memory, what appears as essential
and irreducible to vague intellectual concepts are the gestures
themselves, the objects, the movements, and the outlines.16
A Chancer, because it deals only with what can be observed, constitutes a novel of
"gestures" and "outlines". Within the text, cause and reason, a certain explanatory
depth, are notable absentees. The connecting thread of narrative progression is gone.
Preferring activity to experience, psychological motivation or explanation is banished,
and replaced by a prose confined to the surface; a prose which has refused the
penetrative urge, for getting to the heart of either things, or Tammas himself, would
entail a focus upon essence. Kelman, like Barthes, like Robbe-Grillet, rejects this
essentialising movement but not for all and only all the same reasons. A Chancer
declines essentialism in favour of a depiction of existential subjectivity in all its
aporetic ambiguity. For Robbe-Grillet, a descriptive 'scientific' narrative is practised
in order to obviate a humanizing or anthropomorphic gaze which falsely bestows
meaning upon things. Kelman's text opts to remain resolutely existential. If it employs
a zero degree narrative mode, it is to close off the possibility ofjudgement, of fixing
character, rather than to arrive at a purely 'scientific' narration. The novel provides
fact, but fact in an existential way: about an individual, in an individual situation and
therefore A Chancer retains the subject which Robbe-Grillet urges the new novelist to
15Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Franfois Mauriac and Freedom', p. 15.
16Aiain Robbe-Grillet, For a New Novel: Essays on Fiction, 1963, trans. Richard
Howard (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1989)), p.20.
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abjure. Ifwe do not enter Tammas, it is because only Tammas as a first person
narrator can relate the machinations of his own consciousness. Again, there is a prior
Sartrean source, for this method of narration replicates the procedure of existential
phenomenology.
Being will be disclosed to us by some kind of immediate access -
boredom, nausea, etc., and ontology will be the description of the
phenomenon ofbeing as it manifests itself; that is, without
intermediary. (BN xxiv)
Being is described as it is manifest, in its moods and activities, without prejudice,
without an "intermediary". Thus the tense is always now, no past and no future ensure
that the individual and 'meaning' are never totalised, never wholly coincident. The
upset temporal trajectory is made vivid through Tammas who reads "yesterday's
Daily Record" (C 206) )or "tomorrow morning's Daily Record' (C 137) or the
"following morning's Sunday Mail1 (C 148): never the paper of the day. An
existentialist would agree with Robbe-Grillet that no meaning inheres in the world, in
objects, but would disagree that this is where the story ends. There is meaning, but it
is not discovered rather it is manufactured, placed there by an individual
consciousness - something which becomes accentuated in Patrick Doyle's
appropriation of electricians' pipes as musical instruments which do not mean or
signify until Patrick intends them as musical instruments. Man's freedom is the source
of the world's meaning. Thus de Beauvoir differentiates between an absurd world
(she has Camus in mind) and an ambiguous world: "To declare that existence is
absurd is to deny that it can ever be given a meaning; to say that it is ambiguous is to
assert that its meaning is never fixed, that it must be constantly won.'"7 The novel
charts Tammas quest for meaning through lowly jobs and unsatisfying relationships,
but his rejection of these ensures that constitution of self is never found in either an
occupation or a relation. Furthermore ifwe consider how we encounter another,
through their observable states, their physical activities, their gestures, their speech, -
what Sartre terms 'conduct' (BN4)- then we can 'know' them in a sense but, given
that meaning and identity are processes, such knowledge is necessarily partial and
17Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics ofAmbiguity, 1948, trans. Bernard Frechtman
(New York: Citadel Press, 1964), p. 129.
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always incomplete. We can only accompany or observe, we can never place ourselves
wholly in the position of another. Hence although the narrator shadows Tammas, only
on occasion do we have any suggestion of knowledge from the inside. As Anna
Boschetti notes, in Sartre's narrative technique, "focusing on a point of view allows
one to mimic the conscious vision with all its limits or the enigmatic effect of a vision
from the outside."18 For Sartre, as for Kelman, "[i]t is not a matter of defining
passions and unpredictable acts, still less of explaining them (in novels, even the best
psychological analyses have a mouldy smell), but rather ofpresenting them."19
Sartre's idea here of an uncontaminated presentation is the aesthetic premise which
drives A Chancer.
It wasn't a possibility to get inside Tammas' head. Again, I wanted to
show things, to demonstrate them. To show necessities. The novel
isn't written from his viewpoint so much as from over his shoulder. I
can only show how people are in the way they react and respond to
him. I can't induce a conversation so that he can say "What happened
to you?" so some sort of individual history can emerge [...] If you're
sticking to writing as well as you can that means not interfering. If
somebody doesn't tell something to somebody else in my story, I can't
jump in and be Nabokov and say "Tell it to me".20
The reactions and responses to which Kelman refers correspond to Sartre's
'conducts', and the informational deficiencies correspond to the absence of a total
position in which the world and everything in it can have an explicable resolution.
Induced conversations halt the narrative because they turn from activity to reflection
and explanation. In existentialism, the subject, the pour-soi or Dasein is first and
foremost an active subject. The author too must avoid interference with his characters
for the same reason. Authorial reflection if it is introduced to alleviate or fill in any
gaps is a form of bad faith. Such a style ofwriting therefore throws back to the reader
his own partial experience of the world. Since the reader is forced to deduce or
18Anna Boschetti, 'Sartre and the Age of the American Novel', trans. Maria-Teresa
Vanderboegh and David Vanderboegh, in eds. Jean-Frangois Fournay and Charles D
Minahen, Situating Sartre in Twentieth-Century Thought and Culture (London:
MacMillan, 1997), pp. 71-92, p. 75.
19Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Frangois Mauriac and Freedom', Literary Essays, pp.7-23,
pp.7-8.
20Kirsty McNeill, 'James Kelman Interviewed', p.7.
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impose significance, to negotiate these gaps and absences, reading the novel re-enacts
the 'reading' of the world, the encounter of the world, and induces the dialogue of
freedoms mentioned in chapter one.
In Writing Degree Zero, Barthes discusses the texts of Celine, revealing a pivotal
narrative component to the fiction of the latter:
In Celine's work [...] writing is not at the service of thought, like some
successfully realistic decor tacked on to the description of a social
sub-class; it really represents the author's descent into the sticky
opacity of the condition which he is describing. (68)
Whilst Kelman would not be happy were his writing to be described as a "descent"
(Kelman as author has a relationship of solidarity with his narrated events, something
arguably lacking in Celine), the entry into the "sticky opacity", a notably Sartrean
locution, of the protagonist's condition serves as an outline of Kelman's narrative. A
Chancer also lacks the relation of "service to thought" since through the
predominance of the third person, Tammas' thoughts stay within Tammas. This lack
of access helps to suggest that it is not an epistemological possibility to grasp essence
at a human level, it is not possible to say what a human life is whilst it is still being
lived, since a transcendent position is not existentially possible. Hence like all
Kelman's novels A Chancer has no definite ending. The novel simply stops with
Tammas hitching a lift. The driver whom he meets is going to London but it is unclear
whether or not Tammas intends going there; indeed it is unclear whether or not
Tammas is actually going to accept the lift. This lack of clear resolution opens up the
future and maintains, albeit tentatively, the possible. As Merleau-Ponty has it "as long
as we are alive, our situation is open".21 Life has 'meaning' only when it is over and
can be converted into a past tense narrative: "At the moment of death we are." (BN
115). If,4 Chancer ends as suddenly, as randomly, as it begins, it is to suggest that
true closure in an existential text would only be possible with death. Until then, all
that is available are episodes, and episodes are therefore the primary structural
technique of the novel. Through this a typography wherein there are no chapters, only
21Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology ofPerception, 1945, trans. Colin Smith,
(London: Routledge, 1998), p.442.
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episodes of varying length, is converted into an existential one. To indicate an
episodic shift, Kelman uses an enlarged parenthesis rather in the manner that Celine
uses an extended line in Journey to the End of the Night. These typographical
techniques upset sequentiality and work to unsettle progressive efficacy: events
become irreducible moments which fail to cohere around a consistent, progressive
plot. A Chancer is incremental, a continual restatement of the same for as Ann
Jefferson indicates, the traditional novel has a teleology, and thus is constructed in
reverse22. If one relies upon this tradition of plotting, then the end is already known to
the story-teller; the tale is effectively delivered in the past tense. An existential text
needs to avoid this. Although Jefferson is speaking of the nouveau roman, her
comments recall Sartre's criticism ofFranfois Mauriac:
The definitive judgements with which M. Mauriac is always ready to
intersperse the narrative prove that he does not conceive his characters
as he ought. He fabricates their natures before setting them down, he
decrees that they will be this or that.23
For the existentialist, character should be shown to be self-generating. Mauriac shuts
off this possibility because his characters are already determined before they are set
down. Existing is a becoming. What an existentialist novelist must attempt is a
character who proceeds by choice or by chance.
However, here we have one of the central problems of existential fiction: can one ever
really represent chance within narrative? In his study of the role of chance in British
fiction24, Leland Monk describes how chance has been relegated by a scientific or
philosophical epistemology which seeks to enshrine order, certainty and necessity as
metaphysical desiderata. Using Foucault to describe how "chance inhabits the
periphery ofwhatever frame of power-knowledge is in place"(4-5), Monk argues that
"chance always takes on a necessarily fateful quality once it is represented in
narrative". Although a text may contain or attempt to deploy chance events these will
22Ann Jefferson, The Nouveau Roman and the Poetics ofFiction (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 30.
23Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Francois Mauriac and Freedom', Literary Essays, pp.15-16.
24Leland Monk, StandardDeviations: Chance and the Modern British Novel
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).
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be ultimately 'normalised' since they are located within a narrative. Each time the
narrative is read, events take on a necessary, fated order. The title of his work,
StandardDeviations, therefore uses a statistical term to convey what he reads as the
"oxymoronic" phrase 'chance in narrative'. He therefore concludes that although
there is a "history" to the ongoing attempt to do so, "no novelist actually manages to
represent chance in narrative". (9) What Monk misses however is that whilst
novelistic events are ultimately normalised by the reading of a narrative, this is only
true after the initial reading. An existential narrative only needs show the operation of
chance or freedom the first time it is read, for only if read again do things, characters,
events, seem predetermined. Reading A Chancer, or Nausea or The Outsider,
becomes an experience analogous to the life of the existential subject. Whilst reading,
the words which we have read, effectively the past life of the text, become the
in-itself, but those segments as yet unread constitute an open future. In the first
reading of the novel this future is unknown; as readers we can only guess what events
will occur or how the narrative subject will proceed or choose, but these moments
cannot have a fateful quality because as readers, we do not know how or indeed if,
the novel will 'end'. In this way, the initial reading of the novel mimics the life of an
individual. Here we can refer to and apply Kierkegaard's famous criticism ofHegel.
Understanding, and with it the attribution of p therefore q, is a retrospective activity,
but life, narrative, is lived forwards.
Monk's text restricts itself to George Eliot, Conrad and Joyce, but the problem of
evading determinism in narrative is, not only a problem with which Kelman's novel
contends: the problem also saturates the writing of those whom Kelman mentions as
influences; particularly 'Russian' fiction of the nineteenth century. Here we find a
number of important precedents for both A Chancer and for Kelman's fictions when
taken as a whole, for here we find the consistent employment of techniques designed
to unsettle literary tradition, particularly as regards plot and narrative style, but
importantly, this reappraisal of fictional procedure is undertaken in order to introduce
into the novel both chance and its approximate correlate, contingency.
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In her essay 'Against Dryness', Iris Murdoch asserts that it is the Russians who are
the "great masters of the contingent"25 and she laments that something of this has been
lost. Murdoch maintains that the issues with which Russian fiction engages, the
problems it highlights, develops and works through, have been displaced due to the
dominance of an empirico-utilitarian schema which seeks to evacuate precisely that
which makes human life human - hence her charge that a certain 'dryness' permeates
contemporary writing. Her essay accordingly presses for a return to the issues with
which nineteenth-century Russian fiction contends and these coalesce around the
notion of contingency. The novel should not concern itselfwith an abstract human
condition, where theory ensures that everything and everyone may be accommodated;
instead it should concentrate upon "real various individuals struggling in society"
(291). Therefore although not uncritical of the existential tradition, Murdoch shares
the existential idea that literature can rediscover and re-articulate this lost "density".
In order to do so, fiction, and one presumes philosophy itself, must re-accept
contingency, but consequently it must appreciate that which typifies Russian writing
of the nineteenth century: the realisation that reality is not a "given whole". (294)
Literature she argues, must "not be too much afraid of incompleteness". (295) Now
as we have seen, Kelman's fiction meets these criteria in various ways. The episodic
structure, the lack of closure and the frequent gaps in what is available to the reader
ensure that a totalised narrative is never achieved: there is no whole. This helps to
achieve the ambiguity and density which Murdoch mentions, and noticeably
Murdoch's promotion of density coincides with and repeats both part ofBarthes'
programme for zero degree writing, and also a key tenet of Sartre's committed
literature. The ideas to which Murdoch alludes receive a fuller analysis in an essay by
Gary Saul Morson26. Again the issues raised here are of considerable relevance in
understanding Kelman's prose. In his essay, Morson argues that Russian writers of
25Iris Murdoch, 'Against Dryness', Existentialists andMystics: Writings on
Philosophy and Literature, ed. Peter Conradi (London: Chatto & Windus, 1997), pp.
287-95, p. 295. References in parenthesis hereafter.
26Gary Saul Morson, 'Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century Novel', in eds. Malcolm
V Jones and Robin Feuer Miller, The Cambridge Companion to the Classic Russian
Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 150-168. References in
parentheses. My discussion of the technical and philosophical bases ofRusssian fiction
both here and throughout draws heavily on this essay.
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the nineteenth century - he discusses Dostoevsky and Tolstoy in the main - move
against the traditional novel and they do so because they detect an implicit
determinism in its construction. It is this which Morson describes as the great insight
ofRussian fiction. Moreover, he agrees with Murdoch that what we might term the
'classic' Russian novel militates against the representation of ideas in abstacto, and
instead operates upon a casuist27 principle, where the individual is presented and
examined in his or her particular environment. Russian fiction looks at individual
'cases'. As an example here, consider Crime and Punishment or A Hero ofour Time.
In the former, where Raskolnikov is the principal case, to underline this the word
"casuistry" recurs several times whilst in the latter, the author's preface (later
employed by Camus as an epigram to A Happy Death) makes clear that the impending
tale is based upon casuist principles whereby the individual becomes a particular
universal. Clearly translatable into Kierkegaardian terms, the Russian novel seeks to
render individual life rather than simply manipulate characters to conform to a
predetermined theory. In so doing, Russian fiction becomes what Morson calls
'prosaics', by which he intends a mode ofwriting "deeply suspicious of the claim of
theory to accommodate the world" . Instead, prosaics, "sees the life of individuals and
society as fraught with contingency, which operates not just at grand historical
junctures but also at every moment of our daily lives" (159). This concern with the
diurnal impacts upon plot, since ifwhat is real are the ordinary events which the
traditional novel either neglects or seeks to place in a structured determined nexus,
then the novel needs to alter and depict instead what has hitherto seemed marginal or
inconsequential: those incidences in the life of an individual which History ignores.
Hence Tolstoy's contention that Raskolnikov's 'real' life is not to be found in his
formulation of theories, but when he simply lies on his couch thinking over ordinary
events. (161)
This reformulation of the real impinges upon and calls for a revision of narrative
technique. Morson identifies three traditional fictional procedures which the Russian
novel attacks and to some extent, these portend and can be seen to connect with the
27Casuistry, from the Latin 'casus', case, was originally used to mean applied ethics.
Although it now carries a pejorative sense, Morson uses the term to describe
"reasoning by cases".
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projects ofBarthes, Robbe-Grillet and Sartre which were outlined above. The first of
these is foreshadowing. This is rejected because it posits a causal frame whereby
earlier events cause those which occur later, with the result that character freedom
becomes illusory since the reader is presented with signs of an already composed
future. So too the structure of the novel requires redefinition and modification if it is
to accommodate and bring forth something of the contingency and chance which
operate in the world. Lastly, closure is to be avoided since it makes narrated events
both teleological and resolvable; gaps and loose ends, inextricable components of the
everyday, are eliminated. These conventional mainstays then are what prose must
exclude. Morson detects two principal aesthetic responses to these problems which he
terms 'creation by potential' and 'sideshadowing'.
Creation by potential ensures that the temporal scheme of the novel flows forward
only. It leaves a narrative in which there are loose ends (164). Sideshadowing
generates counter-possibilities and leaves a permanent 'could have been otherwise' to
narrated events. Morson describes sideshadowing as the opposite of foreshadowing,
sideshadowing "conveys the sense that time is open and that each moment contains
real alternatives" (164). Both techniques convey clearly existential positions. Within
an existential narrative, the future must be open because it is yet to be decided, it will
only come to be through the conscious projection of an individual into it through the
selection of an alternative or possibility. Prolepses are rejected because they convert
the flux and fluidity of being into an already determined causal sequence. So too
closure which implies a resolution of narrated events. Time must be made fluid rather
than static or progressive: nothing in human reality (with the exception of death) is
inevitable and there is a constant incompleteness which invades being. Chance,
contingency, the daily life of the individual, form the narrative stock ofKelman's
novel, but as technical and typographical moves the techniques and concerns of
Russian fiction have their correspondence in Tammas himself.
Though both the novel's title and a friend ofVi describe Tammas as 'a chancer'(C
286), this is then not an ascription of essence nor even a typification of character.
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- A character - everyone knows what the word means. It is not a banal
he, anonymous and transparent, the simple subject of the action
expressed by the verb. A character must have a proper name, two if
possible: a surname and a given name. He must have parents, a
heredity. He must have a profession. If he has possessions as well, so
much the better. Finally, he must possess a "character", a face which
reflects it, a past which has molded that face and that character. His
character dictates his actions, makes him react to each event in a
determined fashion. His character permits the reader to judge him, to
love him, to hate him. {For a New Novel 27)
Here Robbe-Grillet summarises what the new novel fashions itself against, but within
the rejection of the traditions of character-based novels, we can glimpse too the
imperatives identified with Russian fiction and we can reconvey all these points as
adumbrating an existential position. Human reality has to found itself, but it has to
found itself in accordance with what it is, and paradoxically what it is is what it is not.
Since human reality is freedom, being 'a chancer' reveals a being open to the future
and this future comes literally from nothing. Tammas attempts to structure his life in
accordance with the narrative principle of creation by potential, which in turn
corresponds to the existential idea of projection. Therefore within A Chancer we are
given almost no information which enables us to 'fix' Tammas. He is never described,
never presented as a set of physical properties, all we know of him are his actions, and
his first name, which is itself frequently declined in favour ofRobbe-Grillet's
transparent 'he'. Significant too is his age: he reveals to Vi that he is twenty, two
years younger than he originally claimed. (C 229) This strategy of partial anonymity
locates Kelman's novel in a series which includes Robbe-Grillet's own texts, and
Sarraute's Portrait ofA Man Unknown but with Kelman, traces ofKafka are ever
present. In The Trial and The Castle, Kafka's heroes surnames are reduced to the
initial 'K', A Chancer simultaneously extends and percolates this: Tammas simply has
none. He has no surname, no family name, "no parents, no heredity", but he also has
no home of his own. Ungrounded, he lives with his sister and brother-in-law. This
ungroundedness is a crucial aspect of existentialism for in her study of the ambiguous,
de Beauvoir states that "on the earthly plane, a life which does not seek to ground
itself will be a pure contingency"28. To intensify this groundlessness, his contingency,
28Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics ofAmbiguity, p. 16.
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Tammas parents are never mentioned, thereby suggesting that there is no 'reason' or
antecedent cause for his being. Tammas is presented to us having skipped a
generation; his sole contact with his predecessors is with his grandmother with whom,
in a foreshadowing of Patrick Doyle's difficulties with his mother, father and brother,
he can scarcely communicate.
These genealogical lacunae and communicative difficulties disrupt the notion of a
smooth causal nexus, of a connected world, but also they preclude the ability to trace
or locate Tammas as either proceeding from or belonging to. He cannot be classified.
Taken together with the episodic structure, Tammas lack of ancestry produces in
fictional form what Sartre terms "being without any relation to a "before"". (BN 207)
Thus when Tammas states "it had come from nothing, and that was the only point" (C
62) this not only applies to the money accrued from gambling but to his own
contingent ontological makeup. Tammas himself proceeds from nothing, from chance;
he is simply there. This is the Heideggerian thrownness which is forever present in
Kelman's work. Additionally however, this simultaneously establishes Tammas as a
paradigm ofwhat Robbe-Grillet terms the "future hero", for it is precisely
Heidegger's idea of thrown Dasien which informs Robbe-Grillet's distinction between
two types of literary protagonist. For Robbe-Grillet, the hero of the traditional novel
is "projected into an immaterial and unstable elsewhere" whilst the hero of the future
"will remain, on the contrary there,"29 Within A Chancer, the absence of direct
ancestry combines with Kelman's eschewal of historical detail and his persistent use of
the present tense to generate a narrative concerned with the here, the now and the
always possible, the chances which constitutes the future.
So far we have examined the means through which chance and contingency impinge
upon novelistic construction and emplotment. We have seen that Kelman takes from
the new novel and Russian writing various existentially appropriable fictional
methods. My elaboration of Russian fiction though has had another purpose, for the
poetry, novels and short stories of its primary practitioners bequeath not only a
methodology but also a theme, the issues arising from which this methodology helps
29Alain Robbe-Grillet, For a New Novel, p. 22.
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to express: that theme is gambling. Gaming, chancing, gambling make constant
appearances in the work ofPushkin, Gogol, Tolstoy, Lermontov, Dostoevsky. As
Jurij Lotman30 shows, cards and card games, and thereby issues of fate and chance,
free will and determinism, so dominated nineteenth-century Russian fiction, that
their introduction into a text made the development of the piece somewhat
predictable. (458)
The theme of the card game introduces chance - an unpredictable
course of events - into the mechanism of the plot and into the link
between the motives of the hero and the results of his actions. Chance
becomes both the mechanism of the plot and the subject of the hero's
and author's deliberations. [...] One of the consequences of this
mechanism of the plot is the characterisation of the hero as a man of
will, who strives amid the turbulent movement of surrounding life to
achieve an aim which he has set himself (473-4)
Lotman sees the pre-eminence of chance as articulated through this fictional concern
with gambling as a both a product and exemplification of a conflict. The conflict he
describes - theoretical models against individual reality - is crucial here, for it is one
which is also basic to existentialism. Crime andPunishment pictures this conflict
between theory and actuality, between a predetermined conception which attempts to
explain all that is or will be and the individualised reality, the singular 'I' who
undercuts it. As Raskolnikov's tormentor Porfiry points out,
the general case, the one all our legal rules and formalities are designed
for and the one on the basis ofwhich they're all worked out and
written into legal textbooks, simply doesn't exist, for the very good
reason that every case, every crime, if you like, as soon as it takes
place in reality, turns into a thoroughly special case.31
The narrator of The Gambler tells how "reason is not enough" for "one turn of the
wheel and everything can be different"32 Gambling becomes a means of enacting this
collision. It becomes the model for the individual against the system. Lotman
30Jurij M Lotman, 'Theme and Plot: The Theme of Cards and the Card Game in
Russian Literature of the Nineteenth Century', PTL 3 (1978), 455-492.
31Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Crime and Punishment, 1865-6, trans. David McDuff
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p.400.
32Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Gambler/Bobok/A Nasty Story, trans. Jessie Coulson
(Flarmondsworth: Penguin, 1966) p.99, p. 153.
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therefore sees the card game, and a general fictional usage of gambling, as a model of
what he terms a 'conflict situation' pointing out that "games of chance are
constructed in such a way that the punter is required to take decisions when he
actually has little or no information to help him" (462) The symbolism of the game of
chance functions then as a model of "man's struggle with Unknown Factors" (462)
We have then one side of the symbolism of cards and of gambling: a world reduced to
the contingent, a world without foundation and without explication into which the
individual is plunged and in which the individual must act. David Parlett, in his
explanation of the starting procedure for a card game, helps to further outline their
analogous ontological symbolism.
Because cards are shuffled before play, the opening position of a card
game is always unpredictable (because governed by chance), unknown
(because players can only see the backs of one another's cards), and
unequal (because some may be dealt a better hand than others).33
Cards are shuffled, therefore their position within a set of fifty-two is entirely
contingent, what cards a player receives is a matter of chance. We have then a
particular contingency, but also a facticity. The cards one receives one receives by
chance, but once they are dealt they become factic: one can, to use a gambling
metaphor, only play (act) with what one is (contingently) dealt. Notice too the
epistemological element. Knowledge is incomplete, one player knows only what cards
he or she holds: opponents and their cards become the unknowable Other, all that one
player sees of another is surface. A card game then, when translated into an existential
position, becomes a model of a situation which is indicative of the need for choice and
illustrative too of the prevalent contingency in and through which this choice must be
made.
Gambling conceived along these lines enacts a metaphysical duel between the
individual and the world as understood existentially. It becomes an existential
confrontation in that it depicts the lone individual placed within a contingent set of
circumstances in which he must make decisions, in which he must act. Tammas'
endless visits to the casino or the racetrack represent an entry into this existential
"David Parlett, A History ofCard Games (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
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universe. The casino exists as a microcosm reflecting the general experience of the
individual in a society. Tammas as punter must play against the house without ever
being able to ascertain what odds are ranged against him, whether the roulette wheel
is fixed, whether the cards for poker or chemin de fer are marked, whether he will win
or whether he will lose. Drew Milne links this to commodity fetishism "in a life- world
dominated by the casino-economy of the stock exchange"34 but this reading
downplays the existential issues which gambling fiction divulges. Tammas inhabits a
world which has certain economic conditions but these are factical, not determinative.
Tammas chooses in and against this background, which as an individual, he can never
fully see. His gamble, his act, is always made into the unknown.
There is however another facet to cards and this is their use as instruments of
prediction, their use in cartomancy. The Greek noun tyche usually rendered as
'fortune' simultaneously conveys both of these meanings: fate mingles with chance
under the cover of fortune.35 The cards then only reveal what is to come, fated, what
is always already determined. Thus cards instantiate a paradox: on the one hand
symbols of chance on the other symbols of necessity. In an exchange in Simpson's
Bar, Tammas and Billy are playing Roper and McCann at dominoes.
Auld Roper
shook his head: The luck yous two are carrying! Jesus Christ Almighty
I wish yous'd fucking fill in my coupon - eh! Lucky pair of. . .! He
sniffed and reached for his tumbler.
Skill, said Tammas
Skill! Skill! That's a bloody good yin right enough. Eh McCann?
D'you hear him? Skill for flick sake! He wouldnt know what skill was
if it jumped up and punched him one on the fucking chin! (C 83)
Here luck and skill are explicitly contrasted. Luck exemplifies chance, Tammas' win
becomes an accident; whereas skill entails fate, Tammas' winning could not have been
34Drew Milne, 'James Kelman: Dialectics ofUrbanity', p.402.
35Annabel Davis-Goff in the introduction to her anthology of gambling literature notes
that "gambling seems to have developed from the use of chance to know the will of
the gods and to seek their advice and assistance". Ed. Annabel Davis-Goff, The
Literary Companion to Gambling: An Anthology ofProse and Poetry (London:
Sinclair Stevenson, 1996), p. xvii.
93
otherwise. Tammas identifies himself with skill and therefore with determination, but
Roper identifies his win with chance. Vi too, reports a conversation where it is stated
that Tammas carries "a bit of luck" (C 148) and of course the title of the novel
suggests that we should identify Tammas with chance. This interplay indicates a
familiar Sartrean position: "In one sense choice is possible, but what is not possible is
not to choose." {EH 48) Existential freedom is paradoxical in that one is 'condemned'
to it. Both world and self are structured according to these seemingly exclusive
polarities, the determined and the free.
I mean that's what you forget, that's the bloody consequence Tammas,
that's what you don't think about [...] See that punting of yours! and
couple it with the broo! Well I'll tell you something; you're beat before
you start. Christ, I dont like saying it, before you even start. (C 115-6)
Within this passage fate, being beat before one starts, is placed aside punting, a means
ofmanipulating odds, generating a return, creating a chance for oneself. Chancing is
necessary because it projects Tammas out of the world of habit, of "Saturday night
routine" (C 15), of endless visits to the bookies or Simpson's Bar where the response
to the question 'what's happening?' is a resounding "nothing" (C 13) This is the life
on the margin, life on the 'broo', a narrow circle of opportunity. McCorquodale takes
Tammas' position to be inevitable, fated, because Tammas possesses neither the
footballing skills of his friend Danny nor the ability to maintain employment for any
sustained period. He lacks too any (desire for) education. All the traditional routes of
working-class 'emancipation' are wholly absent. But within this constricted world,
Tammas acts, gambles, to reduce its determining properties: what the novel implies is
that within the factical given, gambling represents a sole freedom, the only available
salve for what Douglas Gifford terms the "sterility of the unemployed soul."36 In A
Chancer, gambling becomes a means of resistance, a way of exhibiting and retaining
ontological fluidity. McCorquodale is therefore wrong. Tammas needs his "punting" if
he is to disengage from a fragmented social world of ennui and repetition and manifest
his freedom; but in another way McCorquodale is right: Tammas does not consider
the consequences, for it is the act that matters, not the outcome.
36Douglas Gifford, 'The Authentic Glasgow Experience: James Kelman's/4 Chancer',
Books in Scotland, no. 19 (Autumn 1985), p. 10.
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These problematics are re-presented through the constant horse and dog racing where
Tammas muses that "the night could yet turn into something." (C 58). Inside the
nomenclature of the pundit abide correlates of the existential themes we have been
tracing. Dogs run from traps and some animals run with handicaps. These correspond
to the broadly factic, the world. Within each race there are favourites and of course
outsiders, with the latter occasionally violating expectations. Betting itself generates a
profusion of choice. There are odds, expectancies, sudden losses and unexpected
winners: there is always the chance that the outsider may prevail. But what happens
then if the favourite loses? What has occurred? Chance, or fate? These issues receive
their first philosophical interrogation in pre-socratic thought. Chance and the free will
and determinism debate assumes a place in philosophy with Democritus and
Epicurus'7.
For Democritus, all events have causal antecedents and it follows therefore that
nothing is contingent. All that is is because of necessity. Epicurus attempts to refute
this with his notion of the clinamen, or sudden swerve. Whilst agreeing with
Democritus that everything consists of atoms, Epicurus argues that although atoms
move through space in a regulated manner, an individual atom may unexpectedly
swerve and collide with the others. This is what he terms the clinamen. Relating this
to A Chancer, we can see that clinamen is reflected at the twin levels of form and
content. We have already discussed the intrusion of contingency within the narrative,
the abrupt episodic shifts, but this sudden inexplicability can also be traced in the
events which the narrative relates. "It was just a change; I just felt like a change." (C
299) This locution depicts the translation of cognition into action but importantly
sudden action, action which seems inexplicable when the reader attempts to posit a
determining antecedent event. This movement, which is a mainstay of both A Hero of
Our Time and Crime andPunishment38 is exemplified throughout A Chancer. One
example is at Billy's wedding.
"My discussion here draws on the entry for 'chance' in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, The Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, 8 vols. (London:
Macmillan. 1967), ii, pp.73-4.
38In Lermontov's novel, the narrator of the first part meets Pechorin by chance,
Pechorin attends Princess Mary's ball by chance and by chance he overhears
95
A moment later Alec shrugged. Anyway, they're about to stick the
records on. All the Scottish stuff first but they'll be dancing after that.
Tammas nodded.
It'll be a good laugh.
Aye. I'll just have a quick pint.
You'll come up but?
Aye, course.
Okay. Billy was wondering where you were as well.
I'll just be a minute tell him.
Okay.
Tammas turned immediately, left the close, crossing in the direction
of the pub, but he carried on walking beyond it. A taxi had pulled to a
stop at the traffic lights; he rushed up to it and climbed in. The driver
was waiting for him to speak. Sorry, he said, Shawfield, Shawfield
jimmy.
There had been a slight flurry of snow when they boarded the bus
and now, as they alighted, it was coming down quite thickly and
beginning to lie. (C 226-7)
The irruption of chance in the narrated events is clearly seen here. As he exits the
wedding and takes the taxi, Tammas becomes a clinamen. Significantly, no reason is
given as to why Tammas leaves the wedding: he just does. No explanation, no reason,
leaves an wncaused event, and such motiveless and random acts populate the
narrative. These sudden swerves which correspond to the gambling act are Tammas'
means of challenging the inevitable, of rendering open slight avenues of possibility,
and again this quest for freedom is metaphorically enacted at the races.
He reached the wall dividing the track from the enclosure and stared
about. The busfare home was not essential. It was not a bad evening,
mild. The busfare would give him a bet. Coupled with the cash
returned him by the conductor he had enough for a twenty pence bet
on the tote, twice the minimum. He could stick the whole lot on a dog.
Grushnitsky's plot to ridicule him through a fixed duel. In Crime and Punishment,
Raskolnikov kills Lizaveta because by chance she is at the home of the money-lender
when he arrives to commit the murder. Raskolnikov finds himself in strange streets by
chance, and the adverb 'suddenly' occurs on almost every page.
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Or split it two way, 10 on the 2nd race and 10 on the 3rd. Or keep the
20 pence for the nap he had chosen; it would be racing in the 4th. Or a
forecast, a 10 pence reverse forecast. Or even a place-only bet of 20
pence. No need even to dig out a winner, just one to finish in the first
two. [...] The place-only bet was correct, it was the correct thing to
do. And so what if the dog actually won the race [...] it would not
matter, it made no difference whether it won or was second, just so
long as it was placed [...] He was standing amongst the small crowd
directly beneath the row ofbookies, checking the form for the race,
studying times and weights and distances. Yet it would not matter. The
dog he decided on would either be placed or not. What dog did not
make any difference. (C 59-60)
In this passage, betting possibilities - signified by the repeated "or"- multiply almost
endlessly and point to the use of the narrative technique of sideshadowing discussed
above. Here, the certainty of the busfare is exchanged for the uncertainty of a possible
future, but this is not a totally open future since it contains only two live possibilities:
either the dog will be placed or it will not. Choice is not completely open, but
dependent upon the situation in which one finds oneself. What this stresses is that the
important thing is to choose, decide. Therefore and noticeably, Tammas eschews
excessive analysis as a valuable method of prediction. As Sartre points out:
voluntary deliberation is always a deception. How can I evaluate
causes and motives on which I myself confer their value before all
deliberation and by the very choice which I make ofmyself? The
illusion here stems from the fact that we endeavour to take causes and
motives for entirely transcendent things which I balance in my hands
like weights and which possess a weight as a permanent property. Yet
on the other hand we try to view them as contents of consciousness,
and this is self-contradictory. Actually causes and motives have only
the weight which my project - i.e., the free production of the end of
the known act to be realized - confers upon them. When I deliberate,
the chips are down. (BN 450-1)
The chips are down, lesjeux sansfait, this gambling locution from Being and
Nothingness becomes a screenplay about determinism,39 but it points here to the
uselessness of utilitarian deliberation. Tammas tells Rab at one stage that "I just want
to have it all in front ofme at the time [. . .] see how I'm fixed for everything" (C 15)
but in human life no such situation arises. Knowledge is always incomplete, tentative,
39Jean-Paul Sartre, The Chips are Down, trans. Louise Varese (London: Rider, 1951).
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thus the possible, what is to be, appears not through acts of deliberation but from
individual decision. The absence of the certain yokes responsibility and such personal
decision together. Thus by the end of the novel, Tammas realises that "it was not
possible to do everything. You need to make your selection and stick to it. There was
nothing else you could do. There was nothing else, nothing at all. A mistake even to
think like that." (C 296) One cannot have everything or know everything because
things only come to be through choice, "selection". Deliberation implies that the
future can be known, predicted, but within Sartrean existentialism, value, like the
future, is made and not found. What will be will be in accordance with the constitutive
choices which make up the project of the for-itself.40
tn response to a question from Kirsty McNeill, Kelman declares that the "subculture"
of the gambling world holds out a route of escape for those such as Tammas.41 As I
have suggested, Kelman's novel intimates that gambling is the only avenue of freedom
open to men like Tammas, but gambling also suggests diversion. The reference here is
of course to Pascal whose own fragmented and incomplete text, Pensees, advances
the theory of gambling as divertissement. Pascal himselfwas deeply interested in the
problem of the cycloid, the roulette wheel, and Halliday and Fuller recount that
Pascal's involvement with the seventeenth century gambler, Le Chevalier de Mere led
to a fascination with dice and gambling.42 Pascal also provides a proto-existential
diagnostic, Here gambling is not seen as a positive symbol of existential ontology, but
an indication of an existential malaise. Man needs diversion because he is unhappy and
for Pascal this discomfort proceeds from a central issue. The difficulty is in realising
that "I am not a necessary being. I am not eternal or infinite either."43 Pascal thus
40Charles Taylor criticises Sartrean existentialism, arguing that this groundlessness of
choice is incoherent. Taylor himself prefers the Ffeideggerian version. See his
'Responsibility for Self in ed. Gary Watson, Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1982), pp. 111-126.
41Kirsty McNeill, 'Interview with James Kelman', p.8.
42See Alban Krailsheimer, Pascal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 10, p. 14
and Eds. John Halliday and Peter Fuller, The Psychology ofGambling (London: Allen
Lane, 1974), p. 1.
43Blaise Pascal, Pensees, trans. A J Krailsheimer (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966), p
67.
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proposes contingency as a stimulant; awareness of one's non-necessity creates
unhappiness, to relieve this unhappiness one seeks a diversion:
The only good thing for men therefore is to be diverted from thinking
ofwhat they are, either by some occupation which takes their mind of
it, or by some novel and agreeable passion which keeps them busy, like
gambling, hunting, some absorbing show, in short by what is called
diversion. (67-8).
Gambling becomes what Pascal terms a 'created target', an imagined telos seemingly
substituting the contingency of the real for a continually differed imagined 'if. As an
activity then gambling provides an illusion of purpose whilst simultaneously
registering precisely the contingency, the absence of essence, which the gambler seeks
to elude. The world of the gambler is a world without guarantee, but each time the
gambling act is worked, contingency re-enters, once again presents itself. Here
gambling seems to function as a mask. It paradoxically conceals the contingency
which entails freedom.
Perhaps the most famous gamble however is Pascal's wager. As Crime and
Punishment illustrates an essentially Pascalian gamble, Raskolnikov gambles on faith,
The Outsider and A Chancer place themselves on the opposite side. They are atheistic
existential challenges to Pascal's wager. Man must make himself in a world without
God and both novels suggest that this is problematic, for the societal structures which
provide the frame in which such choice must be made are like odds stacked in the
house's favour. In Camus' novel when Meursault is put on trial, the prosecutor, as
representative of the system and thus of society, seems not only to try Meursault, but
also seems to impugn chance itself.
Raymond said that it was quite by chance that I happened to be at the
beach. The prosecutor then asked him how it was that the letter which
lay behind this intrigue had been written by me. Raymond replied that
it was quite by chance. The prosecutor retorted that chance already
had a number ofmisdemeanours on its conscience in this affair. He
wanted to know if it was by chance that I hadn't intervened when
Raymond had beaten up his mistress, by chance that I'd acted as a
witness at the police station, and also by chance that the statement I'd
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made on that occasion had proved to be so thoroughly
accommodating. (The Outsider 92).
A Chancer then emerges from a distinct literary genealogy; it combines various
fictional strands in its articulation of existential issues. The narrative mode, the zero
degree writing, never returns in quite this form. However the issues generated by its
adoption are maintained in Kelman's subsequent novels.
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Chapter Four
Temporality and the Origin of Negation: The Busconductor Hines
The central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of
time.
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time1
There are many varieties of experience of lack, or absence, and many
subtle distinctions between the experience of negation and the negation
of experience.
R D Laing, The Politics ofExperience2
Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being - like a worm.
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness 3
1Being and Time, p.464.
2R D Laing, The Politics ofExperience and The Bird ofParadise, 1967
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), p.32.
3Being andNothingness, p. 21
101
Like all of Kelman's fictions, The Busconductor Hines is a text pervaded by that most
pivotal existential problematic - freedom. Within the novel, this basic existential
concern is imparted principally by a concentration upon two topics: negation and
temporality; and it is with an analysis of these and how they contribute to the
fundamental existential thematic with which this chapter shall be principally
concerned. However as well as being Kelman's first published novel, The
Busconductor Hines is additionally significant in that at a formal level it inaugurates
the narrative mode utilised mutatis mutandis in all his subsequent novels. The
technical devices - principally the ambiguous narrative voice - with which this novel is
composed, induce the referents of the adjective 'Kelmanesque'. Therefore before
proceeding to discuss the themes which the narrative articulates, it would be beneficial
to analyse how the formal features of the text contribute to an existential construction
of the work as a whole.
As with all of Kelman's prose fiction, Hines utilises a narrative focaliser, the
eponymous busconductor of the title. However, focus is not achieved via a
straightforward first-person narration, since throughout the text the narrative
modulates between first and third-person voices. However, Hines maintains or implies
an I-voice because when the third-person is used, it is deployed in such a way that it
maintains a strict proximity to its ostensible subject. Thus for the reader, locating a
clear deictic shift is problematic. Through this vacillating narrative style, the novel
forces the reader into addressing a familiar Beckettian question: which I says I?
it's written in the form of a sort of interior monologue [. ..] it's not
written in the 'I' voice but it may as well have been written in the 'I'
voice, so in that sense it has to have been written from the inside [...]
There's a couple of things going on in the book [...] I can't really
describe it as an interior monologue, nor is it a dialogue [. . .] It's very
possible you see that Hines could be writing that novel. I mean that it
is technically possible within the framework of the novel. Nothing that
happens happens outwith the perception ofHines [...] I could describe
it as a first person novel written in the third person.4
4Duncan McLean, 'James Kelman Interviewed' , p.100, 101, 102.
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As outlined here, Kelman's intended style has both a Chekhovian quality whereby the
narrative voice is pressed down into, wrapped around, and dissolved into the
character, but also a Joycean component where voices and registers interfuse.
There ticks the clock; if it hadnt been wound then the ticking etc., it
wouldnt be happening. And anyway, he had forgotten to bring the
soap so this is a genuine reason not to wash [his feet]. Often it is the
fresh socks that he forgets to bring and sometimes the towel and
sometimes more than the one item maybe even the fucking lot so that
Sandra, having to get whatever it is, for him. O christ. And he doesnt
like having to ask her if he has forgotten, he gets so sick of it, this
forgetting and the dependency. (BH 165)
The ambiguity of narrative voice to which Kelman alludes is evident in this passage.
Speech (or thought?) - "O chrisf'- is conveyed as free representation unfettered by
quotation marks. This obscures the shift from narrative voice to character voice,
although as Kelman points out, given that it is "technically possible" that Hines
narrates the tale, there may be no such shift at all. This ambiguity and equivocacy of
voice is upheld by the third person passages which maintain a spoken quality by both
importing demotic locutions ("the fucking lot") to maintain an informal tenor, and
additionally by jettisoning apostrophes in the contractions "hadnt", "wouldnt",
"doesnt". Although this latter move is not consistently maintained throughout the
novel5, the elision of the apostrophe turns the written into spoken: one cannot hear an
apostrophe. Cairns Craig reads the combination of these and related techniques as a
formal procedure set out to achieve a coherence which Hines, and Kelman's other
'heroes', lack.
The text [...] constructs a linguistic unity which resists the
fragmentation and isolation that the novels chart as the experience of
their characters. Unity of voice replaces unity of political or social
purpose as the foundation of solidarity: the text enacts at a linguistic
level what it points to as absent in the world, a communality that
transcends the absolute isolation of the individual human being.6
Whilst broadly accurate, this analysis requires does require some modification.
Kelman's narrative strategy has a twofold motivation: to achieve an objectivity, a kind
of epistemological degree zero such as the reader encounters in the work of
5For example: "It's no patience you need man it's skill." (BH 126)
6Cairns Craig, 'Resisting Arrest: James Kelman', p. 103-4.
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Robbe-Grillet, whilst still retaining an experiencing subject - a character to whom
these experiences belong. Narrated situations and narrated events are situations and
events for someone, albeit a fictional someone. Events and situations constitute 'facts'
about that person. Thus the modulating narrative mode is deployed to efface any
distance between the narrative, the narrator and the reader; it is to enforce the factical
and reduce or preclude any possibility of distancing or any space to enable judgement.
It does this by closing the gap between narrator and protagonist. Kelman tells us that
he seeks to "write a story where there is no space between the telling and the event."7
Therefore Craig's analysis, whilst correct in identifying linguistic solidarity as both an
impetus and an effect ofKelman's prose style, errs by moving in the wrong direction.
It mistakes the space wherein the solidarity is to be achieved, by moving from the
concrete, the very specificity which Kelman's narrative is designed to maintain, to the
linguistic: for Kelman though this separation is not possible since the linguistic is
within the concrete, within the world. Manfred Malzahn commits a similar mistake
when he writes that in Hines, the "main narrative technique is the transcendence of
reality"8, but what Kelman does, or what he intends, is precisely the opposite: he
moves the narrator into the world of the character. The narrator occupies the same
fictional space as the subject of the narrated events thereby rendering the linguistic
coextensive with the concrete world: there is no 'transcendence', because there is no
transcendent position. Consequently although the third-person voice predominates, it
declines the omniscience associated with the traditional use of this mode; the reader
only 'sees' what Hines sees. It is essential for an understanding of Kelman's work that
these points are grasped. Simultaneously affirming Sartre's call for a "hard realism of
subjectivity without mediation or distance"9, it further helps account for Kelman's
interest in the nonveau roman. The introduction of the modulating first person/ third
7James Kelman in Duncan McLean, 'James Kelman Interviewed', p. 122.
8Manfred Malzahn, 'The Industrial Novel' in ed. Cairns Craig, The History ofScottish
Literature, 4 vols (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), IV, pp.229-242,
p.239. Malzhan's error is perhaps explicable by his desire to accomodate Kelman
within the parameters ofwhat he terms 'Scottish working-class' fiction.
9Sartre quoted in Anna Bruschetti, 'Sartre and the Age of the American Novel', trans.
Maria-Teresa Vanderboegh and David Vanderboegh in eds. Jean-Franyois Fournay
and Charles D Minahen, Situating Sartre in Twentieth-Century Thought and Culture
(London: MacMillan, 1997), pp.71-92, p.76.
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person narrative style represents both a continuation and a surpassing of the
compositional technique ofA Chancer, assessed in chapter three. It is a continuation,
because what underpins its use is still based upon the premises of the New Novel.
In an essay on Beckett, Robbe-Grillet invokes Heidegger to insist that it is the task of
the writer to show what being-there consists in; for Robbe-Grillet "the essential
theme" is "presence".10 Kelman wants to do this in an 'objective' way; but it is
objective in a specialised, qualified sense. Roland Barthes prefixes his study of
Robbe-Grillet with a quotation from the OxfordEnglish Dictionary pointing to a
particular use of the noun 'objective': "In optics, the lens situated nearest the object
to be observed.'"1 Kelman when using the third person is committed to a proximity of
contact, a precise contiguity. The narrative "lens" is situated within the world of the
subject and like a lens it records without judging what it is recording. Lack of
judgement is the important outcome. This is the notion of objectivity which Kelman
discusses with Kirsty McNeill; one which is wholly committed to the enactment of
"factual reality'"2. It is a technique committed to concretion, the establishment of an
objective facticity but also a specific concretion: the situations through which the
novel moves are relative to a particular subjectivity. A straightforward third-person
narrative can achieve the concrete but will necessarily downgrade the subject; a purely
first-person account lacks the factual objectivity of the third-person. Kelman's
existentialist aesthetic requires both: both being and world, subject and framework.
Facticity and concretion are established immediately the novel opens:
Hines jumped up from the armchair, she was about to lift the huge
soup-pot of boiling water. She nodded when he said, I'll get it.
[...] What a weight, he said.
I put in too much ... She had returned to the oven for a smaller pot
10Alain Robbe-Grillet, 'Samuel Beckett, or "Presence" in the Theatre', trans. Barbara
Bray, in ed. Martin Esslin, Samuel Beckett: A Collection ofCritical Essays
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 108-116, p. 108, p. 114.
"Roland Barthes 'Objective Literature: Alain Robbe-Grillet', trans. Richard Howard
in Alain Robbe-Grillet, Two Novels by Robbe-Grillet: Jealousy and In The Labyrinth,
1957, 1959, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Grove Press, 1965), pp.11-25, p. 11.
12Kirsty McNeill, 'Interview with James Kelman', p 4. In this interview, Kelman
names Robbe-Grillet and Sarraute and explicitly links the development of his own
narrative techniques to contact with the nouveau roman.
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ofwater which was also boiling. She murmured, almost inaudibly.
What?
She glanced at him.
Sorry; I thought you were eh ... He prised the lid off his tobacco
tin and began rolling a cigarette. Before putting the empty pots back
into their place in the kitchen-cabinet she wiped them dry with the
dishtowel. Then she undressed. She stopped, and walked to draw the
Venetian blind at the window above the sink. Hines smiled. Passing
helicopters eh! (BH 9)
This passage begins with the subject followed by an active verb; subject and verb
suggesting the existential couplet of Being and doing. A number of sentences - "I put
[...] She glanced [...] He prised [...] She stopped" - convey processes, the cumulative
effect of which is to suggest and reinforce the notion of activity disclosed by the
opening clause. The frequent use of the definite article provokes the situational
specificity which one would expect from an existentialist text, and as with all of
Kelman's novels, the opening is immediately determinative, the passage lacks any
aetiological moments; there is no antecedent causal state. We do not know why Hines
has jumped until we move further into the narrative. Similarly, Hines' wife is initially
indicated by the pronoun "she" and only as the tale progresses do we learn her name.
This is existentially significant as it drives the narrative forward and insists upon a
future orientation; a facet of some importance as Kelman describes to Duncan
McLean:
The principle part of that sentence is the first one which is 'Hines
jumps up' [sic]. There is no cause or effect: it's a picture of a fact; the
fact is: somebody has jumped up. That begins the whole thing, the
character jumps up, stands to attention - there is this movement going
on. And then you start analysis [...] It's got to begin in a really
unemphatic way [...] It's got to be something that's so everyday.13
Nothing could be more everyday than the taking of a bath. The avowed concern with
the objective (in the sense outlined above) depiction of fact makes the novel
'existential' in a basic way: 'x exists' is an existential proposition, a 'fact'. Kelman's
novels and stories work to emphasise, to contend, that these basic moments, or
analogous situations, exist and in so doing they designate an extra-textual reality.
Given all the above, it is surprising that Douglas Gifford in an early review of the
13Duncan Maclean, 'James Kelman Interviewed', p. 120.
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novel writes that there is a "paradox that all this craft and detail is spent on apparently
so slight a central situation."14 But the relation of style to content in The
Busconductor Hines is only paradoxical if one is not aware of existential philosophy
and existential literature. Since Kelman's fictions share in Heidegger's concern with
Dasein's average everydayness, elaborate conventions of plotting and traditional
narrative sequentiality are outlawed; they have to be. Nothing happens, or rather
nothing extraordinary happens. This however does not render "slight" the fictive
situations which Hines moves through. Hines himself describes his situation as
"demanding" but "not odd" (BH 87), pointing to the difficulties which inhere in the
most seemingly innocuous situations. Kelman's literary project is therefore analogous
with formal existentialism in that it seeks to reinvest the everyday with significance; to
show that the lives of his characters even whilst embroiled in the diurnal are anything
but "slight".
Beginning with the everyday, Heidegger's analysis ofDasein moves to consider what
he terms 'existentials'15, the basic features ofDasein's (and only Dasein's) being. For
Heidegger one of the most fundamentally important existentials is Mood, something
which Dasein "always has" {BT173). To designate this existential, Heidegger uses the
term Stimmung, which in German conveys simultaneously the tuning of a musical
instrument. This idea of tuning is carried over into the notion ofBefindlichkeit,
roughly 'how one finds oneself, and Heidegger argues that one always finds oneself
in a mood. These moods are ontologically important because they disclose, they 'light
up' the world, exposing what one has been previously unaware of, but they also direct
how Dasein, as a hermeneutical Being, engages with and understands the world.
Although mentioning boredom and joy, Heidegger, following Kierkegaard, devotes
considerable time to Angst. When augmented by boredom they represent perhaps the
classic existential symptoms. Angst and boredom cling to, surround and constantly
threaten to engulf Kelman's protagonists and Robert Hines is no exception. In The
Busconductor Hines, these twin moods surface almost immediately:
14Douglas Gifford, 'The Richest Collection in Years', Books in Scotland, 15 (Summer
1984), 9-14, (p. 11).
15See Being and Time, p.70.
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I dont know what's up with me sometimes (BH 19)
my state ofutter boredom {BH 34)
The aporia present in the first quotation depicts the indefinite quality which divorces
anxiety from basic fear. Fear is intentional, in the philosophical sense; anxiety is not.
Heidegger tells us that "the world as such is that in the face ofwhich one has anxiety"
(.BT 23); a formulation which Hines repeats: "There are parties whose attention to a
variety of aspects of existence renders life uneasy. It cannot be said to be the fault of
Hines that he is such a party. {BH 181). Angst and boredom function as symbols
indicating an ontological malaise immediately recognisable from Heidegger in which
"Being has become manifest as a burden." {BT 173) However the occurrence of these
existentials is of less importance than what they reveal, and for Heidegger moods
ultimately reveal two things: Dasein's temporal structure and the presence of'the
nothing'. These archetypal existential notions of temporality and nullity saturate
Kelman's text. The former predominates, and given its centrality in the novel and in
Heidegger's ontology, it is to temporality that I shall attend first.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that the protagonist is a busconductor, numerous
references to time and the temporal suffuse the novel. In the first of the two
quotations above Hines' indication of anxiety follows an exchange with his wife. In
bed, Sandra has forgotten to "check the clock": Hines replies "You're best no to."
{BH 19). The novel however suggests that forgetting time is impossible. Hines, his
wife and his son, live lives regulated by external, public or clock-time. Sandra wants
to work full-time, Hines wants more overtime, Hines' paper of choice is the Evening
Times, and ticking clocks appear like pedal points throughout the narrative. What the
novel rapidly discloses is a disparity, a conflict, between existential time and
clock-time or public time.
He yawned. A bit early yet I suppose - the time; a bit early yet, to go
to bed.
She smiled.
Naw, half-ten, too early. If you're really tired you should go.
He nodded. {BH 29)
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Things passed sluggishly [...] The clock. He raised himself to see the
time: apparently 20 minutes had elapsed since the alarm clock
sounded. It seemed like twenty seconds. Too late now to make any
breakfast. {BH 112)
The disjunction between the two temporalities is clearly seen here. Hines' body feels
tired and so signals that it is 'time' for bed, but the clock dictates that it is not.
Conversely when he should be making his way to work, his body-clock suggests that
only a few seconds have expired, whereas the alarm clock registers a greater temporal
movement. Both these quotations illustrate the disruption engendered by the orienting
of life around the artificial time of the clock. What is a clock?
A clock is a physical system in which an identical temporal sequence is
constantly repeated, with the provision that this physical system is not
subject to change through any external influence. The repetition is
cyclical. Each period has an identical temporal duration. The clock
provides an identical duration that constantly repeats itself [. . .] This
time is thoroughly uniform, homogenous.16
The propensities of clock-temporality which Heidegger picks out expand within
Kelman's novel. Clock temporality predominates and extends, creating what Hines
deems a "clockwork universe" {BH 112). Initially this may seem a restating of the
familiar Modernist agon between, to use Bergson's terms, temps duree and
clock-time. Whilst similarities are present, it is important to recall that Heidegger is
equally critical of both the Bergsonian and Aristotelian models of time. According to
Heidegger both repeat the idea of time as a series of nows, a sempiternal sequence,
and this construal contaminates Dasein producing a distracting movement away from
authentic selfhood. "I'm sick of this eternal busconducting" {BH 39); Hines
accordingly identifies his profession as one which produces such cylicality. In a
characteristic addition, Kelman imports a socio-economic detail to his existentialism
as the novel insists on a quasi-Marxian identification between a society structured
according to a capitalist grid, which is necessarily temporal, and an impoverishment of
primordial existential temporality: "The Department of Transport must bear much of
16 Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time, 1989, trans. William McNeill (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992), p.4E.
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the blame, the way it fucks with one's body-clock." It "fucks with" the body clock
because it represents and is structured by the mechanical clock.
The clock shows us the now, but no clock ever shows the future or has
ever shown the past. All measuring of time means bringing time into
the 'how much'. If I determine by the clock the point at which a future
event will occur, then it is not the future that is meant; rather what I
determine is 'how long'. I now have to wait until the now intended.
(CT17E)
What Hines terms "garage time" {BH 186) is this sequence of nows. Garage time
causes a collapsed past and a negated future; a sequestered, anchorless life, a "carry
on backwards and forwards" {BH 91) and backwards and forwards constitutes no
movement at all.
Kelman's narratives are not concerned with progressions along a
temporal trajectory of events; they are concerned with an
unchangeable context into which human beings are thrown and from
which there is no escape. They are concerned fundamentally, therefore,
not with the progress implied by a narrative sequence but with
repetition - repetition as the systematisation and dehumanisation to
which working-class people, above all others, are subjected.17
Here Cairns Craig picks out repetition, systematisation and dehumanisation as being
symptomatic of a curtailed temporality. Ifwe bring out the existential issues involved
then Hines has no 'trajectory' because he is encapsulated in the now, encapsulated in
his role - whether busconductor, husband or father- and thus without that ecstatic
future orientation which both Heidegger and Sartre insist occupies a central place in
existential ontology. It is to underline this that the novel ends with Hines returning to
the buses. The busconductor who endlessly describes and re-describes the same route,
under the aegis of a never altering chronology of the clock both literally and
metaphorically depicts human reality shorn of the dynamic temporality necessary for
authentic being. For Hines "the immediate past is not only today but tomorrow" {BH
81) and this appraisal of a recapitulatory existence noticeably omits the temporal
dimension to which Heidegger attributes the greatest importance. "The fundamental
phenomenon of time is the future". {Concept of Time 14E) If one is lodged in a
17Cairns Craig, 'Resisting Arrest: James Kelman', The Scottish Novel Since the
Seventies, p. 105.
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perpetual present, a network of nows, then one becomes static. For Heidegger, human
being is temporality; if it lacks a temporal dimension then it lacks precisely those
ontological qualities which make human being human being. Dasein made static
becomes an object. It is this notion of Dasein becalmed in the now that transplants the
novel, moving it outwith a Bergsonian paradigm and into an existential one. In so
doing, the novel again suggests that the prevalent capitalist society generates an
economic facticity inimical to Dasein's existentiality. Hines talks of "sold hours" (BH
206), signalling a commodification or in Heideggerian terms a transmutation of fluid
time into quantifiable zuhanden or vorhanden. Hines therefore collocates his
employers, public-temporality and objectification:
Best to ignore fixed things like weeks and months and the rest of it.
That's the time thing they set you up. (.BH 70)
The time things they set you up. {BH 81)
Hines had explained how the thing was genuinely distanced from
individuals as such. {BH 129)
Added calendar divisions both fix, in the sense ofmaking immobile, and fix in the
sense of datability and Hines tells us that his employers regard him as a "fixture". {BH
112) Further, the mysterious "thing" negates individuality because it takes
world-time as temporally primordial: it negates or chronically restricts existential time
and thus is culpable in an act of reification and ontological restriction. For Hines, the
"time thing" is both an object itself but additionally the principle means of his own
objectification. The time thing is the time of'the they', like 'the thing' it is both
distant from and distancing to, existential individuality. Heidegger writes that
[i]n utilising public means of transport [. . .] every Other is like the next.
This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely
into the kind ofBeing of'the Others', in such a way, indeed, that the
Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this
inconscpicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the
"they" is unfolded. {BT 164)
The dictatorship of the they is the dictatorship of the garage for Hines not only utilises
public transport, but as a conductor, he assists in its regulation. Instead then of an
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authentic subjectivity, with its corresponding fiitural horizon, Hines is converted into
a function.
Travelling on the Underground, I often wonder with a kind of dread
what can be the inward reality of the life of this or that man employed
on the railway - the man who opens the doors, for instance, or the one
who punches the tickets. Surely everything both within him and
outside him conspires to identify this man with his functions [...]. The
rather horrible expression 'time table' perfectly describes his life. So
many hours for each function. Sleep too is a function so that the other
functions may be exercised in their turn [. . .]. We need go no further;
this sketch is sufficient to suggest the emergence of a kind of vital
schedule; the details will vary with the country, the climate, the
profession, etc., but what matters is that there is a schedule.18
Substitute buses for references to the Underground, and Marcel's depiction of the
employee condemned to clock-servitude lights up the lebenswelt ofHines; one in
which everything is settled "from the hour of birth", where "the A going to B that the
C has become a picture" {BH 119). Kelman's choice of employment for his character
is not therefore either accidental nor ofmerely contingent importance. As a
busconductor, Hines begins and ends his working day at a terminus, a structure which
shares its name with the Roman god of boundaries. The terminus binds because it
represents the source of clock temporality, it provides Hines with both his terminus
ad quem and his terminus ad quo and thereby the means of ontological constriction.
So for Hines, "the problem is the surrounding" {BH 98), but the problematic
instantiated by the bus company, it is one form of "surrounding", expands to include
his total world. Glasgow is experienced as a "narrowing" {BH 145) suggesting what
Heidegger describes as existentiality being "determined by facticity". {BT236) What
the novel does is to depict increased and increasing factical obstacles such that the
zone of the possible suffers a corresponding contraction. The radical alterity that
Heidegger and Sartre position at the heart of Dasein, or the pour-soi, has no external
outlet precisely because the external world, or more properly the factical, is composed
such that there are no alternatives. The coefficient of adversity is multiplied, has
I8Gabriel Marcel, 'On the Ontological Mystery', 1954, trans. Manya Harari, The
Philosophy ofExistence (London: Harvill,1954)
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become so great, that Hines is "forced into situations a dog wouldnt be forced into."
(.BH 182).
Bound, restricted, arrested, "Hines Robert whose number is 4729" {BH 167) becomes
an avatar of Joseph K. (K.'s last words in The Trial are "Like a dog") and the
Kafkaesque symmetry is reinforced in one of the two19 explicit literary references in
the novel: "One fine morning Hines R. was arrested". Like Joseph K., Hines is
arrested both from without - The Department ofTransport and the 'imperial' world
with which Hines takes it to be complicit - but also from within. Converging with
Marcel's idea of "the actor" who is "reduced to living as though he were in fact
submerged by his functions"20, Sartre probes the society which demands that man
"limit himself to his function" {BN 59). When this dual process of submersion and
limitation is internalised, it transports into Bad Faith. "Here you have a Busconductor
Hines" {BH 97) who wants to become a "the Busdriver Hines" [sic] {BH 64), but
both are roles, both are mistakenly taken to provide a pre-structured, already-defined
self. Famously, Sartre illustrates this concept by describing a cafe waiter who
internalises his role such that the nothingness of the pour-soi is displaced, one might
say filled, by an imagined essential structure or nature. It is imagined because as
Sartre argues bad faith disregards, or attempts to efface, the pivotal ontological
distinction between an inanimate object and a human being: "the waiter in the cafe can
not be immediately a cafe waiter in the sense that this inkwell is an inkwell, or the
glass is a glass." {BN 59) He cannot be in the way that a glass may be said to be,
because human being is "essentially ahead of itself' {BT 458).
Thus curtailed, Hines complains of "absent horizons" {BH 168) but he is
simultaneously aware that "one is occasionally required to consider the
future" {BH 43). The problem is however that in the society which he inhabits, the
future, when assessed in terms of live possibilities is so restricted as to constitute no
future at all. "1-man-buses are the vehicular items of the not too distant future" {BH
I9The other being to Kirilov {BH 136), the idealist who commits suicide in
Dostoevsky's The Possessed. Kirilov appears frequently in Camus' The Myth of
Sisyphus and The Rebel.
20Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy ofExistence, p. 3.
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80). One man buses render conductors obsolete, but one cannot go backwards either
since "life on the broo had not been good" (BH 83). An impossible past and an
impossible future mean Hines cannot "be getting beyond the moment" (BH 119). He
scans the Evening Times situations vacant column and comes up with nothing for
there is no vacant situation for Hines to project himself into.
there he is and they are here, the unit, the trio. And it is all so fucking
long, so long, and yet here he is, still fucking here and not doing, not
doing anything, still here, on the buses, back on the third term. And if
the connection is now to be severed there can be no return. (BH 82-3)
Hines is faced, as Patrick Doyle will be, with Kierkegaard's Either/Or. What
Kierkegaard intends by this locution is sometimes misunderstood: Kierkegaard is not
contending that one should choose between X and Y; the either/or is whether one
chooses choice: So "give us an aye or give us a naw - because in betweens no longer
exist in any scheme of the world" (BH 99) The introduction ofKierkegaard
re-orientates how the reader encounters and interprets the following passage.
The position in which he is to be finding himself is no worse than
that of countless others whose efforts are no longer negotiable but
that that position might yet have become tranquil that
they could have multiplied inasmuch, inasmuch as Hines could
eventually, he could have become
He was wanting that becoming. (BH 98)
First we should notice that Hines expands his prognosis to include "countless others"
like himself, the universal in the particular, but the key term here is 'becoming'. A
notable component ofHegelianism, where becoming is a synthesis of Being and
Nothing, in Kierkegaard the term is adopted to express the mode of being constitutive
of authentic personhood.21 Subjective existence existentially speaking is a process of
becoming. The omission of the closing full stop after 'becoming' helps depict a future
not yet decided, a blank space. What a person is to become is his or her own
responsibility. "If [...] the self does not become itself then it is in despair, whether it
21"the subject is existing, and that existing is a becoming"; "to be in mediation is to be
finished; to exist is to become." Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 196, 199.
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knows it or not. Yet a self, every moment it exists, is in a process of becoming".22
This is the becoming that Hines wants. Yet as Kierkegaard maintains, a discrepancy
arises between what is desired and what is achievable - possibility is not limitless - and
the realisation of this leads us back to Angst or despair. Therefore the novel has a
circular structure. Kierkegaard tells of the "decisive moment", when man is brought
"to the utmost extremity, where in human terms there is no possibility" (SD 68). For
Kierkegaard this vacuum is filled by faith, but Hines, like Patrick Doyle and Sammy
Samuels is a self-professed atheist. "It's alright for you christians but what about the
rest of us man? no after-life or fuck all." (BH 48). No 'after-life' merely repeats and
exacerbates the lack of possibility in this life: "A good genuine atheist's got no
fucking chance in this grey but gold bundle of shite of a fucking city." {BH 40)
Syntactic disarray and repeated clauses produce a paradoxical narrative which moves
forward, through the hours of the clock, and yet stays still since clock time is a
sequence of repetition.
The backsliding shite [...] You can have a way of moving which you
reckon has to be ahead in a definite sense and then for some reason,
for some reason what happens is fuck all really, nothing, nothing at all,
nothing at all is happening yet there you are {BH 91).
Heidegger argues however that even when Dasein is taken with 'the they' he or she
still maintains a dim acquaintance with existential time. During a walk in the park,
Hines stops to contemplate the river: "the driftwood flowing towards him, passing
below; he went to the other side to watch it reappear." {BH 54). It is the flow which
is significant, for it suggests the constancy ofmovement, the always becoming of
existential identity, but the implication is that Hines identifies himself with the
driftwood. He does not or cannot act and thereby plunge into the future and thus is
merely transported along a series of unaltering nows. Shortly thereafter he encounters
a woman who resembles Sandra, pushing a pram as Sandra once did. The pram,
which throughout the novel is associated with Hines' son Paul, functions as a pointer
to the future, - Paul is described as "another tomorrow" {BH 119) - as Sandra, whom
Hines remembers meeting from work, becomes an indicator of the past. Again
22Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, 1849, trans. Alastair Hannay
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989), p.60.
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though, in some of the most moving passages of the novel, Hines transfers his hopes
to his son. Paul is the nearest Hines can come to a future.
Although Hines construes himself as "always beat" (BH 22) he both effects and
displays little resistances. His uniform makes him feel "itchy", he feels good when he
is without it and he refuses to "play a part in the system of the British Greats" (BH
109). The uniform is a symbol of public-time; it represents the world of his employers
which is why Hines declines to wear it when he is sent to head office on his day off.
So the 'greenly' uniform represents time made uniform and Hines' poor timekeeping
is perhaps the most readily detectable evidence that he has yet to completely surrender
to the inauthenticity which haunts the novel. This tardiness is supplemented by an
activity which seems so commonplace that one barely notices its occurrence. Hines
smokes.
Smoking is an activity which recurs throughout Kelman's prose. Its importance here
is flagged by the Polygon edition of The Busconductor Hines which has a dustjacket
which replicates the design of a packet ofRizla cigarette papers. Smoking is
important for it involves itself with and continues the theme of time. Smoking and
time are inseperable. In his Cigarettes are Sublime, Richard Klein describes how the
photographer Brassai employed cigarettes to measure the exposure time of
photographic plates, and how Sartre constantly exemplifies philosophical points using
cigarettes as concrete examples.23 Similarly, Michael Inwood in his study of
Heidegger details how Greek peasants (his term) describe the duration of a
journey not in hours or minutes, but by the number of cigarettes consumed in its
undertaking.24 What these examples show, and what Klein goes on to discuss, is the
importance of the cigarette as a temporal measure or rather an alternative temporal
23 Richard Klein, Cigarettes are Sublime (1993, rpt London: Picador, 1995), p.24.
Sartre explicitly links smoking and time in an interview with Simone de Beauvoir. "To
smoke a pipe you have to be settled in a specific place, at a cafe table for instance, and
then you have to stare at the world around you as you smoke. A Pipe is an
immobilizing element." Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, p.412.
As Klein points out, Sartre never smokes nor mentions cigars: "wrong class".
(Cigarettes are Sublime 28)
24 Michael Inwood, Heidegger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.30.
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measure. Klein argues that the cigarette is not a cigarette "but a clock" (ibid.) - not
however the standardised clock of public-time.
The cigarette kills time, chronometric time, the stark mechanical
measure ofmortality [...] Smoking cigarettes is permanently linked to
the idea of suspending the passage of ordinary time and instituting
some other. (8)
The moment of taking a cigarette allows one to open a parenthesis in
the time of ordinary experience, a space and time of heightened
attention that gives rise to a feeling of transcendence [...] It produces a
little rush of infinity that alters perspectives, however slightly, and
permits, albeit briefly, an ecstatic standing outside of oneself. (16)
Transposing this back to Kelman's novel allows us to recast Hines frequent cigarette
breaks as his means of removing himself from chronometric time, a way of having his
own time, a way of killing clock-time. At various significant moments in the novel,
Hines reaches for his tobacco tin. Chided by the Deskclerk over his lack of punctuality
Hines rolls a cigarette. A discussion with Sandra who wants to work full-time ends
with Hines reaching for his tobacco tin to elude further participation in the
conversation. Having drawn a Sunday shift, Hines spends some time at home before
proceeding to the terminus:
he sipped at the tea. It was lukewarm; he set the cup onto the
mantelpiece and rolled a cigarette. He glanced at the clock. Well ... I
suppose I suppose. He looked to Sandra but she didnt acknowledge
him. He lit the cigarette. (BH 43)
Here smoking takes Hines from the relentlessness of the ticking clock. It takes back, if
only to the smallest degree, minutes due to the public-time of the Department of
Transport. Therefore it is one of the novel's most significant moments when Hines
interrupts his route, stops the bus, and goes to buy tobacco.
Cigarettes by their nature are short-lived and they cost money. Hines describes how
he removes funds from the limited housekeeping budget to buy tobacco. Cigarettes
enable a brief supplanting ofworking time but to feed the habit Hines requires more
money and in the world he inhabits, money and time are inseparable. Therefore
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whatever respite cigarettes offer is only temporary besides, "THE MORE YOU
SMOKE THE MORE YOU RISK YOUR HEALTH". (BH 73)
Hines' engagement with the world is unsatisfactory, frustrating, and this triggers an
introspection, an internal migration. In so doing, The Busconductor Hines suggests a
literary ancestry, positioning itself alongside Notes from Underground and much of
Beckett's early and middle prose. Comparisons with the latter seem especially
rewarding. The anonymous blurb on the Everyman edition describes Hines as
possessing a "gloriously anarchic imagination in the manner ofLeopold Bloom."
Gloriously anarchic it may be but it is less in the manner of Leopold Bloom than in the
manner of Beckett's Murphy. Both Hines and Murphy inhabit condemned buildings.
The hero of one eponymous text shares with the hero of another an aversion to
clock-time - Murphy speaks of time as "the old fornicator" and of "the bewitching
Miss Greenwich"25- but additionally both protagonists attempt to achieve relative
refuge through an interior movement, a withdrawal. Murphy's retreat from the world,
form what the character Neary describes as the "big blooming buzzing confusion"
(.Murphy 6) is paralleled by Hines who when alone, closes the curtains and sets a
record on continuous play, or lies with his eyes closed and his fingers in his ears.
Imagination or disengagement constitutes and creates a zone of freedom that seems
wholly absent in the world without. Both novels suggest that even a limited freedom
is only possible in intellectu. Various critics have pointed out Beckett's fondness for
the work of the Belgian Occasionalist philosopher Arnold Geulincx, a thinker whom
Beckett explicitly names in his work. The Beckett scholar Ruby Cohn identifies an
important passage in Geulincx's Ethics which furnishes Beckett with a favourite
metaphor: "While the ship headed towards the West speedily drags the passenger
away, nothing prevents him from walking towards the East on that very ship."26 This,
Geulincx's idea of the limitations affecting human freedom, is adopted by Molloy in a
slightly modified from:
25Samuel Beckett, Murphy, 1938 (London: Picador, 1973), p.67.
26Ruby Cohn, 'Philosophical Fragments in the Work of Samuel Beckett' in ed. Martin
Esslin, Samuel Beckett: A Collection ofCritical Essays (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp.169-177, p.171-2.
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I who loved the image of old Geulincx, dead young, who left me free,
on the black boat ofUlysses, to crawl towards the East, along the
deck. That is a great measure of freedom, for him who was not the
pioneering spirit. And from the poop, poring upon the wave, a sadly
rejoicing slave, I follow with my eyes the proud and futile wake.27
Hines too is an "object aboard the world" (BH 86) but his world is not the deck of a
boat, it is the deck of a bus. Back to the bus and back to the buses. Both boat and bus
suggest facticity, the world from which it is impossible to alight.
If angst generates an encounter with issues of existential temporality then it also
engenders an encounter with the nothing. Negation and nothingness are significant
features of both The Busconductor Hines and formal, philosophical existentialism.
Throughout Kelman's novel there are continuous references to negation, absence and
lacunae. These thematic incidences are dealt with below, but negation arises too at a
formal level and our discussion ofBeckett prepares the way for this. In a passage
which could function as a description of a common narrative style, Celia, Murphy's
girlfriend, describes Murphy's mode of oration:
She felt, as she felt so often with Murphy, spattered with words that
went dead as soon as they sounded; each word obliterated, before it
had time to make sense, by the word that came next; so that in the end
she did not know what had been said. (Murphy 27)
Form spills into content as manner of narration suggests mode ofbeing. The
experience of nothing or nothingness, ruptures the intelligible safe structures which
maintain and ground the self. Language, as a means of grasping, knowing and making
certain, becomes problematised, crepitant. Negation and related concepts arise in the
novel at a syntactic level as Kelman repeats the familiar Beckettian move of
self-cancelling sentences.
Although I'm sorry I'm no really sorry. And I dont mean that I dont
mean it cause I do, I do mean it. I apologise and do not apologise (BH
61)
27Samuel Beckett, Molloy, The Beckett Trilogy: Molloy, Malone Dies, The
Unnamable, 1950-1952, (London: Picador, 1979), p.48.
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The present situation may well be demanding but the circumstances are
not odd. They are baffling. They are baffling and they are not fucking
baffling. (BH 87)
At first sight the position he is in is of an appalling nature. It is not
appalling. (BH 103)
Here language unworks itself as its epistemological status as a hook upon the real
becomes threatened. Hines' assertions have no epistemological value: they state and
un-state. They say nothing in a moment ofBeckettian "obliteration". These textual
moments are related to and explicable by two principal existential conceptions of
nothing. For Sartre, as discussed in the previous chapter, reality is punctured by
negatites (BN 21); human being itself is a lack, a nothing, which causes nothingnesses
to arise in the world. Nothing constitutes freedom because freedom is a nothing rather
than a something. In Being and Time and 'What is Metaphysics?', Heidegger takes
the nothing to be revelatory of the radical contingency of all that is, but by so doing, it
also serves to frame the something, the existent is that which stands out from the
nothing. Both the Heideggerian and Sartrean conceptions are present within the text.
Hines describes the "District ofD." as a place where "vacancies readily occur" (BH
94). Within this vacancy, he, Sandra and Paul live in a "no-bedroomed flat" (BH 96).
Nothing expands to include Hines himself: his head is a "gap-site", a "delicate
absence" (BH 160), but a description of the square he inhabits leads to a crucial and
revealing rumination. The passage begins with Hines pondering the difficulties of
animals in the city:
They're starving right enough. And they are not to be having anywhere
to live. They keep trying to stay one jump ahead of the demolition
men. You get the building knocked down and then the equipment gets
transferred around the corner, and so on down the line, getting nearer
and nearer to this very window. And all the time the poor auld fucking
animals go running for cover, scrambling along beneath the
floorboards and up and down the stair they go (BH 80)
Hines as we have seen alludes to Kafka in describing his situation as being one which
a dog would not be forced into. Ifwe retain this then the implication of the passage
above is that the animals and the occupants of the tower blocks are equivalent, they
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share a certain 'unhomeliness'. Always on the move, they have no permanent shelter.
As Hines puts it he, and by extension they, are "not in a state of harbour" (BH 104).
For Heidegger, this feeling of unheimlichkeit is symptomatic of, and denotes the
presence of, Angst. Heidegger tells us that "in anxiety one feels uncanny
[aunheimlich]" (BT 233) and that "anxiety is anxious in the face of the "nothing" of the
world." (BT 343) The passage from Hines then reveals the kind of nothing ofwhich
Heidegger speaks. The collapsing buildings which seem to be coming at Hines as if
they are toppling dominoes, sit beside his earlier realisation of contingency (BH 99).
The impermanence of the buildings forces the realisation that nothing is as it has to
be. Nothing that Hines sees is permanent - "the whole world's crumbling about my
ears" (BH 61) - and this includes Hines himself. Hines' flat is "to be being
demolished" (BH 81) an ambiguous assertion for it resonates on two levels. Firstly it
straightforwardly points to the tearing down of old buildings but secondly it throws
up this notion of transient being: the demolished flat entails a "flit out from here to the
next place" but it registers also the unveiling achieved through the experience of
angst. Being, when read in terms of commonplace certainty, is being demolished.
Nothing assaults the familiar, "everyday familiarity collapses" (BT233) and through
this it exposes the contingency at the heart of being.
We "hover" in anxiety. More precisely, anxiety leaves us hanging
because it induces the slipping away of beings as a whole. This implies
that we ourselves - we humans who are in being - in the midst of
things slip away from ourselves [...] In the altogether unsettling
experience of this hovering where there is nothing to hold onto, pure
Da-sein is all that is there.28
This experience of lost totality or wholeness irrupts when Hines plays music: "the
sounds didnt connect [...] The lines had snapped. Lines extend from sound to point.
When the points are absent the connection has become a shambles" (BH 101) The
connectiveless world, nothing connects with nothing, although it arises through
anxiety has a positive aspect. As Heidegger explains "without the original revelation
of the nothing, no selfhood and no freedom." ('What is Metaphysics?'103).
28Martin Heidegger, 'What is Metaphysics?', trans, anon in ed. David Farrell Krell,
Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, rev. edn. (London: Routledge, 1993),
pp.93-110,p. 101.
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Nothingness holds freedom out as a possibility but it needs to be grasped. Here the
Heideggerian interpretation is supplemented by the Sartrean one: "when all is said and
done he is a negation. Being a negation is peculiar. Hines can see himself as this and it
makes him think." (BH 202) What is interesting here is the ambiguity inherent in the
passage. Is Hines a negation, in the non-existential sense; is he superfluous a nothing,
a nobody. Or, is this Hines' eventual realisation of his constitution as a Sartrean
pour-soil If the latter, then Hines is guilty of Bad Faith. He is correct to point out that
"being a negation is peculiar", for each individual on a Sartrean model is a peculiar
negation and this tallies with Heidegger's contention that anxiety and the nothing
"individualises Dasein" (BT 233), but Hines seeks refuse in the trio, the family, the
unit. Resolute, or authentic Dasein, is required to face the world as an individual. To
achieve authenticity, Dasein has to accept "the uncanniness [unheimlichkeit] of
thrown individualisation" (BT325). As Heidegger points out, Anxiety, arising from
the nothing, should bring Dasein "face to face with its Being-free-for". (BT 232)
Hines however can only achieve half of this process.
Now: towards the latter stages of his last spell on the broo a certain
husband and father's marked aversion to nought led him into what can
authentically be called a pragmatic assessment of life, the outcome of
which is his renewed determination to become a the [sic] Busdriver
Hines. (BH 93-4)
The Nothing seen here as the "nought", has caused Hines to reassess his life, but
instead of bringing him to the cusp of authenticity, he lapses. Nothing poses a
question and Hines provides the wrong answer. He wants to be a "the Busdriver
Hines". Authenticity however demands not a return to, but a struggle against an
original condition. This takes us back to the issues arising through our discussion of
temporality above. The novel suggests that Hines' position is the only possibility
available. It is a tenuous, uncertain life. In a world shorn of certainties, "Maybe'11 do"
(BH 223).
Summarising, we may say that as in A Chancer, Kelman writes a non-sequential,
episodic prose. It is a narrative punctuated by gaps and absence and these gaps
correspond to the fragile ontology ofHines. A precarious and troubled existence,
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Hines 'hovers', to use the Heideggerian term, in a perpetual anxiety. Whilst for
Nietzsche, repetition and the eternal recurrence of the same represent a metaphorical
'test' for the overman, in The Busconductor Hines, they represent the daily reality for
the occupants of a de-industrialised, collapsed society. Hines' life has no point. This
purposelessness is at once the source of his freedom and also his problem in that it
brings forth anxiety. For Hines, possibilities all belong to the past, symbolised by a
never attempted emigration to Australia. The novel closes with Hines' unexplained
return to the buses, but the last lines are the most revealing: "Hines shifted his
position, he wiped the condensation from the back window and looked out." (BH
237). Significantly it is the back window Hines looks through. Hines can only ever see
what lies behind. His return to his problematic occupation means he has not shifted
position at all.
Kelman writes that in constructing Hines, he withdrew a number of literary references




A Disaffection: Absurdity and Revolt
He feels imprisoned on this earth, he feels confined; the melancholy,
the impotence, the sicknesses, the wild delusions of the captive break
out in him; no consolation can console him for the very reason that it is
mere consolation, gentle, head-splitting consolation in the face of the
brutal fact of imprisonment. But if he is asked what he actually wants
he cannot reply, for - this is one of his strongest arguments - he has no
conception of freedom.
Franz Kafka, Aphorisms.'
They imagine that the sounds they receive flow into them, sweet and
nourishing, and that their sufferings become music, like those of young
Werther; they think that beauty is compassionate towards them. The
mugs.
Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea.2
It's the hysterical individual who allows his life to be polarised by
simple extreme antitheses like strength-weakness, potency-impotence,
health-sickness. He feels challenged but unable to struggle with social
injustice, too weak, so he struggles with women, with children, with
his 'unhappiness'.
Saul Bellow, Herzog3
'Franz Kafka, Aphorisms, p. 3 5.
2Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, p.246.
"Saul Bellow, Herzog, 1964 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983), p.215.
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Kelman's 1989 novel, A Disaffection, continues and refines the tradition of
existentialist fiction. The novel focuses upon the alienation of Patrick Doyle and in so
doing, pursues and represents in fictional form, the philosophies of, principally,
Camus and Kierkegaard. Although these philosophers dominate, the inclusion of
references to the Pythagoreans, Hegel and Schopenhauer are also, as we shall see,
significant for an existential reading of the novel. The calmly declarative opening -
"Patrick Doyle was a teacher. Gradually he had become sickened by it" (Z)l) - in its
compression of'plot' into two sentences, recalls Kafka, but simultaneously introduces
part of the novel's philosophical content: absurdity.
It happens that the stage-sets collapse. Rising, tram, four hours in the
office or factory, meal, tram, four hours of work, meal, sleep and
Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday,
according to the same rhythm - this path is easily followed most of the
time. But one day the 'why' arises and everything begins in that
weariness tinged with amazement. 'Begins' - this is important.
Weariness comes at the end of the acts of a mechanical life, but at the
same time it inaugurates the impulse of consciousness and provokes
what follows. What follows is the gradual return into the chain or it is
the definitive awakening. (MS 19)
A Disaffection begins in the past, Doyle "was" a schoolteacher, leaving the reader to
wonder what Doyle is now. Another of Kelman's solitary males, a self-confessed
"lonely man" (D\6), and like the narrator ofNotesfrom Underground, a 'sick' man,
the novel opens with Doyle having already raised his 'why'. In reducing Patrick's past
to two sentences delivered in the third person, the narrative then contends with the
Doyle of the present. This lack of build-up, typical of the existentialist novel, suggests
further that in this novel Kelman, like Camus, is not so much interested in the
discovery of the absurd - we are not told how or why Doyle's 'sickness' has arisen -
as in the consequences'. "If one is assured of these facts, what is one to conclude, how
far is one to go to elude nothing? Is one to die voluntarily or to hope in spite of
everything?" (AT 22). Absurdity, the possibilities of elusion and suicide, are the
questions which the novel goes on to explore.
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Absurdity itself is a polysematic term. It is firstly a rejection of, or realisation of, the
absence of any transcendent4. Man is alone in the universe: "To be alone and without
gods is death says Holderlin but Holderlin was wrong and is a poor bastard" (D 205) .
Holderlin is "wrong", because to be alone and "without gods" is precisely man's life
in an absurd universe:
in a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an
alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of the
memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land. This divorce
between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the
feeling of absurdity. (M 13)
Absurdity includes an awareness or realisation of the lack of any extra-human 'truth'
which would legitimise or explain human activity.
No code of ethics and no effort are justifiable apriori in the face of the
cruel mathematics that command our condition. (A/21)
That universal reason, practical or ethical, that determinism, these
categories that explain everything are enough to make a decent man
laugh. (M 26)
There are no logical, theological, or ethical premises which might uphold the
individual and provide his life with 'meaning'. Camus inherits from Nietzsche a
distrust of any rational or religious system that attempts to ground man or slot him
into a pre-packaged significatory system. It is this post-Nietzschean, absurdist
universe in which Patrick finds himself: "So God is dead is he, well, well, well." (D
80) Doyle's rehearsal ofNietzsche delineates the world and the universe into which he
has been thrown; one in which he is alone, a Camusian 'stranger'. This experience of
separation, Camus' "divorce" between the individual and the world which the
individual inhabits, induces a profound alienation, productive of an emotional
response which Heidegger characterises as the "not-at-home" (BT234). Doyle's
unhomeliness is evident throughout the novel. In describing Glasgow as "a form of
antichthon" (D 205), the Pythagorean term for a second earth on the other side of the
4 I should point out that Camus utilises this term in a way entirely different from
Sartre. For Sartre transcendence is a structure of human being and describes the
process whereby thepour-soi projects itself toward what it is not. Camus employs the
term in the more familiar way to describe a going beyond this world.
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sun, Doyle suggests that he experiences the city as unreal, unworldly. Break this noun
apart and we find the root chthon, 'soil' and anti which as well as 'opposite' can also
mean 'against'. But, if the city he inhabits is one in which he feels unsettled, then his
alienation is compounded when he is alone in his house. Patrick's unease in the very
place he is supposed to feel most 'at home', is one of the novel's most potent
representations of solitary existential anxiety: "one of the problems of being alone,
always coming into nothing, coming home to this coldness, a permanent dearth of
warmth" (D 5); "The house is not a place to be. Get out of it." (D 89).
These quotations hint at another facet of absurdity. If awareness of the absurd unveils
a 'gap' between man and his world, it can also engender a feeling of alienation from
oneself.
Pat shivered. He was standing in the bathroom staring at his face,
having just tapped himself on the chin for some unfathomable reason -
the moment when a person sees his or herself in a mirror, seeing a
stranger, and peering at this stranger with furrowed brow. (Z) 124)
this fucking I. III. I got really fucking sick of it I mean it was
depressing, horrible. (D 145)
He was looking at a bloke who had difficulty in seeing himself. (D
164)
The mirror is symbolically charged in that it re-presents the self as an other. Reflection
undermines the sense of self. For Camus, "the stranger who at certain seconds comes
to meet us in a mirror, the familiar and yet alarming brother we encounter [...] is also
the absurd." (M 21) Such feelings of self-estrangement promote a need to "[ejscape
from the head"(Z) 91), and Doyle's initial method of self-circumvention is to immerse
himself in the crowd. He goes for drinks to the local art centre, goes to his parents, or
his brother's house hoping to become absorbed in company, but such ventures are
unsatisfactory. Patrick feels that he is "beginning to look forward to them far too
much", that they are "a symptom of his lifestyle, viz the lonely man." (D 16).
Movement into the public or social sphere as a method of flight from the unhomely is
characterised by Heidegger as 'falling':
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When in falling we flee into the "at-home" of publicness, we flee in the
face of the "not-at-home"; that is, we flee in the face of the
uncanniness which lies in Dasein - in Dasein as thrown
Being-in-the-world 234)
Like the narrator of'Not not while the giro', Doyle requires company as either a
palliative or a distraction, a mechanism of escape. Company promises communication
but Doyle is in the position described in Beckett's The Unnameable-. "the inability to
speak, the inability to be silent, and solitude"5 Doyle's aphasia, his inability to
communicate effectively and thereby ease his solipsism, is disclosed in his meeting
with his parents and throughout in his involvement with Alison. At dinner the Doyles
sit "craned over the plates, the three people eating, this man and woman and man,
while within the limits of each an intense caterwaul. We are alone! We are isolate
beings! The good Lord alone" (D 114). His isolation and communicative incapacity is
underlined when his father looks at him, the possibility of extended contact causing
them both to look away. The simple familial act of drying the dishes finds Doyle
"[n]ot having anything to talk about". He continues "[w]hat was there to talk about?
Nothing. Fuck all." (D f 18) The afternoon drinking session at Gavin's presents
a situation from which Patrick "felt excluded immediately." (D 253). Contact with
Alison is equally problematic. A car journey finds them both ill at ease; Doyle
cannot even formulate what he wants to say, "even getting it into language is
difficult." (D 132) A later meeting in Miller's Bar and Patrick "could not speak" (D
229); when Alison speaks, Patrick "missed what it was [...] he couldn't make out
what it was [...] he missed it." (D 231). "This is a fellow needing human intercourse"
(Z) 251) is Doyle's self-diagnosis but his assumption that company will provide
amelioration is perpetually undone. An existential view would condemn even the
attempt. Both Heidegger and Sartre construe the desire for dissolution within the
social as being indicative of inauthenticity or bad faith. Sartre's notebooks describe an
individual who
5Samuel Beckett, The Beckett Trilogy: Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnameable,
p.365.
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deliberately loses himself [...] dissolves himself in the social. Like
Heidegger's inauthentic being, which says 'One dies in order to avoid
saying 'I die'. He relates to himself only through society.6
Thus in the passage above when Patrick refers to himself in the third person, the
narrative form directly reflects his attempt to dissolve the 'I'. Throughout A
Disaffection, the narrative voice modulates between the first and third person in order
to enact at a formal level the existential indeterminacy of the speaker. The societal
'we' only provides an illusory shelter because an individual cannot divest himself of
himself. Existential fiction and existential philosophy, tend to suggest therefore that an
external salve for an individual's ontological distress is not possible. For Kierkegaard,
"I can abstract myself from everything but not from myself', a point which Sartre has
Roquentin declare in Nausea: "I cannot escape from myself."7
Since the public, external world provides little in the way of effective respite, Doyle is
forced inward and so begins his "inability to be silent" If he cannot successfully
communicate with others then he is left to talk with himself. His tacit soliloquies
become therefore a "method of eradicating it all." (D 121). Concentrated
introspection becomes another attempt to mitigate or expunge the angst which his
solitary condition provokes; but in having to "force everything onto himself' (D 159),
Doyle only increases his alienation. For Heidegger
this alienation drives [Dasein] into a kind of Being which borders on
the most exaggerated 'self-dissection', tempting itselfwith all
possibilities of explanation [ . . .] This alienation closes off from Dasein
its authenticity and possibility [...] The alienation of falling - at once
tempting and tranquillizing - leads by its own movement, to Dasein's
getting entangled in itself. (.BT 222-223)
Doyle's 'entanglement' is disclosed through his confused syntax ("the world was
become bleak" {D 175); "not to think and not to spoke" (D 162), his constant detours
of thought, and the parataxes and aposiopeses which disrupt both his internal and
external speech patterns. Possibilities are conjured and effaced - "You can do it; come
on. No. Yes. No. Aye ya fucking bastard ye come on" (D 251) - as the narrative,
6 Jean-Paul Sartre, War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phoney War November 1939 -
March 1940, trans. Quintin Hoare (London: Verso, 1985), p. 13.
7 Soren Kierkegaard, Papers andJournals, p. 51. Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, p.53.
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borrowed from Beckett, encloses itself, doubles back upon itself, and envelops Doyle.
The text makes sustained use of the "three dots" technique, prevalent in the work of
Celine8. Whilst A Disaffection, Death on Credit and Journey to the End of the Night
share an aesthetic committed to linguistic authenticity, Kelman's use of parentheses to
disrupt narrative flow suggests further a world wholly lacking in necessary
connections. In so doing, A Disaffection is a fictional replication of the process
described by Camus where "thinking ceases to be unifying" (M 30).
Kelman's deployment of language conveys another existential point. Switching
linguistic registers permits an accentuation of rootlessness.
The man with the mournful face was looking at Pat. He was actually
looking at him. It was funny. No it wasnt. But just as well paranoia
was not a problem. No doubt he was an emissary from the education
department of Scotland, sent to keep an eye on the chap Doyle who
fails to turn up for headmagisterial appointments on top of everything
else, these ghastly rumours, the chap's political beliefs, it seems he's
agin the government. How awful. How absolutely fucking awful and
incendiary. Dont tell us the bounder dislikes being a teacher! Dashed
uncivil! And he has the dem cheek to stand up in front of children! (D
102)
Like the identity of the existential subject, the language is fluid, it refuses to settle In
the passage above, we move through literary locutions, "mournful face", antiquated
formal terms, "chap", "bounder", parodied received pronunciation, "dem", to the
'taboo' - "fucking". Such use of register points to a Joycean component in Kelman's
work. In Ulysses, and in particular the 'Oxen of the Sun' episode, a compendium of
styles ensures that a pure, originatory language is never achieved. For Sartre,
language is primarily a means of being-with-others. Within the text, the disruption of
linguistic structure formalises the communicative inability of the subject. A familiar
technique of existentialist fiction, syntactic chaos establishes at a technical level the
ontological disarray of the narrator. Language becomes problematic as it reflects the
discord of the speaker.
8 The term is Celine's. See his interview in ed. George Plimpton, Writers at Work:
The Paris Review Interviews, third series, 1967 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), pp.
83-102, p.96.
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A language so problematicised finds Patrick exhibiting a familiar Beckettian trait. He
craves silence, rest, "a pleasant soporicity" (D 66) and therefore a kind of closure, but
he cannot cease from his Heideggerian "self-dissection": "All I seem to do is talk." (Z)
321). Silence is both an object of desire and an object of repulsion: desired because it
would allow him rest, the "type of thing he never achieves" (ibid.); repulsive because
in the silence he is left to himself. The need to fill the silence is a way of deflecting
attention from the nothingness, in the Heideggerian sense, which surrounds him. As in
Happy Days, encroaching silence is met with a barrage of literary and philosophical
quotation and allusion: "Are there any quotations to help? What can be said if not
done to alleviate matters" (D 183). For Patrick "it was these wee yarns he told himself
that kept him fucking sane" (D 49). He shares Winnie's problem - "if only I could
bear to be alone, I mean prattle away with not a soul to hear."9 The means of
ostensible salvation is however the means of imprisonment. Language is both poison
and cure and so Doyle remains immured in Beckett's famous paradox: "there is
nothing to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to
express, together with the obligation to express.'"0
The most important symbols of Doyle's desire for integration however are the
electricians' pipes he chances upon at the opening of the novel. Far from being as one
critic insists", a reference to Magritte or an obvious Freudian symbol, Patrick's
obsession with these pipes can be seen as another attempt to recover a lost wholeness,
to bridge the gap between man and the universe and thus reharmonise his existence.
9 Samuel Beckett, Happy Days in The Complete Dramatic Works (London: Faber and
Faber, 1986), pp. 135-168, p. 145.
10 Samuel Beckett, 'Three Dialogues', Samuel Beckett, Disjecta: Miscellaneous
Writings and a Dramatic Fragment, ed. Ruby Cohn (London: John Calder, 1984),
pp. 138-147, p.139.
"Macdonald Daly, 'Your Average Working Kelman', Cencrastus, No 43 (August
1993), 14-16, p. 14, p.15. Daly's rather adhominem piece consistently
misunderstands and misrepresents key moments ofA Disaffection. For Daly, the
novel is "complete absurd unadulterated shite." A Disaffection is simply another
'Glasgow novel' either depicting the denizens as uncouth or as cliched inhabitants of a
readily familiar Glasgow tradition.
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If he got the right tone or pitch then that would be it and the
distinctions between them, and the gaps in time, all such elements
would be part ofwhat was important. (D 9)
I suppose it's really I suppose because I need some kind of escape, to
give my brains a rest. (D 136).
The last quotation here can be read in Schopenhauerian terms. Schopenhauer, himself
a flautist, argues that only through aesthetic contemplation, including the experience
ofmusic, can the effects of the Will - desire, needs, lack - be momentarily suspended.
Moreover, music brings us closer to the Platonic eidos, the Kantian noumenon, and
brings a concomitant loss of individual subjectivity.
At the moment when, torn from the will, we have given ourselves up
to pure, will-less knowing, we have stepped into another world, so to
speak, where everything that moves our will, and thus violently
agitates us, no longer exists. [.. .] Happiness and unhappiness have
vanished.12
Through the pipes, therefore, Doyle conceives of how he might become "related to
things as a totality, that old business of harmony, linked in the universal chain." (D
9-10) Piping produces a pure non-vocal sound, and thus an escape from words.
Emblematic then of the conflict between the irrational world and man's desire for
clarity, the soterial promise which the pipes initially represent is however, like much
else in Doyle's life, frustrated - "He is going to take this pair of electrician's pipes and
create harmony - no he isni" (D 115). This syntactic auto-cancellation is of course
familiar in the work ofBeckett, but as a symbol, the pipes trigger an allusion to
Kafka.
I am the Piper Doyle. I pipe. Up piped Doyle to enliven the
proceedings. That story ofKafka's about the nice wee woman
who is a vain mouse and who pipes a song of astonishing, of
astonishing [sic] (D 211).
The story which Doyle remembers, 'Josephine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk', is an
earlier presentation of a defeated desire for transcendence. Piping for the mouse folk
l2Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E F J Payne, 2
vols. (New York: Dover, 1966), I, p. 197..
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functions as a means whereby the individual "is set free from the fetters of daily life.'"3
Josephine wants "public, unambiguous, permanent recognition of her art, going far
beyond any precedent so far known. But while almost everything else seems within
her reach, this eludes her persistently." It eludes her, and by implication Patrick,
because when the piping stops, the piper is again left with "the struggle for
existence". (368) Transport to another world or realm is either fleeting, illusory, or
simply impossible. Indeed much of Kafka's work enacts precisely this doomed
longing. Transcendence, be it in the quasi-religious quest for ultimate meaning, as in
The Trial or The Castle; or the putative transcendence of'art' (Josephine's piping in
the story above) is never attainable. Franz Kuna sees Kafka as a writer for whom life
is "balanced on a razor-edge between affirming the world we live in, and an
irrepressible spiritual urge to transcend this world.'"4 This paradoxicality, which is
also a central motif in Beckett15, fulfils a similar creative role in A Disaffection.
Patrick is poised between this world, a place of alienation and frustration, and the
presumed Elysium of some imagined other.
Doyle's pipes then "have got fuck all to do with Scotland" (D 24) and have
everything to do with a Romantic longing for a lost wholeness, an impossible
Aufhebung. Patrick's other focus of longing, both romantic and Romantic is his
married colleague Alison. Within the novel, Alison functions in a way analogous to
Tadzeu in Death in Venice, in that she serves as a screen upon which Doyle's
imagination projects. A Disaffection reconveys a central tenet ofMann's text in that it
depicts the consequences of an excessive Romantic imagination. Hence too, Doyle's
identification with Goethe's Werther and his mention of Suzette Gontard - the latter
13 Franz Kafka, 'Josephine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk', trans. Willa and Edwin
Muir in The Penguin Complete Short Stories ofFranz Kafka, (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1983), pp.360-376, p.370.
14 Franz Kuna, 'The Janus-faced Novel: Conrad, Musil, Kafka, Mann' in eds. Malcolm
Bradbury and James MacFarlane, Modernism 1890-1930 (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1991), pp. 443-452, p.449.
15 For instance Richard Ellmann declares that "Beckett's work was to rest, or to be
restless, amid [...] paradoxes." Richard Ellmann, 'Samuel Beckett: Nayman of
Noland' in Four Dubliners: Wilde, Yeats, Joyce and Beckett (London: Cardinal,
1988), pp. 79-104, p. 81.
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the wife of a Frankfurt banker with whom Holderlin had an affair16. Doyle equivocates
between viewing Alison as a person - "Fucks sake she is just a woman and that's that.
No paragon there" (D 89) - and as an object, a form, a solution.
She was beautiful [. . .] he had never for one real and genuine minute
imagined she could ever be here in this place, his house [. . .] quietly
studying the book in hand, taking the weight of her body onto her left
foot, the right leg bent at the knee. It was one of these poses, good
kind of poses, classic; he could imagine being a sculptor and motioning
her to the side a little, and back a little and so on, capturing the
shadows of the folds in her coat, those long spiral shapes - curved
cuboidals. (D 138)
Sculpted by Doyle's Romanticised imagination, Alison is transformed into a Platonic
form. Again however Doyle's imagination is defeated. When in Miller's Bar Patrick
touches Alison's hand, she becomes physical - Doyle realises that "she was human
after all" (D 228) - and she tells Pat that it is not possible for them to have a
relationship. Alison's rejection of Patrick is then a rejection of the possibility of either
physical or metaphysical communion or redemption.
The constant hope of transcendent connection explains Patrick's proclivity for
nostalgia. Both a word and a process which recur throughout the text, nostalgia by
definition involves the perusal ofwhat is past, what is eternally fixed.
just maybe to do with a world that's past, over and done with, gone
and never to return. I'm no saying there was anything good about it
especially, I just think it's a bit sad, to think of it all. (D 324)
Symbolic of the desire for an Edenic age, nostalgia is explicitly connected with the
pipes from the outset of the narrative: "He took a very long deep breath and once
more he blasted out this long very deep sound. It was really beautiful. Of a crazy sort
of nostalgia that would aye be impossible to describe in words". (D 1) Nostalgia, with
its Greek roots, nostos, return home, algos, pain, is a kind of retroactive pursuit of
,6In his introduction to the Penguin SelectedPoems, Michael Hamburger notes that
"Susette was more to [Holderlin] than a lover or mistress. She was the Platonic
Diotima who transfigured [his] life and poetry." Michael Hamburger, 'Introduction' in
Friedrich Holderlin, Selected Poems and Fragments, ed. Jeremy Adler, trans. Michael
Hamburger (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998), pp.xvii-xliii, p.xxi.
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harmony, a quest for final settlement Doyle describes himself as one who "quests" (D
125); his quest in the absurdist universe is formulated by Camus; it is one " in which
the heart vainly seeks the link that will connect it again, [. . .] it is as it were the first
sign of absurdity." (M 19) Whilst Doyle rejects much of his past, the youthful ideals
that took him to university and provided the motivation to be a schoolteacher, his
nostalgia and therefore his longing for connection, persists. Doyle fits the Camusian
portrait of a self that "can negate everything [...] except this desire for unity, this
longing to solve, this need for clarity and cohesion." (M 51)
Absurdity contaminates temporality. The need for cohesion which Camus describes
becomes a retrospective pursuit. In Sartrean existentialism, the past represents the
immutable being-in-itselfofman. Doyle's nostalgia as a longing for something certain
and fixed is then a mode of bad faith, a denial of human reality as a fundamental
freedom.
A man or a woman is an active being. Man therefore always tends
towards the future, whereas surrender, abandon, letting go is present,
or tends toward the past [...] sliminess and stickiness is contingency
[...] whereas breaking free is toward the future.17
As in the earlier 'Not not while the giro', the desire for fixity is a form of
self-objectification. Anxiety which arises from the realisation of freedom, prompts a
reversal, a want for stasis; a desire for the fluid, open, future to be consumed by the
fixed, closed, past. This need, as shown in the quotation above, is related to Sartre's
concept of the 'sticky' consciousness. Its thematic relevance becomes apparent when
Patrick sitting down to play the pipes, contemplates his recently consumed dinner:
He put two hours as the period of proper gestation. The fish would
have drowned by then, and the chips would have merged into his very
parts, his very being; it would all have become part of his very flesh,
forcing its way into his very character, his very psychology and
personal traits being heightened by this solid mass of fish and fried
potato. (D 55-6)
17 Sartre in Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, trans. Patrick O'Brian
(1981, rpt; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), p.3 16.
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The glutinous mass of the food and the comic horror it induces can be read as a
representation of the Sartrean visqueux. Sartre's model of authentic human
consciousness is one of transparency and fluidity, but Doyle in seeing himselfmerge
with the "solid mass" of his dinner depicts instead a consciousness which has become
'sticky' and indeterminate. Patrick
needed things to be solid, if things were not solid how could he be
expected to play things. This was the worst of it. But it was true.
Things had to solid. If they were not solid, christ." (D 218)
Looking at the bars of an electric fire, Doyle imagines "being caught between the
poles" and concludes that it "would be nice to be left that way forever." (D 57) This
"halfway house" (D 58) of inertia only results in bad faith.
If nostalgia is connected with the unreachable past, its absurdist concomitant is a
problematic future. Time is a problem because it is forever moving onward. Here
Camus notably differs from Heidegger and to an extent Sartre. For Heidegger
authenticity involves an acceptance that Dasein is a "being-toward-death"; for Sartre
as discussed, human reality involves a conscious pro-jection into the future. Both
Camus and Doyle however view the future and the passage of time as dread-full.
Doyle's awareness of temporal transition surfaces forcefully when he visits the
headmaster Milne.
Old Milne was looking at him. Patrick looked back at him. Joseph K.
was thirty when the bad things started happening and Jesus of
Nazareth was thirty when he started preaching. Who else? (D 178)
The answer is provided by Camus:
a time comes when a man notices or says that he is thirty. Thus he
asserts his youth. But simultaneously he situates himself in relation to
time. He takes his place in it. He admits that he stands at a certain
point on a curve that he acknowledges having to travel to its end. He
belongs to time and, by the horror that seizes him, he recognises his
worst enemy. Tomorrow, he was longing for tomorrow, whereas
everything in him ought to reject it. (AT 20)
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Patrick dreads the future. Temporality is of course central to Heidegger's existential
analysis of Dasein. Human being is temporality, Dasein is time18. For Heidegger,
authenticity is ultimately achievable through an acceptance of Dasein as a
being-toward-death. Sartrean thought contends that the future remains a tabula rasa,
a nothingness, into which the individual projects himself. Doyle however identifies his
horror of time as a consequence of his solitary condition.
There is no point dwelling on the past. It is a thing he was wont to do.
But this is because he is a single chap and single chaps are single
persons ergo they dwell on the past and there is nothing wrong in
dwelling on the past. How can you dwell on the future? There is
nothing to dwell on! It doesni fucking exist. It is a fucking blank.
Everything has yet to take place. This is what the future is, the place
where things have yet to occur [. . .] The future is the nothing. (ZT161)
Two existential views compete in this passage. Doyle agrees with Sartre that the
future is the "nothing" but recoils from filling it. To escape a contingent future for
which he alone is responsible for shaping, Patrick again attempts to connect with the
universal and the necessary. To do so, he employs a familiar Beckettian remedy:
mathematics and arithmetic. For the narrator ofCompany "simple sums you find a
help in times of trouble'"9, for the narrator of The Unnameable, there is "nothing
more restful than arithmetic."20 As a possible remedial, arithmetic seems to offer what
language and the world do not: certainty and a priori truth. Thus Patrick's translation
of his name into numbers, indicates an attempt to transcend language and efface his
contingent, worldly, linguistic, identity.
A Disaffection is the record ofDoyle's pursuit of a grounded self; assimilation within
a world that is systematic, contained by universal rationality. He oscillates between
awareness of the impossibility of his task - "he wasn't after any extra-terrestial point
of communication" (D 153) - and an ever present desire for integration. Hence his
obsession for mathematics and arithmetic, but also the Pythagoreans.
18 "Summing up, we may say: time is Dasein." Martin Heidegger, The Concept of
Time, p.22E.
19 Samuel Beckett, Nohow On: Company, III Seen III Said, WorstwardHo (New
York: Grove Press, 1996), p.29.
20 Samuel Beckett, The Unnameable, p.357.
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The Pythagoreans called numbers 'figures'. The whole ofmatter could
be reduced to them. Numbers or figures were the elemental parts, the
constituents. And of course you have bodies still being called figures.
Plus 'soh' 'lah' 'te' 'doh' etcetera being scales, numbers. Everything
went together and could be reduced to numbers, even names of
course. The initials P: D for instance, they could be reduced to 16: 4
based on the twenty-six letter roman alphabet; 42: 22, or even 24: 22.
Numbers are great. You can do anything you like with them. Plus it
gets you away from objects and entities [...] (D 36-7)
The initial p, when rendered into Greek becomes n, an infinite number. Either
construction takes Patrick away from "objects and entities" both ofwhich occupy a
spatio-temporal location. As Jonathan Barnes points out, presocratic thought
proposes that the principles of numbers constitutes an arche, or first principle of all
things21. The Greek idea ofKosmos, generates the idea of an ordered or marshalled
universe that is beautiful to contemplate a counterpoint to Patrick's inharmonious
disorder. Presocratic thought searches for the phnsis, the underlying essence of
things, and concludes that this is number. For the Pythagoreans, number functions as
an ultimate explanatory principle providing an ordered and harmonious Kosmos.
Essentialist in its timbre, the Pythagorean model disregards chance and contingency.
Richard Rorty links the development of mathematics with a particular epistemic shift
in Greek thought toward an increasing occupation with universals. Rorty points out
that "mathematics prides itself on overlooking individual details."22 The notion that
man and the world are submissible or reducible to a numerical and hence
logical/rational explanation is of course challenged by existentialism. Again Doyle
instantiates a paradox: numerical systems present transcendent truth, but the outset of
the novel reveals Patrick as "the bloke who can show Godel's Theorem to the average
first-year class." (D14)
To every co-consistent recursive class k offormulae there correspond
recursive class-signs r, such that neither v Gen r nor Neg (v Gen r)
belongs to Fig (/c) (where v is the free variable of r)23
21 Ed. Jonathan Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987),
p.44.
22 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and theMirror ofNature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980),
p.38.
23 Douglas R Hofstadter, Godel, Escher, Bach: The Eternal Golden Braid
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Godel's Theorem, reproduced above, concerns propositions within an arithmetical or
mathematical system and actually encompasses two theories. Rendered into
propositional calculus, the first incompleteness theorem holds that in any system S of
arithmetic, there will be a sentence P of the language S such that if S is consistent,
neither P nor its negation are provable in S.24 P for Patrick becomes this proposition
which the system cannot accommodate. He cannot be absorbed within a numerical
whole and this numerical system functions as an analogue of the state. With this we
have the other existentially important textual motif: the individual and the system.
Making Doyle a schoolteacher, and thus someone with a university education allows
the explicit inclusion of a series of cultural references; amongst which Hegel,
Hblderlin, Goya, Kafka and the presocratics. Doyle's problematic occupation has
another purpose however.
I have speculated for some time as to the real reason why I resigned
my post as a secondary-school teacher. Thinking it over now, it occurs
to me that such a position was the very thing for me. Today it dawned
on me: that was precisely the reason, I had to consider myself
absolutely fitted for the job. So if I'd continued in it I had everything
to lose, nothing to gain.2'
In a text dominated by philosophical references, and at crucial moments by references
to Kierkegaard, it seems critically suspect to view Doyle as the progeny ofGeorge
Friel' sMr AlfredMA26. The first part ofEither/Or is written by a school teacher who
has resigned and, in common with Doyle, is resigned. He is not fit for the job.
Kelman's text then, as well as a fictionalisation of Camusian motifs is in addition a
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), p. 17.
24 From ed. Jennifer Speake, A Dictionary ofPhilosophy, 2nd ed., (London: Pan,
1984), p.133.
25 Soren Kierkegaard, Either/Or: A Fragment ofLife, trans. Alastair Hannay (1843,
rpt.; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), p.50-1. Hereafter E/O.
26Such a position is held by Margery Palmer McCulloch. See her 'What Crisis in
Scottish Fiction?: Creative Courage and Cultural Continuity in Novels by Friel,
Jenkins and Kelman'. Douglas Gifford similarly claims that Kelman "is working in the
tradition of enigmatic idealism so prevalent in modern Scottish fiction; the other
classic of the pedagogic strain being George Friel'sMr AlfredMAI' 'Decline in the
West', Books in Scotland, no.30 (Spring 1989), 5-12, p.7.
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rehearsal in concreto, of a contest between the Kierkegaardian and Hegelian
philosophies.
Kierkegaard is mentioned twice in the text, the second time along with Hegel.
Hegel was never near to insanity. He never was. Or so we are given to
understand. He had a good cheery lifestyle as a student. He caroused
with women and drink. [.. .] He caroused with women and drink and no
doubt that is why Schopenhauer hated him. Kierkegaard didn't fucking
like him either. (D 118)
Not quite. Schopenhauer, who described Hegel as "a repulsive and dull charlatan [. . .]
an unparalleled scribbler of nonsense"27, objected less to Hegel's private life and more
to his philosophical system. For Schopenhauer, Hegelian thought is
the attempt, [...] to comprehend the history of the world as a planned
whole, or, as they call it, "to construct it organically," a crude and
shallow realism is actually at the root of this [. . .] constructive
histories, guided by a shallow optimism, always ultimately end in a
comfortable, substantial fat State with a well-regulated constitution,
good justice and police, useful arts and industries, and at most
intellectual perfection, since this is in fact the only possible perfection,
for that which is moral remains unaltered.28
This organiscist tendency and the Romantic elevation of the State is opposed by
Schopenhauer, but it is Kierkegaard's objections to the all encompassing Hegelian
system that constitute the beginning of existentialism qua philosophy. Like
Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard objects to the lack ofmoral space in the Hegelian system.
Both agree that the Hegelian system is back to front. For Schopenhauer, "concepts
should arise through abstraction from intuitive perceptions, and hence the latter
should exist before the former."29 For Kierkegaard, Hegel has "forgotten" the ethical
27 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will andRepresentation, trans. E F J Payne, 2
vols. (New York: Dover, 1966), ii, p.70.
28 Ibid., ii, pp.442-3. A valuable discussion of Schopenhauer's views of the Hegelian
state may be found in Riidiger Safranski, Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of
Philosophy, trans. Ewald Osers (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), pp.230-2.
See also Bryan Magee, The Philosophy ofSchopenhauer, rev. edn (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997).
29Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga andParalipomena: Short Philosophical Essays,
trans. E F J Payne, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), ii, p.627.
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existing individual, and it is this antimony, systematised objectivity against
particularised subjectivity, abstract Geist against concrete individuality, which
Kierkegaard formalises and Kelman's novel enacts. Thus when MacDonald Daly
complains that Kelman's text lacks "a Hegelian conceptual framework"30, he rather
misses the point. The novel is precisely an existential challenge to the Hegelian notion
that such conceptualisation is possible. This is why Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer
are so important.
As discussed, Kierkegaard rejects the conceptualisation and abstract tendency
inherent in Hegelian thought. The tendency toward abstraction is something ofwhich
Doyle is aware: "conceptualising. Creating a distance already [. . .] that was the kind of
thing he always seemed to be doing nowadays." (.D 9). For Kierkegaard, abstract
thoughts of the Hegelian kind, and abstract thinkers in general, "abandon existence",
disregarding the "definite something"31 that an individual is. Hegelian systematicity
wants "to answer systematically a question that has the remarkable quality that it
cannot be raised systematically." (CUP 174) For the objective or systematic thinker,
"individuals fade away into humankind [. . .] it is impossible to discover you and me, an
individual existing human being, even if new magnifying glasses for the concrete are
invented." (CUP 350) The task of the subjective thinker is to "understand himself in
existence" (CUP 351). However, conceptualisation as propounded by Hegel lifts the
individual out of existence and thereby negates the concrete:
This was him offwith the concepts again. Theoretical webs, dirty
webs, fusty webs; old and shrivelling away into nothingness, a fine
dust. Who needs that kind of stuff. Far better getting out into open air
and doing it, actually doing it, something solid and concrete and
unconceptualisable. (D 10)
Doyle quests after "genuine authenticity" (ibid.), achievable only at an individual level,
but as a schoolteacher, his daily life is spent in the service of the state.
Being a teacher caused people to spend their lives worrying out
concepts, postulating this that and the next thing, all manner of
30Macdonald Daly, 'Your Average Working Kelman', p. 16.
''Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments,
p.301. Hereafter CUP.
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hypothesising. The further from activity the better. Please allow us to
conceptualise your problem, thus we can attain a sensation of
nourishment ergo that your problem, though not yet solved, has been
conceptualised. (Z) 86)
The tendency to conceptualise, to ponder rather than act, is linked explicitly to
Doyle's occupation. For Flegel, the absolute universal end is the state, having as it
does "absolute power over everything individual and particular, over life, property,
and the latter's rights."32 The state is "a wholly spiritual entity" (ibid., §335, p.369)
but it is the real effects of this "web", this "spiritual entity", which bind and frustrate
Doyle. For Kierkegaard therefore, the individual needs to abandon the life of the state;
must realise that he
has his teleology within him, has an inner teleology, is himself his own
teleology, and his self, then, is the goal for which he strives. This self
of his is not, however, an abstraction, but absolutely concrete. (E/O
561)
Doyle becomes a paradigm ofKierkegaardian conflict wherein one's "whole nature is
in contradiction with itself'. Kierkegaard maintains that "you can only get out of this
contradiction with an either/or." (E/O 477) An individual must choose the possibility
of choice. In this context, an early conversation in the staffroom over whether one
should drink and drive, assumes greater symbolic status than its ostensible subject
matter suggests.
It was a case of either/or, the drink or the car.
Patrick gaped at him. Is that the truth?
Yeh.
For fuck sake.
It would be impossible for him! said Alison. (D 40-1))
This impossibility must however be overcome, for to remain a schoolteacher is to be a
part of the state apparatus which dissolves his individuality.
One never accepts any vocational responsibility. If one does so, one
simply becomes Mr Anybody, a tiny little pivot in the machinery of the
32 G W F Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy ofRight, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H B
Nisbet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), §323, p.360.
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corporate state; you cease to direct your own affairs, and then theories
can be of little help. (E/O 238)
Patrick is aware of the need for decision:
it was definitely the sort of situation, the kind that it was burdensome
to remove from, to just carry on within, it was even just carrying on in
the company for fuck sake that was difficult and to be able to reach
freedom, to be able to get out from under this and away, away, gone,
freedom, liberation [...] (D 42)
But he is "not able to make a decision and stick by it" (D 63). His attempt to flee the
city, which he correctly equates with "a distinct manifestation of the existential leap"
(.D 69) results in a u-turn, and a heading back to Glasgow, the city in which he feels
alienated. To attain true subjectivity, Patrick has to confront the problems of his
existence and act, choose. Patrick's 'real' either/or is not then a choice between the
consumption of alcohol and safe motoring practise but between continuing service in
the abstract state, where his position is not free because determined, or attaining true
subjectivity. Systems are finished and final products, but human existence is a
becoming.
Doyle recites the Hegelian precept "the individual has to succumb to reason" (D 273)
but forgets his earlier assertion that "there [is] little to trust in reason" (D 8) He
becomes a focal point of two antagonistic philosophies, existentialism and
essentialism. Within the text, the ordered universe of the pythagorean kosmos has its
idealistic analogue in Hegelian thought. The idea of an all embracing Geist, within
which Doyle is merely a part has, like its similarly inclusive Pythagorean precursor
with its numerical essentialism, to be rejected.
The judge who narrates the second part of Kierkegaard's Either/Or, and who
represents the ethical as against the aesthetic mode of existence, accuses the
schoolteacher who narrates the first of thinking "too abstractly". (E/O 455)
Abstracting or conceptualising becomes a "sedative" (E/O 514). Patrick's tendency
for intellectual divagation results in a continual postponement of choice, and so he
remains static, ontologically indeterminate.
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What is to be chosen stands in the deepest relationship to the chooser,
and when the choice concerns a problem of life the individual must
naturally go on living at the same time; so the longer he postpones the
choice the easier it is to modify it, even though he keeps on
deliberating and deliberating. (E/O 482)
Doyle himself makes the connection between an excess of deliberation and a
corresponding inactivity.
This very very astonishingly bad habit of waiting and waiting before
getting off the arse to go to lavatories was symptomatic of his life.
There had to be a connection between it and things ofmammoth
import. (Z) 285)
Nicola, his brother's wife, identifies Patrick's malaise. She thinks he is in a rut (Z)
269), that he is not committing himself (D 312), something recognised also by one of
his pupils - "what ye do ye start all these things and then ye dont finish them or even
just follow them through properly." (Z) 196) He has been brought to the moment of
existential awareness, this is what the novel is about, but he cannot 'leap', "that
fucking leap you always had to make to begin things." (D 55) Doyle cannot 'leap'
because he continually conceptualises; he wants systems or other people to determine
what his actions should be: this is his rut. His need for external direction reaches its
ironic apogee when Doyle the schoolteacher looks to his pupils for guidance.
I want some advice to do with my immediate plans. What I feel is I'm
not enjoying being the person who teaches and if I canni do it here I
don't want to do it anywhere. I'm saying to ye that there is a bit of
crisis in my life. I'm sick of being alone and being a teacher in a society
that I say I detest all the time, to the extent that the term 'detest' isni
really appropriate christ because it's a form of obscenity. (Z) 248)
One pupil, Paul Moore, re-enacts the accusatory look ofDoyle's father. "Paul Moore
looked at Patrick and Patrick eventually looked away from the wee bastard who had
gazed right into his heart and seen something rotten." (Z) 248). This recalls an earlier
passage:
that was always the way of it with him, everyfiickingwhere, with the
family and all the rest of it this continually seeing the mirror image,
casting doubt upon your motives. It was hopeless. {D 96)
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In the boy's look, his father's look, and in his own reflected image, Patrick sees his
life judged. He wants to escape, he "could crawl into a corner. He could crawl under
his desk." (D 248) Escape is illusory. Instead, Doyle's hopelessness and inability to
act modulate into apathy. He declares himself "so fucking belaboured with boredom"
(D 92), "just biding, biding" (D 99). A corrosive and debilitating ennui is a constant in
the work ofDostoevsky and permeates Lermontov's Hero ofOur Time.
Dostoevsky's underground man is "bored with constantly doing nothing" (N 123); in
this Doyle follows but he adds a Beckettian note:
What was to be done. Nothing. (D 3)
So what's to be done? Nothing. Nothing at all.
That temptation.
There is no temptation. None whatsoever.
None whatsoever. On the contrary: (D 173)
Patrick reiterates Estragon's "nothing to be done", the opening lines, and constant
refrain of Waitingfor Godot. The passage above, in which the colon calls for a
contrary which does not come, alludes also to the play's construction wherein stage
directions undercut, nihilate, the speech of the characters. One option is that which
Didi and Gogo attempt: suicide. "So what is to be done what is to be done aside that
is from suicide. Aside from suicide." (D 173) As a constant possibility, suicide haunts
the novel. For Camus, suicide can take one of two forms: physical suicide, the taking
of one's own life, or philosophical suicide, the belief in systems, determinism, and the
elevation of logic. Doyle's frustrated love for his married colleague, with its
invocation of The Sorrows of Young Werther represents the first.
How did young Werther accomplish the deed. It is a couple of years
since Pat read the novel. And the parallels! Christ, he hadni even
thought of that. Young lover on behalf of
beautiful-but-not-to-be-got-young-lass. (D 80)
The second form of suicide is foregrounded throughout the novel. It is what Camus
describes as explaining the world with "bad reasons" (M 13). In an attempt to imbue
human life with meaning, the individual seeks shelter in the underground man's
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"Crystal Palace". Although the final page of the novel still finds him pondering
suicide's "temptation", Doyle appears ultimately to reject self-destruction - "fuck off.
That includes Werther" (D 258) Doyle's tendency to postpone choice and action
suggest however that he still remains subject to philosophical suicide and this tempers
his declaration of resignation. Hamlet's famous aporetic rumination on whether to be,
or not to be is quoted in the text. Ironically, whilst Hamlet eventually overcomes
procrastination and acts, Patrick's aporia only intensifies as the novel advances.
He did not know what to do. Not any longer, he just didni know. He
didni know what was right and what was not right, what was wrong
and what was not wrong that being not wrong, that being right He did
not know what to do. (D 303-4)
For Patrick, the 'Glasgow Hamlet'33, not knowing what to do collapses into nothing
to be done and the seduction of surrender - "resignation for christ sake what a
temptation." (D 84)
I'm just no sure. I'm just no sure. But I'm resigned. I'm resigned.
Christ I think that's what it is, I'm resigned. This is me realising it for
the first time. There ye are. That's one thing. That's the one thing. (D
317)
Doyle's last words, "fuck off, fuck off' (D 337), recalls the stoical ending of
Beckett's Rockaby, "fuck life"34, but simultaneously the resignation which Camus
attributes to Sisyphus. "Crushing truths perish from being acknowledged" (M 109):
Camus' declaration insists that lucid awareness of the absurd is the only victory which
an individual can achieve in an absurd universe.
If this myth is tragic, that is because its hero is conscious. Where
would his torture be, indeed, if at every step the hope of succeeding
upheld him? The workman of today works every day in his life at the
same tasks and this fate is no less absurd. But it is tragic only at the
rare moments when it becomes conscious. Sisyphus, proletarian of the
gods, powerless and rebellious, knows the whole extent of his
33This sobriquet is borrowed from Karl Miller. Miller makes several useful
comparisons between Shakespeare's protagonist and Patrick Doyle. Karl Miller,
'Glasgow Hamlet', Authors (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 156-162.
34 Samuel Beckett, Rockaby, in The Complete Dramatic Works (London: Faber and
Faber, 1986), pp.431-448, p.448.
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wretched condition; it is what he thinks of during his descent. The
lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his
victory. There is no fate that cannot be surmounted by scorn. (MS
109)
The doubled "fuck off' registers the scorn of the rebel, but simultaneously the
repetition indicates his Sisyphean fate. Camus noticeably asserts that Sisyphus'
existence is a tragic one. Tragedy denotes ineluctability, and A Disaffection suggests
similarly that the situation of the individual cannot be transcended. Like Beckett
however, Kelman injects humour into his narrative as tragedy's concomitant. In its
use of humour and despair, contradiction and paradox, the narrative assumes a form
of juxtaposed contrariety. A Disaffection is a Beckettian tragicomedy. The
tragi-comic urge, a paradigm of the paradoxical, exists in the philosophers with which
the text contends. For Schopenhauer, whose pessimism pervades Beckett's fictions,
"the life of every individual, viewed as a whole [...] is really a tragedy; but gone
through in detail it has the character of a comedy."35 This amalgamation is similarly
foreshadowed in Kierkegaard:
That the subjective existing thinker is just as positive as negative can
[. . .] be expressed by saying that he has just as much of the comic as of
pathos. [. . .] The pathos that is not safeguarded by the comic is an
illusion; the comic that is not safeguarded by pathos is immaturity."
(CUP 87)
Positivity and negativity coexist in the character of Doyle. Tragicomedy presents the
perfect literary mode for a fiction dealing with stasis and inertia. This paradoxical
contiguity informs the narrative structure and seems more apposite to a fictional
reconveying of absurdity given Camus' insistence that one must preserve the paradox.
As is evidenced by the foregoing, Kelman's aesthetic of contradiction need not and
perhaps should not be read as a nod to a Scottish tradition of antisyzygy, and yet such
an assertion has gained critical currency. Gavin Wallace sees A Disaffection as a novel
of despair going on to claim despondency induced by contradictoriness as a Scottish
literary paradigm, Wallace implicitly links Kelman to a Scottish tradition of
antisyzygy:
35 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will andRepresentation, i, p. 322.
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Paradox and contradiction of this kind is nothing new in Scottish
letters, of course. Whether conscious or unconscious, for better or for
worse, duality, division and fracture persist as the prevailing critical
tools in Scotland. That the antisyzygy fast approaching its centenary
sizzles still is a source of concern and puzzlement to newer, younger
critics, but it would be difficult to deny the continuing relevance of the
fundamental issues of contradictoriness and paradox to the Scottish
imagination.36
Paradox and contradictoriness are "nothing new" in Russian fiction either, but
Wallace assumes that native incidence equates to native influence and he suggests that
A Disaffection is a work which proceeds from the tradition which he delineates. As I
have shown, the novel's structure of contradictory paradoxicality, does not emanate
from these indigenous forms - A Disaffection is not a reheating of Stevenson, and
Kelman is as far from MacDiarmid as he is from F.veleyn Waugh - but to a tradition at
least as old as A Hero ofOur Time (published in the same year Stevenson was born).
Contradiction and paradox are features of Lermontov, Dostoevsky, Camus, Beckett,
features of literary existentialism and prevalent too in more formal philosophical
discourse: Kierkegaard's Either/Or contains two antagonous accounts of existence.
These then are the traditions Kelman utilises, these are the authors he maintains as
having exerted an influence upon his own fictions. This is not however to belittle, or
somehow culturally invalidate these native forms, this would be anathema to Kelman's
literary project, but to misplace, misread, or misunderstand Kelman as part of such a
'Scottish tradition' is equally remiss. In particular, if one accepts MacDiarmid's
DrunkMan as both a paradigm and zenith of antisyzygy, then the attempt to situated
Disaffection in its wake collapses. MacDiarmid's synthetic language, his nationalism,
cultural or otherwise, his reliance upon history and myth, are all wholly absent from
Kelman's work. Indeed, Kelman's writing, particularly within A Disaffection, can be
seen as an existential riposte to the Hegelianism37 ofMacDiarmid.
36 Gavin Wallace, 'Voices in Empty Houses: The Novel ofDamaged Identity' in eds.
Wallace and Stevenson, The Scottish Hovel Since the Seventies: New Visions, Old
Dreams (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993), pp.217-231, p.218.
37"F11 hae nae haufway hoose, but aye be whaur/ Extremes meet" is arguably not as
Kenneth Buthlay claims a Nietzschean principle, but a restating of the Hegelian
dialectic which seeks a reconcilation of both thesis and antithesis in a new synthesis.
This it seems to me is the fundamental compositional method ofMacDiarmid's text.
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As a character, Patrick Doyle is foreshadowed in a variety of existential texts.
Bellow's Herzog presents a hero in a cloacal city, troubled by Hegel - whom he curses
for rendering him "sick with abstractions" (129) - who carries a volume of
Kierkegaard in his pocket. Like Doyle, Herzog conducts conversations with himself
and writes imaginary letters to a litany of philosophers. Bellow dramatises the
problematic formation of identity. Herzog tells us that "modern character is
inconstant, divided, vacillating, lacking the firm stone-like certitude of archaic man,
also deprived of the firm ideas of the seventeenth century, clear, hard theorems."
(113). Although critical ofHeidegger and German existentialism ("preachers of
dread"), Herzog expounds that a "consciousness when it doesn't clearly understand
what to live for, what to die for, can only abuse and ridicule itself." (280). Both
Herzog and Doyle inhabit this space in which certainties have been excised by
vagaries. Identity is no longer stable and certain, but in a state of flux. There is no
harmonious Kosmos as there is no harmonious polis. Cairns Craig writes
The ideal city community has dissolved into isolated and terrorised
individuals, who in turn are dissolving into fragmentary and multiple
individuals, an inner disharmony to match the outer chaos. The
problem for Kelman's protagonists is that the ideal of community
which they seek is unenvisageable ahead of them: it is already lost and
defeated in the past. That is why, for Doyle, the year 1770 accumulates
significance: it is the year ofHegel and Holderlin's birth, of
Beethoven's, ofWordsworth's, of the birth of revolution in the
Americas. It is the year in which germinates the great harmonies of
romantic music and the vision of a harmonious citizenry [. . .] The
harmonies of that romantic assault upon the traditional order of reality
turn into madness.38
Thus too, Doyle's obsession with Goya, particularly the 'black' paintings, produced
during Goya's isolation in the Qninta del sordo79. However it is his most famous
aquatint, El sueho de la razon produce monstruos, with its central image of the
solitary self surrounded by furies that is most apposite here. Hegel's attempt to
Hugh MacDiarmid, A DrunkMan Looks at the Thistle, 1926 (Edinburgh: Scottish
Academic Press, 1987), p. 14. Buthlay's annotation is on p. 15.
38Cairns Craig, 'Resisting Arrest: James Kelman', p. 112.
59See Janis Tomlinson, Francisco Goyay Lucientes 1746-1828 (London: Phaidon,
1994)
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dissolve all in the absolute has failed. Under assault from the Romantics, the
Enlightenment enshrinement of rationality has collapsed, reason no longer accounts
for everything, but as Goya foretold, the sleep of reason has indeed brought forth
monsters. Those "hard theorems" of the Enlightenment, mourned by Herzog,
grounded the self and provided a structure. In the modern world, shorn of such
certainty, the self is abandoned and attempts to make way amidst, and make itself out
of, contradictions. Thus in his embittered ennui, Doyle is also a twentieth century
Pechorin: "I was born with a passion for contradiction. My whole life has been
nothing but a series of dismal, unsuccessful attempts to go against heart or reason"40.
Doyle is a hero of our time. A Disaffection does not close, suggesting that like
Lermontov's text, what is intended is a portrait but of a particular kind: one which is
confined to the elaboration of an 'is', not one which suggests an ought, suggests a
solution. As the novel ends, Patrick is left to his struggle. In his next novel however,
Kelman offers a glimpse of escape.
40 Mikhail Yur'evich Lermontov, A Hero ofOur Time, 1839/40, trans. Paul Foote
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966), p.98.
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Chapter Six
In Camera: How Late it Was, How Late
"Where is the master going?" "I don't know," I said, just
out of here, just out of here. Out of here, nothing else, it's the
only way I can reach my goal." "So you know your goal?" he asked.
"Yes," I replied, "I've just told you. Out of here - that's my goal."
Franz Kafka, 'The Departure'.1
A man evaporates without an eye-witness.
Jean-Paul Sartre, The Reprieve 2
It is sometimes advantageous to be unseen.
Ralph Ellison, InvisibleMan.3
"The Departure', trans. Tania and James Stern, The Penguin Complete Short Stories
ofFranz Kafka, p.449.
2Jean-Paul Sartre, The Reprieve, 1945, trans. Eric Sutton (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1964), p. 168.
3Ralph Ellison, InvisibleMan, 1947 (New York: Vintage, 1972), p.3.
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Like A Disaffection, Kelman's Booker Prize winning How Late it Was, How Late,
begins with an allusion to Notesfrom Underground. The protagonist Sammy Samuels
proclamatory "ye're no a good man, ye're just no a good man" recalls the
underground man's self diagnosis: "I am a sick man ...I am an angry man". The first
sentence ofHow Late proceeds for seven lines without the interruption of a lull stop,
recalling the rapidity of the dialogue, and the confessional interrogative quality with
which Notesfrom Underground begins. It further shares with Dostoevsky's text a
certain garrulousness and also an implied reader: the first word of the novel is "ye"
and the monologues of Sammy/the narrator frequently contain asides addressed to this
extra-textual "you". But inside this narrative form there lurks an ambiguity. Whilst the
usage of "you" suggests a reaching out from the novel, a contacting with the reader, it
might also suggest an unseen, tacit audience within the text itself.
This is very deliberately written in the voice of a man who could be an
acquaintance of the central character, an acquaintance of the man that
goes blind, and also he is telling the story to other men and the ideal
setting would be a pub. So you could say that this story is told by a
man to other men in a pub and he is telling the story about another
guy, and this other guy is a guy who would normally be drinking in the
same pub with the same people.4
Kelman's use of "could" both qualifies his statement and prohibits the possibility of
the author defining the writing, the ambiguity is ours to resolve or maintain.
Furthermore, whilst immediately reminiscent ofDostoevsky, the combination of a
confessional mode and the frequent use of the second person pronoun suggests also
an Augustinian component. The title of the novel hints at this: in his Confessions
Augustine writes "Too late I loved Thee [. . .] too late". This passage continues "Thou
flashest, shonest and scatteredst my blindness"5. Literal and metaphorical notions of
blindness and sight are of course essential elements in both texts. Augustine's work
records his transition from benighted sinner, to salvation through the attainment of
4'K is for Culture', p.26.
5 The Confessions ofSaint Augustine, trans. E B Pusey (London: Dent, 1907), book
X, section xxvii, p.227. I am grateful to Cairns Craig for pointing this out.
Kelman's title also seems to relate to a passage from The Busconductor Hines: "One
might start off by too late it is too late, too fucking late, it is too fucking late for the
shite, for this imbecilic carry on; it is too late. The problem is that it is too late." (BH
98)
152
faith in Christianity. In Kelman's novel, this idea of personal quest is activated by
Sammy describing himself as "the bold yin" (HL 83, 84)6. However Sammy's journey
is a reverse of the Augustinian one. Instead of opening his eyes to the light of God,
Sammy moves from vision to blindness: his eyes shut.
The Augustinian parallel persists though, for How Late, like the Confessions, is a text
concerned with both the inner and the individual. As Charles Taylor points out,
Augustine authors a discourse of radical inwardness and for this Taylor sees him as a
seminal figure in Western thought.7 Kelman's novel certainly shares in this type of
subjectivity but what is of greater significance is that Augustine exerted an influence
upon Heidegger8 and in Kelman's novel, Heideggerian concepts are again of
considerable exegetical use. In How Late, the punctuation of the opening lines, a
succession of commas and semicolons, gives a fluid, seamless quality to Sammy's
initial stream of consciousness but this is halted, one might say arrested, by Sammy's
"edging back into awareness of where ye are" (HL 1). In common with all of
Kelman's fiction, the initial narrative plunge mimics formally the Heideggerian
'thrownness' of the existential subject. Accordingly, Sammy's initial thoughts move
from his condition to his position: "Where in the name of fuck ... He was here" (HL
1). Consciousness 'wakes' and finds itself positioned within the situation which
constitutes its facticity, and the factic "here" quickly assumes a sinister quality. Within
the text, the Dostoevskian fades and a more insidious, Kafkaesque quality is
introduced. "He was here, he was leaning against auld rusty palings, with pointed
spikes, some missing or broke off." (HL 1) These palings and spikes immediately
suggest encirclement, entrapment, the bars of a prison. Imprisonment entails both
6This idea of quest is bolstered by Samuels' absent girlfriend. Her name, Helen,
suggesting a Homeric parallel.
7"It is hardly an exaggeration to say that it was Augustine who introduced the
inwardness of radical reflexivity and bequeathed it to Western thought." Charles
Taylor, Sources of the Self: TheMaking of the Modern Identity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 131.
8For details see Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis ofHeidegger's Being and Time
(Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1995) and George Steiner, Heidegger, 2nd
rev edn. (London: Fontana, 1992). Steiner describes Augustine as "so often
Heidegger's predecessor" particularly for his notion of individualised temporality.
(102)
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curtailed liberty but also a prisoner and a jailer and thus from its outset, How Late
signals that its existential subject matter will be a by now familiar one: freedom.
James Wood, Booker judge for the 1994 competition, partially defended his award of
the prize to How Late, by situating Kelman's work within a significant strand of
European literature. Kelman's work has prestigious forebears.
Kelman writes a kind of prison literature. The principle of such writing
- in some ofCeline, in Camus' La Peste, in Solzhenitsyn, in
Breytenbach's Memoirs ofan Albino Terrorist - is a luxurious
oppresiveness whereby the smallest things, like getting an extra gram
of bread per day, or looking at timetables for trains out of the sealed
city of Oran as Camus' narrator does, are subjected to intense scrutiny.
Eventually these small things become the only things, and hence
metaphysically important and narratologically suspenseful. [...] Some
of these writers describe real prisons; but all of them mean the prison
of life, the sentence that cannot be commuted.9
As Wood records, prisons are twofold; they can be either literal or metaphorical.
Wood mentions Camus, and it is precisely this duality, this interplay between the
literal and the metaphorical which is suggested in the passage from Robinson Crusoe
which Camus places at the outset of The Plague: "It is as reasonable to represent one
kind of imprisonment by another, as it is to represent anything that really exists by that
which exists not!'"" The Plague itself is frequently read metaphorically as a
commentary upon occupied France during the second world war.
How Late also depicts circumscription in various ways. Sammy, as a fictional
character, is first of all contained between the pages of the novel. As a fictional
subject in a fictional world, he is contained within Glasgow (the reader never sees him
leave the city); contained in various rooms (be they police cells or his own house); and
the onset of blindness contains him within himself. His loss of sight also occasions a
protracted involvement with the State. As we shall see however, the most important
means of containment, existentially speaking, to which Sammy is subject, is 'the
look'. Despite then his use of "luxurious", an anomalous adjective when discussing
9James Wood, 'In Defence ofKelman', The Guardian, 25 October 1994, p. 9.
'"Albert Camus, The Plague, trans. Stuart Gilbert, 1947 (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1960).
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the inhabitants of Kelman's fictions, Wood is correct in identifying oppresiveness and
the scrutiny of the small as central concerns of the prison literature he delineates, for
restricted freedom necessitates a limited perceptual or experiential horizon; a focus
limited to the near at hand. This scrutiny of the small is illustrated on the first page of
the novel where we find Samuels pondering the whereabouts of his shoes, his
"leathers", which have been mysteriously replaced by a pair of too small trainers.
There is then much to commend in Wood's analysis - importantly he positions Kelman
within a European discourse - but there are however significant omissions in his
roster. This chapter will argue that Kelman's novel does indeed depict Sammy as
being 'imprisoned' and further, that his place of incarceration is a 'prison' which has
its bars drawn from Beckett, Kafka and Sartre.
Both The Trial and 'Metamorphosis' begin with the protagonists awakening into
fantastic situations. Gregor Samsa and Joseph K. are imprisoned in their separate
ways; the former confined within the body of a beetle, the latter is literally arrested
but this is to symbolise a more fundamental internment within the labyrinthine
structures of an indefinite state apparatus - K. remember is never placed within a
bricks and mortar prison. Sammy Samuels wakes too, though not in his bed, nor even
in a house, but "in a corner" (HL 1). Joseph K. awakes to persons unknown; when
Sammy regains consciousness, the first people he sees he mistakes for tourists.
He shook his head and glanced up the way; people - there were people
there; eyes looking. These eyes looking. Terrible brightness and he had
to shield his own cause of it, like they were godly figures and the light
coming from them was godly or something but it must just have been
the sun high behind them [...] Maybe they were tourists. (HL 2)
This segment triggers a further literary intimation. With its focus upon brightness and
vision, the passage repeats and recasts certain significant moments from Beckett's
Happy Days - indeed David Buckley's review of the novel proposed that Sammy was
a "Beckett hero buried a foot deeper in the sand".11 Buried in a mound of earth,
Beckett's most famous internee is both literally and metaphorically confined -
Sammy's containment, although hinted at by the palings, has yet to be fully described
"David Buckley, 'Darkness invisible', The Observer, Review Section, 3 April 1994,
p. 19.
- but ifwe compare the texts further, a common imagistic sequence begins to emerge
Sammy's "godly light", recalls Winnie's rehearsal ofMilton - "holy light [...] blaze of
hellish light'"2 - but also Beckett's staging specifications: "Blazing light" (ibid. 138).
Kelman's inclusion of the Miltonic allusion prepares us for Sammy's blindness.
Winnie is buried in the centre of an "expanse of scorched grass" (ibid ); Sammy
awakes in a "bed of grassy weeds" (.HL 1). The stage directions prefacing Winnie's
opening speech have her "gazing at zenith" (ibid. 138), a movement mimicked in the
passage above by Sammy's upward glance. Like Sammy, Winnie is also the subject of
inquisitive glances from (presumed) tourists; in Winnie's case aMr and Mrs
Shower/Cooker (ibid. 155-7). These characters are pivotal to an understanding of the
play. In a letter to Alan Schneider, Beckett pointed out that he derived the character
names "Shower" and "Cooker" from the German schauen (to look) and gucken (to
peep), going on to state that they "represent the onlooker (audience) wanting to know
the meaning of things.'"3 The incidence of perceptual motifs caused some critics to
see Beckett's play as both a dramatisation of Berkeley's esse is percepi14, and a
modulation of the Cartesian cogito, where I think therefore I am becomes I speak
therefore I am. Within such an analysis, both Willie and the audience function as
Winnie's 'witnesses', each symbolising her need for Others in order that she may be.
Kelman's text whilst echoing and absorbing these and other Beckettian qualities,
simultaneously accommodates elements which echo Kafka and Sartre. Whereas
Winnie needs others - she needs to speak, to be seen, to be heard - Sammy Samuels
requires precisely the opposite: he needs to vanish.
The Shorter OxfordEnglish Dictionary records that the English 'look' is
etymologically linked to the German lugen meaning 'to spy'. The look to which
Sammy is subject evolves into such a malevolent surveyal and so the oppresiveness
and scrutiny to which James Wood refers now commingle. Scrutiny, and observation
in various forms, become the vehicles for the conveyance of a particular oppression.
nHappy Days, p. 140. See also Paradise Lost, Book III, lines 1 ff.
I3Ed. Maurice Harmon, No Author Better Served: The Correspondence ofSamuel
Beckett andAlan Schneider (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 95.
14See for instance Beryl S. and John Fletcher, A Student's Guide to the Plays of
Samuel Beckett (London: Faber and Faber, 1985), p. 37 and p. 149. Berkeley makes
this claim in his A Treatise Concerning the Principles ofHuman Knowledge.
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The imagery which the text deploys thus coalesces around a Kafkan15 construal of an
omniscient state which surreptitiously monitors its subjects - it is worth remembering
here that the dust-jacket ofHow Late features the symbol for a police camera. If read
in this way, the light from above in which Sammy is bathed, loses its celestial Miltonic
quality and hints instead at the blinding light of an interrogation room. Likewise, the
eyes with which he is observed belong not to bemused tourists, but to an interrogator,
an accuser.
How come they were all looking at him? This yin with the big beery
face and these cunning wee eyes [...] he was watching; no watching
but fucking staring, staring right into Sammy [. . .] Fuck ye! Sammy
gave him a look back [...] he caught sight of the tourists again. Only
they werenay tourists, no this time anyway they were sodjers, fucking
bastards, ye could smell it; even without the uniforms. A mile away.
Sammy knew them, ye can aye tell, their eyes; if ye know these eyes
then ye aye see them, these kind of eyes they stay with ye. (HL 3)
To foreground the importance of a particular look, twelve words in this passage are
either perceptual or ocular cognates. In a kind of delayed decoding, the 'tourists'
metamorphose into policemen ("sodjers"), enforcers of state legislature. Under this
gaze of authority, Samuels feels himself to be caught and the novel moves quickly
from his visual 'arrest' to its physical correlate. Sammy first fights with and then flees
from the policemen, but they catch him and dispense a retaliatory beating: "he was
fuckt, fuckt, he couldnay break loose, he fucking couldnay, they had him, they fucking
had him." (HL 6) Here, syntax reinforces sense: the repeated phrases working to
underline Sammy's containment. Although clearly evident here, the
imprisonment/freedom dialectic which How Late investigates is more explicitly
highlighted in an earlier draft of the novel's opening chapter. Whilst still in progress,
Kelman published an extract in the magazine Parcel ofRogues which foregrounds
more noticeably the novel's central concern. "Escape. But ye cannay escape, escape is
the thing ye can never do, the one thing, surrounded on all sides by flesh and bone,
there's nay escape."16 Cranial enclosure and spatial confinement again take the reader
15I borrow this term, discussed in chapter one, from Milan Kundera.
16James Kelman, 'Untitled - From a Novel in Progress', in Parcel ofRogues
(Stromness, Orkney: Clocktower Press, [n.d.]), pp. 14-19, p. 14.
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back to Beckett. In The Trilogy for instance the narrator, who like Samuels frequently
addresses an implied reader, states:
You may say it is all in my head, and indeed sometimes it seems to me
I am in a head and that these eight, no, six, these six planes that
enclose me are of solid bone"17
Kelman's eventual excision of the passage from the published novel suggests that
during the writing process, he discovered either a way in which Sammy can escape, or
that he wished to foreground a different form of imprisonment.
Whilst imprisonment within the skull continues throughout - Sammy describes
himself, again in quasi-Beckettian terms, as inhabiting a "dark cavern of mental
solitude" (HL 190) - the novel proceeds to underscore Sammy's metaphorical
confinement by the addition of literal confinement. The second time he wakes in the
novel, Sammy finds himself in a police cell. "He didnay know where the fuck he was.
He looked about [...] There was a screw watching. Ye could tell. [...] The screw
again. Sammy thought he could see the eye in the gloom." {HL 7). Noticeably, the
"screw" gazes with "the eye"; and this conjunction is repeated each time he appears in
the narrative. Through the persistent use of the definite article a subtle and yet
substantial transposition is effected whereby the eye shifts from being that of an
individual into that of universal authority. This combination of vision and domination
permits the conjunction of Sartre and Kafka. For the former, "the eye is not at first
apprehended as a sensible organ of vision but as a support for the look" ((BN 258).
Now, given that this segment of the novel is situated in a cell, the Sartrean look
begins its association with authority and the Kafkan state. This alliance between vision
and authority makes itself apparent through a more noticeable symbolic aspect, for the
singular eye points to the gaze of a Cyclops effecting a further emblem of
incarceration given that the Cyclopes were credited with constructing the walls which
17 The Beckett Trilogy, p.203. See also S E Gontarski's introduction to the Nohow On
trilogy, 'The Conjuring of Something Out ofNothing: Samuel Beckett's "Closed
Space" Novels.' in Samuel Beckett, Nohow On: Company, III Seen III Said,
WorstwardHo (1980-83; rpt. New York: Grove Press, 1996), pp.vii - xxvii.
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enclose ancient, pre-Greek cities.18 "Brick walls, brick walls" (HL 320) are both
physical and metaphysical symbols.
Whilst the 'screw' is able to look, Sammy upon wakening again, finds himself blind.
Sammy's blindness constitutes the most significant 'plot' aspect of the novel but
curiously, he treats his loss of sight with relative equanimity, describing it as "just a
new predicament." (HL 10) This matter of factness suggests that Kelman's realism is
not that ofBalzac or ofMcllvanney or Archie Hind, but that ofKafka. It is as
mentioned in chapter one, a 'fantastic' realism. As Sartre points out, Kafka's heroes -
specifically Samsa, and the surveyor K - are never surprised by the situations into
which they are thrown19. Read against this Kafkan background, Sammy's blindness
becomes an analogue ofGregor Samsa's metamorphosis. "What has happened to me?
he thought. It was no dream."20 Samsa's words are restated by Sammy: "[it's] no a
nightmare. It wasnay. It was just a thing happening to him." (HL 39). For both Kafka
and Kelman, what is important therefore is not whether a man can actually wake up
blind, or actually wake up transformed into a beetle, but what such transformations
reveal or are intended to reveal, and it is at this level that realism enters. The
metaphorical or symbolic component attaching to his situation is alluded to by Sammy
himself. Blindness he tells us "was just a new problem. He had to cope with it, that's
all, that was all it was. Every day was a fucking problem. And this was a new yin."
(HL 37) Sammy's blindness then is not intended as a straightforwardly realistic 'fact'
but rather as a structural device which discloses certain aspects of
ontological/existential significance.
Within the novel, blindness accrues existential weight for three reasons. Firstly, it
suggests the existentialist rejection of the traditional empirical/rational construal of
man as a passive observer of events. As discussed in chapter one, existentialists argue
that man is a subject or actor in the world. Sight loss necessarily defeats any attempt
at achieving this observer status; Sammy can no longer stand back and observe the
18See Betty Radice, Who's Who in the Ancient World: A Handbook to the Survivors
of the Greek andRoman Classics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), p.96.
19Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Aminadab or the Fantastic Cansidered as Literature', Literary
Essays, p.65.
20Franz Kafka, 'Metamorphosis', Metamorphosis and Other Stories, p. 9.
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world, he now has to act and engage within it. This once again points to the text's
submerged Augustinian component. George Steiner argues that Heidegger's notion of
truth as something which is experienced, rather than simply perceived, is derived from
book X of the Confessions.
Already Augustine had warned against the obsessive concupiscentia
oculorum [lust of the eyes] of philosophers, their Platonic insistence on
"seeing" the essence of things instead of experiencing it with total
existential commitment.21
Sammy's blindness can therefore be read as metaphorical re-enactment of the
existential rejection of the essentialist gaze. Secondly, Sammy's blindness, like K.'s
arrest and Samsa's metamorphosis (and we might add, Mersault's killing of the Arab
in The Outsider) remains unexplained. Although the rep encourages Sammy to ascribe
loss of sight to his police beating, this is never explicitly confirmed; the two events
resemble more a Humean conjunction of events. This absence of causal efficacy,
effectively a lack of determinism, again promotes the idea of thrownness and thereby
underlines the basic existential qualities, freedom and contingency, which attach to
human reality. For existentialists, the individual is foundationless, therefore Sammy's
situation has no ultimate source, it just is, and so becomes a facticity to be negotiated.
Finally however, blindness allows a focus upon the presence and absence of the look.
Consider this passage:
And a whole crash of thoughts. With one weird wee image to finish it
all off: if this was permanent he wouldnay be able to see himself ever
again. Christ that was wild. And he wouldnay see cunts looking at him.
Wild right enough. What did it matter but what did it matter cunts
looking at ye. Who gives a fuck. Just sometimes they bore their way
in, some of them do anyway; they seem able to give ye a look that's
more than a look; it's like when ye're a wean at school and there's this
auld woman teacher who takes it serious even when you and the wee
muckers are having a laugh and cracking jokes behind her back and
suddenly she looks straight at ye and ye can tell she knows the score,
she knows it's happening. Exactly. And it's only you. The rest dont
notice. You see her and she sees you. Naybody else. Probably it's their
turn next week. The now it's you she's copped. You. The jokes dont
sound funny any longer. The auld bastard, she's fucked ye man. With
one look. That's how easy you are. And ye see the truth then about
2lGeorge Steiner, Heidegger, p.78. See also Being and Time, p.215//'
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yerself. Ye see how ye're fixed forever. Stupid wee fucking arsehole.
Laughing with the rest because ye're feart no to, feart to stand out
from the crowd; ye're just a wee fucking coward, trying to take the
piss out an auld woman man pathetic, fucking pathetic. (HL 11-12)
Here, the novel deploys a fictive articulation of the Sartrean 'look'. An important
concept in Sartre's ontology, the look, and its pivotal role in his discussion of
being-with-others (and the Other in general) is initially an instrument for escaping "the
reef of solipsism". Of greater significance to an understanding ofKelman's novel
however is the philosophical basis of Sartre's theory. Sartre's model for human
relations is based upon the Hegelian master/slave dialectic where Others are both
necessary for our being and yet a threat to our possibilities and thus our freedom.22 In
its foregrounding of the binding effects of a particular look, How Late pays less
attention to the positive, the affirmation that one is, and continually contends with the
negative, the threat to the individual's freedom.
For Sartre, human relations are at best hostile; he tells us that "conflict is the original
meaning of being-for-others." (BN 364). Within this ontological picture,
being-for-others is exemplified principally through being seen and thus the look is one
of the pre-eminent mechanisms for transmitting and effecting this hostility:
to perceive is to look at, and to apprehend a look is not to apprehend a
look-as-object in the world [...] it is to be conscious of being looked
at. The look which the eyes manifest, no matter what kind of eyes they
are is a pure reference to myself. What I apprehend immediately [...] is
not that there is someone there, it is that I am vulnerable, that I have a
body which can be hurt, that I occupy a place and that I can not in any
case escape from the space in which I am without defence - in short,
that /am seen. (BN 258-9).
Returning to the passage from How Late, it is evident that Sammy shares the equation
of vision with hostility. Blindness he tells us entails that he "wouldnay be able to see
himself ever again" but more importantly "he wouldnay see cunts looking at him".
22"Self-consciousness exists in and for itselfwhen, and by the fact that, it so exists for
another; that is it exists only in being acknowledged." But, "the formative activity has
not only this positive significance that in it the pure being-for-itself of the servile
consciousness acquires an existence; it also has, in contrast with its first moment, the
negative significance offear." G W F Hegel, Phenomenology ofSpirit, 1807, trans. A
V Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pill, p. 118.
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Vision possesses an invasory property, what the blind philosopher Martin Milligan
describes as "the especially intrusive character of sight".21 Through vision Others, or
The Other, "bore their way in". Here Sammy's choice of words repeat those of Inez
in Sartre's dramatisation of the look, In Camera: "I shan't take my eyes of off you
[...] you'll feel them boring in."24 Notice here that vision is presented as something
menacing. Her method of threatening Garcin is taken up by Sammy; he too sees vision
in terms of forcible invasion: "a look that's more than a look." The look with which
Sammy is picked out in the present is related to an incident in his past - "it's like when
ye're a wean". His recollection of his earlier admonishment in the classroom becomes
explicable in terms of Sartrean shame. With his classmates, Sammy is unreflectively
absorbed in teasing the teacher, when she turns however, she looks straight at him,
and the others disappear. Sammy is singled out, seen. Again this look carries a hostile
charge - "she's fucked ye man" - but crucially carries a more ontologically significant
component: "And ye see the truth then about yerself. Ye see how ye're fixed forever
[.. .] ye're just a wee fucking coward." The crucial word here is "fixed", for this is the
consequence of the look which Sartre describes: it inhibits freedom.
The appearance of the Other [.. .] causes the appearance in the situation
of an aspect which I did not wish, ofwhich I am not master, and which
on principle escapes me since it is for the Other. (BN 265)
Through the Other's look I live myself as fixed in the midst of the
world, as in danger, as irremediable. (BN 268)
Once more the nihilating escape of the for-itself is fixed, once more the
in-itself closes in upon the for-itself. (BN 262)
For Sartre, the Other's look is both the "solidification and alienation" of one's
possibilities (BN263) and Sartre's description accordingly utilises the language of
pursuit and entrapment: the in-itself "closes in" upon the for-itself. It is therefore
important that the incident which Sammy recalls is a remembered incident; it occurs in
the past, for the past is the realm of the in-itself It is indeed fixed, in perpetuity.
21Bryan Magee and Martin Milligan, Sight Unseen: Letters Between Bryan Magee
andMartinMilligan (London: Phoenix, 1998), p. 197.
24Jean-Paul Sartre, In Camera, trans. Stuart Gilbert, in ed. Martin Brown, Three
European Plays (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958), pp. 149-191, p. 182. Subsequent
references in parentheses.
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As a property of another subjectivity, the look is external and therefore how Sammy
appears to the other is something which he cannot control:
there were things out his control. There was things in his control but
there were other things out, they were out his control, he had put them
out his control. (HL 7)
it was always them that chose it; ye never had any fucking choices.
Everything ye fucking did in life it was always fucking them, fucking
them, them them them. (HL 32-3)
He didnay want even to think about it, the situation, cause he couldnay
control it, he couldnay do nothing that would help it. (HL 59)
Sammy puts things out of his control by converting himself into what the other sees.
Thus his initial description of himself as "no a good man" becomes an internalised
version of a definition imposed from without. Seeing oneself as others do is not, as in
Burns, either positive or beneficial. It is debilitating for if one is controlled by the
"they", defined by the "them", this effects a radical curtailment of choice and
consequently a reduction of the individual's possibilities: it is a simply another form of
imprisonment.
To illustrate the objectifying look Sartre famously employs the example of a jealous
man apprehended whilst spying through a keyhole. He too is caught by the other's
gaze and this look fixes the individual; identifies it completely with an immutable
character and in so doing converts the fluctuating or transcendent for-itself into a
static object.
Shame [...] is shame of self; it is the recognition of the fact that I am
indeed that object which the Other is looking at and judging. I can be
ashamed only as my freedom escapes me in order to become a given
object. (BN 261)
Pure shame is not a feeling of being this or that guilty object but in
general of being an object; that is, of recognising myself in this
degraded, fixed and dependent being which I am for the Other. (BN
288)
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Again, for the reading suggested here, it is significant that Sartre uses a vocabulary
infused with legal language: "escapes" "guilty", "freedom", "judging". In Sammy's
case the look of the teacher judges him and converts him into a coward Cowardice,
as an example of the objectifying action of the look, is discussed formally in Being
andNothingness, and fictionally in both the play In Camera and the novel The
Reprieve 25 Within the latter, the character Daniel, who shares with Sammy a Hebraic
biblical name, believes himself the subject of "the inexorable look", which he equates
with the "Medusa's petrifying gaze" (R 169). Petrification, turning into stone,
articulates precisely the action of the look whereby the for-itself is transmuted,
objectified, into in-itself:
I am myself for all eternity, pederast, villain, coward. I am seen; no,
not even that: it sees me. He was the object of a look. A look that
searched him to the depths, pierced him like a knife-thrust, and was
not his own look: an impenetrable look, the embodiment of night,
awaiting him in his deepest self and condemning him to be himself [...]
for all eternity [...] I am seen. Transparent, transparent, transfixed. (R
116-7)
Noticeably Daniel experiences the look as being omnipresent: "the look was there,
and everywhere, silent transparent and mysterious" (R 168); "I have been continually
under observation - even in my solitary room" (R 345). Under its felt weight, Daniel
concedes his subjectivity, he sees himself always a pederast, but Sammy endeavours
to retain his capacity for self-determination. To defeat the objectifying gaze, Sammy
keeps moving, "just on, on" (HL 49), "ye just battered on" {HL 52) but eventually his
movements resemble the anabasis and katabasis of a Beckettian hero. He ventures
out only to turn back, and his movements until the climax of the novel are inexorably
circular. In common with the characters in No Exit, Sammy's movements appear only
to describe the walls of his prison26. However ifwe recall Kafka, then Sammy's
actions regain a positive aspect. In The Trial, Block tells K. that
2;,Jean-Paul Sartre, The Reprieve, p.345. References hereafter in parenthesis.
26It is perhaps worth pointing out here that the first British production of Thus Clos
opened on 16 July 1946 under the title Vicious Circle.
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it's better for a suspected man to keep on the move than be stationary,
for the man who is stationary may, without knowing it, be in the scales
and weighed with his sins. (Trial 217))
Reading How Late alongside Kafka modifies how one interprets the presentation of
the look. There is a key divergence between the looks to which Sammy and Daniel are
subject. Given that Daniel in Hebrew signifies 'the lord is judge', it is unsurprising
that he identifies the all pervasiveness of the look with God: "Thou lookest at me";
"Before God and before men, I am"(R 169, 346). Here the deliberately biblical
language evokes the book of Job: "I know that thou canst do everything, and that no
thought can be withholden from thee" (Job 42. 2). God's look is omnipresent and
omniscient, but Sammy being an atheist secularises the look. Instead of an omniscient
God - whilst in prison Sammy explicitly rejects the notion - it is the look of an
omniscient state with which he feels himself'fixed'. Daniel's biblical 'He' becomes
Sammy's secular "they":
ye saw their eyes, going this way and that, flickering about; either they
didnay look at ye or else they bored right in, they fucking bored right
in [...] they were fucking staring right into yer brain to say what ye
were really saying like what was coming out was a cover up for
something else. [...] they look at ye, they stare at ye, they try to screw
ye. It's worse than a nightmare, cause it's happening, it's all round ye
and ye cannay see fuck all else. It's everywhere ye look. (HL 207-8).
The 'Medusa Complex', Sartre's term for the paranoiac dread of objectification
caused by the felt gaze of the Other, engulfs Daniel and maintains itself as a constant
possibility for Sammy. At the DSS offices, Sammy is convinced that the lift is bugged,
and that the oxygen levels within the building are deliberately maintained at a low
level in order to inhibit thinking. His monologues contain numerous references to
"spooks" and "blabbers" and on two occasions he believes that he is being followed.
The rep takes this behaviour as evidence of Sammy's general paranoia but this
perpetual unease, the idea of concealed plots and covert proceedings, are qualities
which How Late shares with both The Castle and The Trial. Sartre provides the
formal existential explication of these fictional Kafkan tropes. The Other represents
that which the I cannot control or foresee. Consequently, the Other's look introduces
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an alien unpredictability into one's situation. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre
describes how
It is this unpredictability which Kafka's art attempts to describe in The
Trial and The Castle. In one sense everything K. and the Surveyor are
doing belongs strictly to them in their own right, and so insofar as they
act upon the world the results conform strictly to anticipations; they
are successful acts. But at the same time the truth of these acts
constantly escapes them; the acts have on principle a meaning which is
their true meaning and which neither K. nor the Surveyor will ever
know. Without doubt Kafka is trying here to express the
transcendence of the divine; it is for the divine that the human act is
constituted in truth. But God here is only the Other pushed to the
limit. [...]. That gloomy evanescent atmosphere of The Trial, that
ignorance which, however, is lived as ignorance, that total opacity
which can only be felt as a presentiment across a total translucency -
this is nothing but the description of our being-in-the-midst-of-the-
world-for-others. (BN 265-6)
Where Sartre posits a religious explanation, Kelman in secularising Kafka retains the
look but effectively translates all talk of God into talk of The State. In How Late it is
the state which is the Other "pushed to the limit"; it is the look of the state which
"constitutes" and constricts the individual. With its inaccessible files which contain the
lives of individuals, its discreet monitoring and the prevalent constancy of its gaze, the
State becomes the twentieth century God.
Through its representation of officialdom, Kelman's novel contends with another
familiar aspect ofKafka's fictive world. Sartre describes how "the universe of the
fantastic seems like a bureaucracy"27, and bureaucratic processes present another
source of immural for Samuels. Disclosed primarily by Sammy's contact with the
deeply ambiguous "rep", but additionally in the passages detailing his interviews with
both the DSS and the doctors assigned to assess his case, official procedures are
depicted as mechanisms for controlling and subduing individuals. For Kafka,
bureaucrats "transform living, changing human beings into dead code numbers,
incapable of any change."28 The police who describe Sammy as a "loose end" (HL
27 Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Aminadab, or the Fantastic Considered as a Language', Literary
Essays, p. 64.
28Gustav Janouch, Conversations with Kafka, 1951, trans. Goronwy Rees (London:
Andre Deutsch, 1968), p. 19.
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186) and an "added complication" (HL 200) suggest Sammy's relegation from
subjectivity to objectivity. How Late shares Kafka's conviction that bureaucrats and
state functionaries serve only to delete and restrict individual possibilities; the
procedures which they carry out classify and process, objectify and limit.
The succession of state employees who confront Sammy seem intended to trigger
precisely these Kafkan resonances. Pressured into pursuing a claim, Sammy first
encounters a nameless Preliminary Officer. A long series of questions ensue and then
Samuels, converted now into a case, is referred to a nameless woman, who decides
that Sammy is to be referred to the PDBO (Police Department Benefits Office) who
have a further array of interrogative criteria and so on. This is Kelman's restatement
of the vast impenetrable machinery of Kafka's Court, and also the convoluted
structure of the Gogolian Civil Service depicted in 'The Overcoat'. Having met the
anonymous officials, none ofwhom seem to possess the authority to resolve Sammy's
problems, the rep suddenly appears who seems for no apparent reason to possess all
the details of Sammy's case. Sammy then attends a meeting with Doctor Logan who
describes Sammy's reported situation as "deeply ambiguous" (HL 217). Logan
recounts an earlier report from a Doctor Crozier, suggesting that Sammy
suffers/suffered from a deep anxiety. The doctor concludes that "No one is unique"
(HL 222) thereby explicitly setting himself against Sammy's earlier statement that
"we're all different, we've all got different lives [...] different influences and different
experiences." (HL 59) Logan's language and syntax frequently mimic the obfuscation
which the procedural process induces:
well I dare say that if a claim in respect of a found dysfunction is
allowed then an application in respect of a customer's wants that may
be consistent with the found dysfunction becomes open to discharge by
the appropriate charitable agency. (HL 223-4)
Official jargon distorts and masks, consuming the maximum amount ofwords in
delivering the least amount of sense. Trying to get Sammy to pursue a claim, the rep
advises him of the protocols and procedures necessary for such an action. The rep's
admonition "It's no like going to an ordinary court" (HL 304) repeats almost verbatim
K.'s avowal: "there's no question of this being a trial before an ordinary kind of
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court." (Trial 115). For Sammy, the problem is not with individuals but with the state
which they serve and the processes they are charged with carrying out: "it wasnay a
case ofblaming the sodjers, that was stupit, nay fucking point; it's the system; they
just take their orders." (HL 63). This replicates K.'s contention that the "outward
manifestations", his arrest and the investigation to which he is subject, are only signs
of a "huge organisation". (Trial 62) For Samuels the police and the DSS officials are
only tokens of the state, the anonymous 'they'.
In How Late, the 'they' of the Disability Court operate upon the same system as that
of The Trial.
Ye've got to remember it isnay up to them to find a proof. That's up
to you, cause it's you that's pursuing the claims. They only need to say
they've beat you and that means they can dismiss the case. They're
what ye call an autonomous body, they don't have to account to
authorities higher than themselves - except in the case of the
Chairperson who's always a lay-officer of the cloth. (HL 303)
Reversing the traditional legal dictum of innocent until proven otherwise, this passage
again restates a moment from The Trial and K.s description of "the very highest
Court, which is absolutely inaccessible" (Trial 181). Sammy does not submit a claim,
reasoning that "all their fucking protocols and procedures" are "just how they
suffocate ye." (HL 321)
IfCamus and Kierkegaard generate the thematic content ofA Disaffection, then How
Late is Kelman's most Kafkan novel. Unlike Doyle, Samuels seems to choose to
resolve his condition. Fie chooses to act. Beckett suggests that "The Kafka hero has
coherence of purpose. He's lost, but he's not falling to bits [...] Kafka's form is
classic, it goes on like a steamroller".29 IfDoyle is "falling to bits" then Sammy's
"coherence of purpose" is manifest in his attempt to escape, to become free, and the
novel ends with him achieving this. In The Reprieve, Daniel states that "a man
evaporates without an eye-witness" (R 168). Sammy's 'road to freedom' lies along
29Israel Shenker, 'An Interview with Beckett', New York Times, 5 May 1956, rpt.;
eds. Lawrence Graver and Raymond Federman, Samuel Beckett: The Critical
Heritage (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 146-9, p. 148.
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the same route. At the beginning of the novel, Sammy describes how "the only
fucking way to cope is by disappearing for six or seven hours out of every
twenty-four." (HL 30) Throughout, disappearance remains in Sammy's mind. Sammy
tells how he "once read a story about a guy that vanished. But it was unbelievable."
{HL 255) The 'literal' invisibility described by, presumably, H G Wells, is impossible,
but there are other ways of vanishing.
He could vamoose but if he wanted to. [...] A blind man hits London.
He would get off at Victoria. It was aye a great feeling when ye left
the bus. All the Glasgow accents disappear. As soon as ye step down
onto the ground; everybody merges into the scenery, no looking at one
another. And then ye're anonymous. That was the fucking crack man
know what I'm talking about getting anonymous, that was what it was
all about, getting fucking anonymous; nay cunt giving ye hassle. {HL
255)
Anonymity, which is desired, is achieved through "no looking at one another",
"merging into the scenery". Near the end of the novel Sammy tells how he is
"preparing to vanish" {HL 331) and the novel ends with him "out of sight" {HL 374).
Sammy the character disappears from the novel, and thus from the reader's sight: the
other as reader no longer looks on.
Kelman's text discloses a fundamental paradoxicality. Sammy functions as a modern
Tiresias; a blind man who nevertheless 'sees' the ills of a particular society. In the
watched society described by the novel, the person being observed is blind. As a
realist text, albeit in the Kafkan mode, How Late witnesses a particular form of life
but features a character who cannot witness anything. When the rep asks Sammy if he
is really blind, he simultaneously poses the question on behalf of the reader. The novel
seems to hint that Sammy's blindness is feigned. "But he had decided. Right there and
then. It was here he made the decision and he was smiling." {HL 3) What Sammy
decides is never made explicit but the suggestion may be that he decides to assume the
role of a blind man. It is therefore significant that Sammy repeats this smile when the
story closes. One could therefore read blindness, whether real or not, as one of
Sammy's "wee survival plans": if he is blind then he cannot see himself looked at. If
he can avoid the look then an avenue of freedom opens up. Sammy requires freedom,
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for the notions of visibility and invisibility conjure too the world explored by Ralph
Ellison of the marginal and the neglected. Kelman works to supplement the
significatory possibilities of blindness by adding economic detail to existential thought.
Within How Late, blindness has an additional function in that it serves as an index of
marginalisation, what Martin Milligan terms "visionism" (70)
Blind people have been isolated - pushed into a corner, herded into
special institutions for the blind, and cut off from the mainstream of the
life of their societies - not by their blindness but by the decisions of
sighted people. (61)
Sammy wakes in a corner and his blindness exacerbates his relative poverty - "This
being blind man it meant ye needed dough; ye couldnay just go places." (HL 71) As
Brian Magee highlights
many blind people are relatively immobile, being limited to the confines
of their own room or to a very restricted area. But it would be a
mistake to think of such limitations as being imposed by their
blindness, for such limitations are imposed primarily by their poverty
or lack of support. (206)
The addition of socio-economic detail to ontological questions is Kelman's
characteristic contribution to the existential tradition.
How Late is however Kelman's most optimistic novel. Whilst A Disaffection, The
Busconductor Hines and A Chancer fail to resolve - Doyle remains as disaffected as
when the novel starts, we do not know if Tammas does go to London, Robert Hines
returns to the buses - Samuels achieves his objective, he does escape. And through the
usage of the second person pronoun, Kelman achieves a progression, further
developing and refining what Laura Cumming terms the "formal democracy"30 of his
prose style.





Only specialists or nostalgics now study Sartre [...] many of us who
came to what we naively took to be intellectual maturity [. . .] now
wonder at how innocent, ignorant and uncritical we then were.
Craig Beveridge and Ronald Turnbull, ScotlandAfter
Enlightenment1
Real intellectual analysis forbids calling one side innocent, the other
evil. Indeed the notion of a side is, where cultures are at issue, highly
problematic, since most cultures aren't watertight little packages, all
homogenous, and all either good or evil.
Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual2
'Craig Beveridge and Ronald Turnbull, ScotlandAfter Enlightenment: Image and
Tradition inModern Scottish Culture (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1997), p. 154.
2Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures (London:
Vintage, 1994), p.89.
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The purpose of this thesis has been to establish and demonstrate the ways in which
Kelman constructs and discloses an existential literature. Chapters one and two square
the frame, bringing forth the parameters within which and from which Kelman works.
Then, through analysing particular texts in chapters three, four, five and six, we have
seen how existential philosophy and existential literature inform both the content and
technique of Kelman's novelistic prose. Kelman produces everyday situated fictions,
where focus upon an individual in an individual set of circumstances divulges
universal existential themes such as absurdity, contingency, possibility and,
temporality. Attention to these themes indicates a general thematic, and this thematic
is I have argued, freedom, self-determination. We have seen that Kelman's work is
devoted to the depiction of precarious and problematic freedoms, struggling
freedoms. Given that it is an existential freedom - it relates to individual relationships,
it is .^//-determination - it follows that existentialism, rather than nationalism, is the
source and field ofKelman's politicised aesthetic. With this movement, Kelman's
work conflicts with that of cultural nationalists, in particular Beveridge and Turnbull.
For Beveridge and Turnbull, Scotland has been intellectually colonised by England.
The intellectual traditions and identity of the former have been engulfed, usurped, or
'inferiorised' by the colonial dominancy of the latter. This colonial process is felt to be
particularly acute in philosophy.
Philosophy departments in Scottish universities have become mere
outposts of Anglo-American philosophy; and our intelligentsia seem
entirely ignorant of Scottish philosophers who have resisted the
specialising tendencies of this tradition, its break with philosophy in the
Continental style, and its retreat to issues remote from social and
political life. A central task of cultural nationalism is the recovery of
Scottish cultural practices (like these native philosophical traditions)
which have been submerged by the intelligentsia's adoption ofEnglish
critical modes.3
To combat this imperialism, Beveridge and Turnbull assert that it is necessary to
re-articulate, revive, and turn back to these occluded cultural practices. There is
however a problem here, for even were we to accept that Turnbull and Beveridge
3Craig Beveridge and Ronald Turnbull, The Eclipse ofScottish Culture: Inferiorism
and the Intellectuals (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1989), p. 15.
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construct a valid argument, its soundness is nevertheless compromised, and it is
compromised because as David McCrone points out, the argument only works if
national cultures exist. Kelman's writing, and McCrone's own work, argue that they
do not.
We might, however, ask an altogether more radical set of questions:
Why should there be an obsessive search to find a national identity?
Why is the question even framed this way? Where does it come from?
The answer is that it derives from an older, essentially nationalist
assumption that all societies worthy of the name should have a
distinctive culture. Despite the fairly critical stances taken against
political Nationalism by Scottish intellectuals, this perspective seems to
echo its assumption that Scotland has (or had) a 'national' culture
waiting to be discovered.4
The question is framed this way because Turnbull and Beveridge only see culture in
national terms, they do not see culture as something which individuals might construct
for themselves, and consequently they are committed to seeing cultural conflict as a
conflict between two homogenous national blocs: England and Scotland. They ignore
the local, at least as Kelman understands it, and thus they see self-determination as a
property of a people, but a people qua carriers, tokens, of a national identity.
Authenticity is not then, as in existential writing, a matter of individual
self-responsibility, of the exercise of creative freedom, but is instead something to be
gauged against how well one conforms to preordained cultural patterns. For
Beveridge and Turnbull, the cultural present and the cultural future are to be
measured against, and brought about through, conformity to a tendentious national
cultural past. Either you agree with, or conform to, this picture or you have been
'Anglicised'. It follows then that ifA does not 'fit' this essentialist construction of
identity, then A, whether a person or an intellectual practice, is not 'Scottish', is not
authentic. But this is simply a variation of the 'no-true-Scotsman' fallacy, for it is
designed to remove troublesome exceptions by recasting or manipulating essentialist
definitions. Beveridge and Turnbull simply fail to see that within any given country, an
individual, or a group of individuals, might adopt a particular philosophical approach,
or a particular conception of philosophical method, purely because it is felt, or
^Understanding Scotland: The Sociology ofa Stateless Nation, p. 190.
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reasoned to be, a better conceptual or explanatory tool. In particular, they suggest
that if an 'English' thought model is adopted then this is an instance of cultural
imperialism; if a 'Continental' model is adopted, then this is an example of fruitful
conversation and mutually enriching intellectual interplay. Thus they operate a
philosophical customs' point where a crude check - Continental equals 'good';
English equals 'bad' - determines what philosophies may be admitted into 'Scotland'.
Crucially however, this performs at an individual level precisely what it seeks to
combat at a national level, for it colonises, in Kelman's sense of the term. It colonises,
for it restricts individual freedom by calling for that individual to adopt, maintain, and
valorize a pre-cast national cultural form. In seeking to make identity a product of
national difference, Beveridge and Turnbull eradicate difference at the level of the
individual: nations are culturally different, but the individuals within them, in order to
be authentic, should all partake and exhibit this supposedly homogenous culture. The
individual ought to adopt a cultural practice simply because he or she is contingently
born within the contingent geographical space in which these contingent cultural
practices arose. This is simply intellectual bad faith. Kelman shows that one can insist
upon cultural validity, resist colonisation and remain authentic without multiplying
entities, without conjuring the national. Instead, Kelman premises and locates
questions of identity and culture upon and within an individual, in a concrete, local,
and processional culture. Culture, like the individual existential self, can always be
changed, it is neither static nor finalised. According to McCrone, the task then is "not
to identify the unique Scottish experience, but to address the universal condition
through day-to-day (Scottish) reality." (193) For this sentence to describe Kelman's
work, all that is required is the erasure or suspension of the bracketed 'Scottish'; all
that is required is the existential.
The importance of philosophy to Kelman is evident from a letter to Edinburgh Review
in which he protests over the then impending closure of the philosophy department at
Strathclyde University. "If the study of philosophy leads to anything it is to
philosophising itself, of raising the fundamental question, the 'truth' which is taken for
granted, that basic premise we sense intuitively to be wrong"5. This quotation sources
'James Kelman, 'Letters', Edinburgh Review, no 83 (1990), 157.
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Kelman's conception within a practice of critical philosophy. Philosophy exists to
empower the individual "to challenge the foundations of truth", and to "question at
the level most likely to frighten authority." The precise type of question which
philosophy raises is made explicit in Kelman's foreword to George Davie's The
Scottish Enlightenment and Other Essays:
Do people have the fundamental right to freedom? By what authority
does one person, or a group of people control another? Is there a case
for assuming responsibility over the social and spiritual life of other
adults? When does 'teaching' become colonization? Can one culture
ever be 'better' than another? Is the attempt to deny your right to
exploit me 'unconstitutional'?6
As Kelman notes, these questions are at once political as well as philosophical.
Through articulating such points, Kelman enters what might be termed the tradition of
the committed intellectual. Kelman declines both the aristocratism inherent in the
thought ofKierkegaard, Nietzsche and Ortega y Gasset, and the apoliticality and
ethical vacuum in Heidegger7, adopting instead an altogether more engaged and
politicised attitude. Philosophy is a critical tool. In this he resembles Camus, Sartre,
de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty, but also Foucault, Chomsky and Edward Said.
Kelman's commitment reveals itself through his work on behalf of the victims of
asbestosis, the rights ofKurdish refugees, his pamphlet highlighting the plight of the
steel industry in Scotland, and his Guardian article following the murder of Stephen
Lawrence.8 Whilst all ofKelman's work can be positioned within a general
commitment to freedom, the range ofKelman's extra-fictional concerns propels his
work into an area familiar from Sartre, Said and perhaps above all Noam Chomsky9.
6James Kelman, 'Foreword' in George Davie, The Scottish Enlightenment and Other
Essays (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1991), [n.p ],
7I intend here the Heidegger ofBeing and Time. Heidegger did of course make an
infamous incursion into the political, but whether National Socialism makes itself
apparent in this work is an ongoing and moot point.
8See 'A BriefNote on the War Being Waged by the State Against the Victims of
Asbestosis' in Some Recent Attacks, pp.59-63; 'Into Barbarism', The Guardian, 22
September 1995, p. 19; Fightingfor Survival: The Steel Industry in Scotland
(Glasgow: Clydeside Press, 1990).
9See in particular Jean-Paul Sartre, 'A Plea for Intellectuals' in Between
Existentialism andMarxism, pp.228-285; Edward Said, Representations of the
Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures (London: Vintage, 1994) and Chomsky's
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All work against the 'cult of the expert', thus Kelman's approval ofGeorge Davie's
idiosyncratic account of'Scottish' thought in The Democratic Intellect is valued not
because it is 'Scottish', but because it advances a claim for a generalist education
centred around the study of philosophy. Again, it is the idea which counts, not its
geographical origin.
Kelman's position is though not without its own problems. For whilst Kelman
enshrines cultural validity, his claim that this validity extends equally to all cultures
seems problematic. If every culture is valid then are the criticisms directed at his work
from Rabbi Neuberger, Howard Jacobson or Simon Wheeler 'valid'? Does a racist
culture have the right to exist? Here a problem common to existential philosophies
arises, for if freedom entails or demands a complete lack of fetters in the process of
self-determination, then there seems to be no position from where a conflict of
freedoms might be resolved. To redeem this, existential thought tends not to adhere
to its foundational and individualistic principles. Both Kelman and Sartre have to
introduce a Kantian component, a categorical imperative, whereby people are free
only in so far as their exercise of freedom does not impinge upon others. Freedom to
and freedom from rub against each other. It is not however clear how freedom can be
thus regulated. A similar problem infects the anarchist tradition to which Kelman
relates himself. The traditional arbiter of individual conflict is the state but in an
anarchic society, or a mode of thought based upon an anarchist position, this referee
is necessarily absent. Secondly, existential identity is individual identity yet Kelman
tends to move between the individual and the group, between an I and a class, a we,
without ever explaining the route traversed to get there. As John Macquarrie10
highlights, a philosophy with a predominance of the social hardly qualifies as
existential. Yet it remains unclear how Kelman can be an existentialist and yet effect
this shift. Finally, as Douglas Dunn" points out, Kelman dismisses too briefly those
writers with whom he disagrees. He never quite gets around to explaining precisely
American Power and the NewMandarins (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969),
pp.246-290.
"'John Macquarrie, Existentialism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973).
"Douglas Dunn, 'I'm right, and good, you're bad', Times Literary Supplement, 1
January 1993, p.5.
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what is at fault in the writing ofWaugh, Larkin or Kingsley Amis. Dunn writes that
Kelman's "differentiation of "good writer" and "bad writer" is essentially moral, and
morality is to a large extent associated with the political convictions which Kelman
finds obvious and necessary." (ibid.) Kelman tends to dismiss English literature en
bloc, precisely the sort of totalising or essentialising move one would expect an
existentialist to reject. An assertion such as "There is just no question that Joseph
Conrad was a racist" (SRA 9) is also problematic. Kelman's sole evidence for this is
Chinua Achebe and yet as Cedric Watts points out in his introduction to a selection of
Conrad's tales, the position is not shared by other African writers.12 As Dunn records,
it is possible to be a bad person and yet a good artist. Dunn's example is Larkin, but
perhaps more apposite here would be Dostoevsky, Knut Hamsun and Celine, or
philosophically, Heidegger.
These criticisms however are fissures rather than chasms. What is important about
Kelman's existentialism is that is re-circulates these questions, it forces, in the
Sartrean manner, questions of freedom to arise. In so doing it redraws that which
Foucault saw washed away upon a nameless beach in the sixties. Significantly,
Kelman's writing occurs over a span when Sartre is once again a subject of serious
academic investigation13. In a volume of essays analysing Sartre's contribution to
twentieth-century thought, one of the editors, Jean-Fran?ois Fournay writes
it is the subject, which the New Novel and poststructuralism wanted so
badly to erase once and for all, that is returning. [. . .] The subject
discussed these days is not of course the European, male, bourgeois
subject of thirty years ago. What I am referring to is a renewed
concern through various approaches for a subjectivity once deemed
dead. The collapse of communism and the threat of neo-fascism across
the world have once again brought the very old question of individual
freedom to the fore. Whatever was said during the seventies about the
absence of absolutes and the impossibility of freedom and justice, the
12Watts mentions that the African writers Lewis Nkosi and Mathew Buyu both read
Heart ofDarkness as a criticism of racism. Cedric Watts, 'Introduction' in Joseph
Conrad, Heart ofDarkness and Other Tales (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1990), pp.vii-xxiii, p.xvii
BSee for instance George Steiner, 'The last philosopher?: Generosity, bad faith and
heroism in the torrential lifework of Jean-Paul Sartre', Times Literary Supplement,
May 19 2000, pp.3-4.
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fact remains that all persons, sophisticated or simple, male or female,
Caucasian, Asian, or people ofAfrican descent, do know freedom and
lack of freedom, justice and injustice, fairness and oppression when
they see them [.. .].14
This is, I would suggest, why Kelman finds an existential position so appealing:
these problems of individual freedom constitute the matter of Kelman's writing.
I close by indicating some avenues of study which are, were, beyond the remit of this
thesis. I have sought to describe the relation between Kelman and the existential
tradition, this has meant that I have neglected various writers whom Kelman picks out
and praises: Lu Hsun, Isaac Loeb Peretz, Sadaat Hasan Manto. Future work might
evolve through assessing a possible relation between these authors and Kelman's
existentially inspired anti-colonialism. Also, in stressing the existential basis of
Kelman's writing, I have had little occasion to point to a relation with anarchism.
Thus a further work would involve an investigation of anarchist literature, and how
Kelman's existential texts reflect, refract, or build upon anarchist thought models.
Proper consideration of these would however constitute another thesis, the present
one has reached its end.
14Jean-Franfois Fourny, 'From a Post-Imperial Point of View', in eds. Jean-Francis
Fourny and Charles D Minahen, Situating Sartre in Twentieth-Century Thought and
Culture (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 1-10, p. 1-2.
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